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ABSTRACT
In 2009, the Government Accountability Office reported that two-thirds of major
weapon systems acquisition programs were required to report budget overruns and were
almost two years behind schedule for delivery of capability to the warfighters. The
Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States asked the same question:
"How do we fix DOD acquisition?"
The Acquisition system has been studied nearly continuously for more than forty
years. Applying traditional system engineering methods have not improved performance,
but developed a highly-complex bureaucracy that is viewed as inflexible, unscalable,
unreliable, and (recently) unsustainable. With this seemingly intractable challenge, this
work uses the synergy of integrating approaches based on engineering, management, and
social sciences to develop a new framework to help understand the policy resistance of
many previous unsuccessful initiatives.
This research seeks to develop a dynamic enterprise engineering system framework
using case study methodology to integrate three widely adopted but disparate frameworks
by evaluating the influence relationships. Informed by the enterprise architecture, this
new framework seeks to incorporate stakeholder salience and its dynamic influence on
value creation as an endogenous factor in the context of the bureaucratic program
enterprise of DOD acquisition. This work not only proposes an intermediate level theory
but also provides insights for policy implications.
Thesis Supervisor: Deborah Nightingale, Ph.D.
Title: Professor of the Practice of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
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I Introduction
1.1 Current Challenges of Defense Acquisition
1.1.1 Fiscal Realities
During the final stages of the submission of the 2009 Federal Budget by the
Executive Branch to Congress, Department of Defense (DOD) Major Acquisition
Programs came under scrutiny as, subsequently, several DOD programs were reduced or
cancelled. The U.S. Army's Future Combat System was cancelled - its largest and most
complex acquisition effort since the simultaneous acquisition of the "Big Five": the
Abrams Tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Helicopter, the Blackhawk
Helicopter, and the PATRIOT air defense artillery system.
This 2009 budget decision followed a decade of well-publicized technical and
political challenges to the defense acquisition program. At its inception, the Future
Combat System (FCS) was bestowed with the Army leadership's wholehearted support.
In 1999, then Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Ken Shinseki sought sufficient funding
to create "irreversible momentum" for the program (Shinseki 1999). The program
incorporated the most advanced technical methodologies to support program
management and engineering efforts. However, this combination of institutional and
technical momentum still proved to be insufficient to withstand the dynamics that have
inhibited DOD acquisition. The Government Accountability Office has persistently cited
systemic DOD acquisition issues (GAO 2001; GAO 2004; GAO 2006; GAO 2008;
GAO 2009).
The Army and the other defense services have been aware of these perceived
shortcomings in program management. The Assistant Secretary of the Army -
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology commissioned a study to improve the
management systems to inform key decisions and oversight of acquisition programs
(Higbee and Ordonio 2005). This study merged two different approaches, a purely
technical program management perspective and a holistic "program health" overview.
The resulting Army Probability of Success management system has been adapted in other
services.
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1.2 Probability of Success Management System
1.2.1 Internal
The technical approach to program management identified factors related to the
research, design, engineering and production of a program: program requirements,
program resources and program execution (Higbee 2006).
These factors were then represented in qualitative assessments arrayed into
subcategory metrics. Examples of these metrics would include number of requirement
changes, current and planned financial resources, Earned Value Management scores for
developers, and other quantitative measurements. These metrics then supported
assessments of the program's probability for success, reflecting issues of cost, schedule,
and performance. However, the Probability of Success system considers more than just
these technical issues.
1.2.2 External
Unlike traditional program assessment, the Probability of Success System assesses a
program's Fit into Capability/Vision and the Program Advocacy. Program Fit into
Capability Vision indicates how well a program integrates into and contributes to the
synergy for major DOD initiatives such as Transformation, Interoperability,
Jointness/Other, and Army plans for current and future force designs. On the other hand,
Program Advocacy accounts for the influence of parties outside the Army on the
program's success.
1.2.3 Program Advocacy
This final consideration captures the perceptions about the program by organizations
outside the program office or its support contractors. Interestingly, while the resolution of
the two approaches resulted in the inclusion of this last factor, the significance of this
non-traditional factor intensified. As all the factors were weighted, Program Advocacy
received the highest weighting value with a quarter of the total possible points. This may
seem an intuitive allocation in hindsight; it was indeed a significant departure from the
leadership's traditional evaluations of programs. This departure represents a dramatic
shift from managing tasks to managing program enterprises. Leaders are now accounting
for the influences of the following organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, War Fighters (Combatant Commanders), Army Leadership, Congress (and
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staffers), Industry, International parties (for allies or potential Foreign Military Sales).
These influences are assessed through the established management archetype of the U.S.
government - bureaucracy.
1.3 Two Perspectives Identify Issues
Since the establishment of the DOD in 1947, DOD acquisition leaders have faced
their challenges primarily by attempting to improve the acquisition process or to manage
the institutional influence (loosely referred to as politics) on defense acquisitions. As the
following discussion indicates, recent senior leaders have concentrated primarily on
improving the process, then as conditions required, they attempting to manage
institutional influences as conditions required
1.3.1 Senior Leadership Perspective
An unprecedented event occurred in 2009: Secretary of Defense Gates preempted
the President's budget submission to Congress by conducting a press conference to
present the DOD's Budget. The Secretary specifically targeted several large weapon
system programs. Not only did Secretary Gates cite specific justifications for halting the
programs, but he also chastised the Defense Acquisition efforts in general:
Entrenched attitudes throughout the government are particularly pronounced in
the area of acquisition: a risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial
interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability,
and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense and
between DOD and other parts of the government. (Gates 2009)
These comments dramatize the challenges of balancing the technical process of
acquisition and the institutional influence of the various organizations that participate
directly and indirectly in the acquisition effort. The Secretary cited these specific
technical issues: a litigious process, budget churn and instability, excessive and changing
requirements. The Secretary also cited non-technical institutional issues: a risk-averse
culture, parochial interests, and adversarial relationships within DOD.
Secretary Gates continued to discuss the status of Acquisition by sharing his
frustration in addressing these challenges: "Since the end of World War II, there have
been nearly 130 studies on these problems - to little avail." (2009) The Secretary's
concerns seem to dismiss any need for further research on acquisition problems. While
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not all of the studies are publicly available, several of the significant studies have been
published by prominent researchers.
1.3.2 Chronology of Research and Practice
A survey of these publications reveals a trend. As the Services reconstituted
themselves following the Vietnam War and focused on the Eastern European region to
wage the Cold War, the economics of producing war-fighting systems dominated the
analytical community (Fox 1974). Analysis of alternative system produced efficient
frontiers for decomposing doctrine into roles for the functional battlefield operating
systems. These trade-spaces could be explored with rigor and decisions could be made
based on facts and empirical analysis by each of the services.
In anticipation of the Reagan "build-up," researchers started to look at defense
industry dynamics and identified policy options at the DOD level, above the services
(Gansler 1980). Ensuing tension across the different organizations was readily apparent
nearly a decade later as researchers looked at the roles and responsibilities (Wilson 1989).
Additionally, enforcement of Goldwater-Nichols Act affected many branches of
government, with integrated services under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inter-service
operational commands defined by region and function, a Central Command, and a
Special Forces Command for unifying the special forces units of individual services.
(Hadley 1986) These organizational relationships were interesting to researchers and
provided new insights into how the DOD operated, especially with regard to acquisition
efforts (Wilson 1989). As the decade ended, the defense world seemed to have
diminished with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the cessation of the Cold War.
As military historians argued with political scientists about the end of history
(Fukuyama 1992) or the future of war (Toffler and Toffler 1993), Army leaders sought to
leverage the exponential advances in information technology to preserve capabilities
developed from the successful acquisition during the build-up. (Sullivan and Harper
1996) This work recognized the possible benefits of advanced command and control
approaches through information technology and acknowledged the institutional
influences of organizations, such as dynamics presented in research of learning
organizations (Senge 1990). Nevertheless, the interest in the physics of war-fighting
seemed to attract less attention than new opportunities in information and command
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(Metz and Kievit 1995). Civilian and military leaders sought to replicate the revolution
in information technology based in business affairs in the military, both the operational
forces and in the Army's force-generating organizations.
In his keynote speech, Chief-of-Staff, General Shinseki (Shinseki 1999) outlined his
vision for transforming the operational forces to ensure that operations other than war
could be fielded within a "full-spectrum" combat force. Likewise, the logistical "tail"
that supports the operational forces would be reengineered to sustain the future force's
effectiveness and improve their efficiency. This vision was unparalleled in its complexity
and risk due to technology's maturity levels, schedules, and costs. However, for an Army
at peace without a peer competitor, all of its resources could be dedicated toward this
imperative.
Not quite two years later, the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11, 2001. Then
less than a year later, the U.S. Army was fully engaged in two theaters. Internal DOD
tension was inevitable - especially the tensions between resource allocations to support
for the ongoing conflicts or investments in the next generation of weapon systems. This
was intensified by the significant changes proposed in the future force as it leveraged the
full complement of "levers" (i.e., doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities) to provide envisioned capabilities. Controversial issues among
the functional branches (Infantry, Armor, etc.), units, and functional staffs ranged from
headgear (berets vs. caps) to vehicle types (wheels vs. tracks) and ultimately the mission
(high-intensity vs. low-intensity conflict). As this vision was implemented into its
supporting objectives by subordinate organizations with their respective bureaucratic
responsibilities, the transformational dynamics were diluted to evolutionary increments.
As evidence of this, one of the major efforts was to improve the strategic deployability of
the force. The division, the standard force package for the Army, was deemed too large
and too heavy for rapid deployment. A new construct that leveraged the anticipated
capabilities generated by the future combat system was the "unit of action." This
brigade-size element was to have the footprint of about a third of a division but have the
force-presence of the division. After planners, analysts, and respective branches added
their requisite people and equipment, the unit of action nearly doubled the brigade size.
This 50 percent reduction in size and equipment may seem impressive. However, the
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non-direct fire systems that were usually attached at division level now were re-allocated
to a separate unit of action headquarters; consequently, two units of action - a division
combat unit and a non-direct fire systems unit not directly allocated to the division - still
were required to deploy for combat operations.
After his recall from retirement in 2003, the new Army Chief of Staff, Peter J.
Schoomaker assessed the status of the transition to the future force. Aware of the
technical challenges occurring with the system development, Schoomaker focused on
organizational approaches to generate capability. With the operations intensifying in Iraq,
units were now rotating to sustain the necessary capabilities by using the Army's new
Army Force Generation Model, championed by the Forces Command Commanding
General Dan Kelly McNeill. This cycling of units demanded that Army leaders shift from
the principle of war that the cold war favored - mass - to the principle of economy of
force. These principles are not mutually exclusive or inversely related, as may appear on
initial inspection: Economy of force typically allows a commander to mass his forces at
the appropriate location while balancing his vulnerabilities in non-critical areas. The
leadership not only recognized the principle of economy of force in terms of geography,
but also in the dimension of time. Strategically, the Army had to sustain its production of
capabilities. The need to cycle units, that is, respond to an active Army's more rapid
deployment, led to the identification of modular (i.e., "plug and play") unit characteristics
of units.
After nearly a decade, the Army has accomplished it conversion of brigades to the
unit of action: these transitioned units are now designated as Brigade Combat Teams. The
necessary standardization for integrating modular systems continues to be a challenge,
but command agreements help to mitigate the situation. However, after the FCS
program's initial budget of $92 billion grew to (by some estimates) $200 billion and its
vehicles drew criticism for technological flaws and unresponsiveness to the lessons of
combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was cancelled (Shachtman 2009) along with other
major defense systems in 2009 as part of the DOD budget submission. This was not a
surprise for anyone acquainted with recent studies of the acquisition system.
While most acquisition decisions focused on the required performance of the
defense systems to be developed, DOD enacted a number of policy changes to strengthen
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the acquisition process and leverage recommended system engineering solutions. These
policy changes included replacing requirements that seemed to trap developers into
infeasible solution sets - or that prohibited innovative approaches - with capabilities that
addressed the needs. Other initiatives redistributed program risk through changes in
contract vehicles on a cost-plus rather than fixed-cost basis. To comply with legislation
that required the establishment of professional military acquisition officers, the
hierarchies of the program offices were filled with leaders who had been professionally
developed specifically to manage the programs and execute the acquisition process.
Further, these program offices were relocated directly under the service secretaries to
ensure direct visibility and influence of the senior civilian leaders. Yet with all these
significant policy changes, recent assessments indicate defense programs are
experiencing increasing challenges and difficulties. A recent GAO report to congress by
the Government Accountability Office, nearly two-thirds of the major acquisition
programs were required to report cost over-runs. This is significant: A program is not
required to report a cost over-run unless the amount of increase is greater than 50% of the
baseline cost. Schedule is also significant: An average of nearly 23 months delay in
providing initial capability (GAO 2009) . Leading researchers claim that policies that
correct only the technical aspects of the Acquisition effort lack the holistic influence
needed to improve acquisition (Sapolsky et al. 2009) .
1.4 Thesis Purpose
1.4.1 Domain Contributions
This research provides new insights regarding the sources of the acquisition issues
that have been identified by Secretary Gates and other senior leaders. This study
integrates previous competitive perspectives on the nature of the issues. It applies
existing theory from multiple disciplines and generates new propositions to enable the
greater community to understand the phenomena observed in the context of Army
Acquisition.
1.4.2 Theoretical Contributions
This study identifies synergies among multiple disciplines and explains gaps or
contradictions within accepted bodies of literature. While the next chapter will present
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the review of existing literature, it provides presents the logic relating theory and practice
to identify the gaps where contributions are necessary.
In order to answer one fundamental research question: "How does stakeholder
salience influence value creation in a bureaucratic program enterprise?" this work
provides a provisional theory by proposing new framework for linking the dynamic
relationships that influence the acquisition enterprise. This framework will integrate two
well known and accepted, and previously unrelated, frameworks for stakeholder salience
(Mitchell et al. 1997) and value-creation (Murman et al. 2002). In order to establish this
relationship, this work develops relationships by extending the Stakeholder Salience
framework beyond identification and categorization of stakeholders, but establishes
influence relationships of salience attributes to the perceived interactions of the
stakeholders in the enterprise. This work also extends the Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise
Architecture Views (Nightingale, 2004; Rhodes, 2009) and integrates these views into
this Dynamic Enterprise Engineering Systems framework.
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation
The outline of the dissertation will with this introduction provide the motivation for
the research effort. Chapter 2 presents a review of the acquisition system in its current
state and significant research efforts to help address the challenges. This chapter also
reviews multiple disciplines that provide theoretical constructs that have been used or
provide insights to the theoretical overlaps or gaps. This chapter also reviews multiple
disciplines that provide theoretical constructs that have been used or provide insights to
the theoretical overlaps or gaps, and traces the emergence of the value creation approach
from Enterprise Engineering Systems as a means close the theoretical gaps, notably for
application in defense acquisition enterprises.
To establish a basis for comparison of the existing and potential, the state of the







Figure 1-1 Current Program Enterprise Theoretical Basis
In the current defense acquisition process, Systems Engineering principles drive
program management methods. However, based on findings in the multidisciplinary
literature survey presented in Chapter 2, the following "closed loop" framework for






Figure 1-2 Proposed Program Enterprise Stakeholder Salience Influence
In Fig. 1-2, the open loop in Fig. 1-1 is modified to a closed-loop framework that
includes value creation and enterprise architecture and allows for dynamic relationships
among the three elements in the loop, and allows for varied stakeholders with
significantly different purposes for their enterprise activity. These form the basis for the
overarching research question.
Research Question: How does stakeholder salience influence value
creation in a bureaucratic program enterprise?
Based on the literature review and the research question, the following initial
propositions are considered to focus the research:
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Proposition 1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise
program value creation process.
Proposition 2: The program enterprise architecture influence stakeholder
salience attributes.
Chapter 3 develops the research methodology and associated logic based on the
overarching research question and the initial set of propositions, Chapter 4 the first case,
followed by the other two cases selected in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 7 presents the
cross-case analysis. Chapter 8 examines the value of the provisional theory in terms of
the policy implications within the research domain. Chapter 9 provides a brief summary
of the research, identifies future opportunities for research, and provides some concluding
thoughts about this effort.
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2 Defense Acquisition Analysis and Approaches
2.1 Literature Overview
The evolving literature of defense acquisition provides concepts and terms crucial to
investigating the cases presented in this study, synthesizing the results, and considering
how to close the gap between theoretical and practical approaches to optimizing defense
acquisition, and developing the arguments for further work. This chapter presents a
survey of the literature used in this report along with key terms and concepts that relate to
ensuing chapters.
This overview begins with the existing Department of Defense acquisition approach
termed the Lifecycle Management Framework. Using an overview graphic, the level of
procedural control is evident.
To formalize the analysis, this work adopts the multi-discipline approach of
engineering systems by drawing from the fields of engineering, management, and social




* Organization Theory and Bureaucracy
By contrasting and comparing these theories, an integrated framework is proposed
for Program Enterprise Stakeholder Salience Influence.
2.2 Lifecycle Management Framework
The current result of efforts to systematically optimize DOD acquisition is most
commonly shown rather than defined (Figure 2-1). It should be noted that the term
lifecycle management is gradually replacing the term acquisition.
The depiction of lifecycle management in Figure 2-1 strongly conveys a sense of
the complexity that can be expected during an acquisition program's lifecycle. For each
process step, there are explicit entry and exit criteria with specified deliverables in terms
of the system's maturity and organizational management information.
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As the elements shown in Fig. 2-1 are the result of the decomposition of the
necessary process steps, Fig. 2-1 presents the high-level activities:
Figure 2-2 High-Level DOD Lifecycle Management Framework
This graphic is a good high-level representation of the lifecycle management
activities. Based on the user needs (e.g., a combatant commander recognizes an inability
of the force to accomplish a certain task to standard) and available technology maturity,
the services constantly perform capability analysis to identify gaps and potential solutions
while considering multiple perspectives: doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). The Milestone Decision Authority
(MIDA) serves as the decision maker responsible for considering all DOTMLPF elements
to ensure a holistic overall solution is achieved. While the overall solution requires
blending each DOTMLPF element, some may be weighted more heavily. This research
effort focuses on materiel-weighted solutions but takes into account the interactions with
other DOTMLPF elements.
Three decision points mark milestones in the lifecycle management framework.
The decision for the validation of a solution that includes either primary or auxiliary
materiel solution is a Milestone A decision.
In conjunction with identifying the capability need for the material solution, an
assessment of the technology readiness is conducted. Based on an assessment of the
readiness for implementation in the materiel solution, demonstrations are conducted and
reported to ensure that technological risks are mitigated. With the successful
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demonstration of sufficient technology readiness, the MDA approves the Milestone B
decision.
At this point, the material solution transitions from a "good idea" to a program of
record with dedicated infrastructure and organization. The program of record is assigned
to a Program Manager (PM) in a Program Executive Office (PEO) to manage the
acquisition process activity. The PM not only leads the coordination of the engineering
and manufacturing development activities according to the seemingly infinite statutes,
policies and regulations, but also serves as the principle coordinator for both intra- and
inter-service coordination teams, as required, and service-industry teams. This effort has
been summarized as "trying to deliver the necessary capabilities to the war-fighter
without ending your career and/or going to jail" during discussion with senior acquisition
executives (Matty 2008). Once a limited-rate production has validated both performance
and cost, the decision for full-rate production is given by the MDA for the milestone C
decision. This results in the fielding and deployment for the material to units as planned
and transition into the sustainment phase of the lifecycle. After the completion of the
production and deployment and the start of the transition to the sustainment phase -- and
depending on the approach for technology upgrades -- the program may be transitioned to
a Product Manager (still aligned under a PM) to ensure coordination and management
until system retirement.
Thus, the phasing of activities is program-centric, though DOTMLPF elements play
into the solution. Every acquisition management system uses the program as the unit of
analysis for aggregating management metrics, assessments, and feedback. In turn, the
goal for the Army acquisition community is to ensure that all programs meet the
quintessential system engineering metrics of cost, schedule and performance plan to
ensure capability delivery.
2.3 Prominence of Systems Engineering
2.3.1 Background and Current State
One of the common texts provides a definition for Systems Engineering:
"Systems Engineering is management technology to assist and support policy making,
planning, decision making, and associated resource allocation or action deployment."
(Sage 1992)
2-4
From its early development and adoption by the defense services at the conclusion
of World War II, systems engineering has grown to be the fundamental discipline to
shape defense acquisition (Grady 1995). Not only was systems engineering touted as
having the capability to identify and integrate numerous complex requirements to support
warfighter needs, the disciplined approach allowed for the integration of decomposed
work structures in various locations and different organizations across the country
working to develop materiel solutions. Eventually the DOD systems engineering process
was standardized with a military standard, MIL-STD-499. In accordance with
established regulations and policies, all systems were required to comply with this
approach (DOD 1969). However, in 1994, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry
issued a policy memorandum barring the use of military specifications and standards on
DOD acquisition programs. Without a commercial systems engineering standard, the
community of practice for systems engineering operated in good faith using the previous
military standard as a baseline, while seeking to improve this technical process. As a
result, a number of variations resulted in the practice of systems engineering and became
increasingly fragmented across the DOD and its industry partners (Redshaw 2010).
However, support for Systems Engineering was reaffirmed in the latest DOD policy
documents:
"Systems engineering provides the integrating technical processes to
define and balance system performance, cost, schedule, and risk within a
family-of-systems and systems-of-systems context." (DOD 1969)
2.3.2 Systems Engineering Critical Aspects
Based on the high-level and detailed systems engineering based acquisition process,
there are three canonical phases: definition, development, and deployment (Sage and
Armstrong 1999). The definition phase focuses on requirements, specifications, and
preliminary conceptual design. The transition to the development phase, facilitated by
the logical design and architecting, allows for detailed design and testing. The system
begins to take physical reality with operational implementation, operational testing and
evaluation and finally operation and maintenance (Sage 1992). As is often the case,
continued research of engineering methodology has enriched this open-loop, phased
approach for a richer engineering approach.
2-5
2.3.3 Engineering Systems
Multiple papers introduce the vocabulary of the field of Engineering Systems used
in this study (Allen et al. 2004; deNeufville 2002; Moses 2004; Whitney et al. 2004).
Moses (2004) identifies several features that distinguish Engineering Systems from other
engineering fields:
e Emphasis on non-traditional properties: flexibility, scalability, safety, durability,
sustainability, reliability, recyclability, maintainability, quality
* System characteristics: complexity, uncertainty, emergence, systems architecture
e System context: engineering systems, enterprise, societal-level
One of the primary focuses of this field is understand the system characteristics of
which much can be ascertained by studying the influence of system architecture. System
architecture is defined as "an abstract description of the entities of a system and the
relationships between those entities," which is especially vital as "complex systems have
behaviors and properties that no subsets of their elements have." (Whitney et al. 2004)
This statement points out the contradiction prevalent in many applications of system
engineering methods: the functional analysis, based on the deconstructionist approach,
can define system performance through mutually exclusive, orthogonal functional
decomposition. This consideration of system boundaries was prevalent in the efforts to
consider the system dynamics of industries (Forrester 1961) and the explicit
categorization of the system variables as endogenous, exogenous, or excluded (Sterman
2000).
The research that helped to develop this emerging field not only extends the field of
engineering, but also integrates management and social science to produce a holistic
theoretical contribution useful in capability analyses that integrate DOTMLPF solutions.
2.3.4 Enterprise Architecture Research
One of the primary domains in which Engineering Systems has "changed the world"
is the study of extended enterprises (Womack et al. 1991). Nightingale and Rhodes
(2004) state that "Enterprises are complex, highly integrated systems comprised of
processes, organizations, information and supporting technologies, with multifaceted
interdependencies and interrelationships across their boundaries." These views have
been integrated to form a holistic enterprise architecture framework. (Rhodes et al. 2009)
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. This enterprise architecture is comprised of seven views. The views and their
definition are provided in the following table.
Table 2-1. Ente prise Architecture Framework Views (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004)
View Description
Strategy The goals, vision and direction objectives of the enterprise with an
emphasis on the business model and competitive environment
External Factors The external regulatory, political and societal environments in which the
and Policies enterprise operates
Process The lifecycle, enabling and leadership processes by which the enterprise
creates value for its stakeholders
Organization The organizational structure as well as the relationships, culture, behaviors,
and boundaries between individuals, teams and organizations
Knowledge The implicit and tacit knowledge, capabilities, intellectual property
collectively in the enterprise
Infrastructure/ The physical layer of the enterprise including real estate, facilities.
Infostructure etc., as well as the network systems and technologies needed to
ensure resource availability.
Product/Services The product architectures and the service architecture of the
enterprise, including services as a primary objective or in support of
products.
The work to understand a holistic systems approach for enterprise architecting,
engineering and analysis has a rich provenance from other thought leaders as well.
One of the most influential researchers, educators, and practitioners of systems
analysis was Russell Ackoff (Ackoff 1967; Ackoff 1981; Ackoff et al. 2006). After
championing the inter-disciplinary approaches that lead to great successes and
widespread adoption of the field of operations research (Ackoff and Rivett 1963), he
continued to look at the synergy of scientific approaches to generate theory and apply this
to address management challenges. One of Ackoff s key emphases was the appropriate
perspective of the firm. While this work explicitly extends the analysis beyond the firm,
it implicitly attempts to draw a defined boundary around this system with the term
corporation, it proposes using an organization view based on the tenets that "an
organization is a purposeful system, that is part of one or more purposeful systems, and
parts of which, people, have purposes of their own." (1981) As a graphical
representation of this view of the corporation, the following figure is provided.
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Figure 2-3 Corporation as an Organization (Ackoff 1981)
Several important characteristics should be noted in Ackoffs representation (Fig. 2-
3): circles that represent the various categories of stakeholders, the stakeholders do not
exchanges with other stakeholders, and the exchanges occur through the element of the
corporation. This also establishes several implicit assumptions: the corporation is the
center of the system interactions, the exchanges are explicitly defined (i.e., with money
flowing only from the corporation to the suppliers), the list of stakeholders is explicit, and
these stakeholders have generalized attributes (i.e., the same government for all
corporations).
Continued work to develop a rich systems understanding are codified in the work to
provide aerospace support for warfighters in U.S. Air Force acquisition efforts (Murman
et al. 2002). Among critical contributions derived from this work is the introduction of a
hierarchy that provides for three levels of enterprise: program, multi-program, and
national/international. This is directly insightful for the context of this work within the
Army acquisition efforts because the enterprise levels correspond organizationally to the
Army Program Manager, Program Executive Office, and Secretariat Oversight. Murman
makes the primary argument that enterprises exist to create value for all stakeholders.
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Accordingly, the enterprise objective is not only to meet the value proposition for the
customer (e.g., warfighter), but also to meet the value proposition for all other
stakeholders (e.g., employees, suppliers, etc.) This also gives rise to the Value Creation
Framework.
2.3.5 Value Creation Framework
The value creation framework was developed based on the analysis of the several
enterprises within the Aerospace International Enterprise.
Identification Proposition Delivery
Figure 2-4 Value Creation Framework (Murman et al. 2002)
In studying the cases presented in Chapters 3-6 with a view to Murman's work, a
framework emerged from the "lifecycle value" concept. Murman provides key indicators
of a strong systems engineering basis. Moreover, the three phases he names extend the
technical process focus of systems engineering into the socio-technical realm:
Definition (identification). Most methodologies applied during the definition
phase of systems engineering focus primarily on eliciting and translating the
customer's needs into explicit requirements. This effort is challenging for several
reasons. First, there is a presumption on behalf of the engineer that customers
don't know what they need. This leads to a process of refining the stated
primitive need into the vetted and approved effective need. This deliberate
refinement of the purpose of the system is expanded in the value identification
step. Not only are the customer's needs identified, but also other organizations
are identified and included in the consideration of possible value exchanges. The
assumption is that all relationships are bidirectional, even if the exchange is
intrinsic. This value exchange potential greatly expands the list of organizations
that influence the purpose of the system in a direct manner for its technical
aspects, but also expands the consideration of other institutional impacts of the
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system, lifecycle considerations, and other opportunities. This also enhances the
ability to consider emergent system behaviors such as "unintended side-effects."
Development (proposition). The development phase provides detailed
architectures that are decomposed into components and then integrated through
subsystems for overall system integration. Additionally, there is an explicit
requirement for developing training support for users of the system. Contrasted
with the value proposition process, the scope of this adjudication of design
decisions is perceptively narrower. The value proposition is the decision making
portion of the value creation framework. With the identified list of stakeholders
and their value exchanges made explicit, multiple objectives, both complementary
and competitive, can be analyzed. The methods necessary for these multiple-
objective decision analyses are well developed theoretically and implemented in
practice. (Keeney 1992; Kirkwood 1997; Saaty 1990)
* Deployment (delivery). The deployment is focused on the acceptance and
realization of the benefits of the system by the customer or end-user. This is not a
static phase for system maturity as up-grades or modifications may be provided as
the system lifecycle design permits. The major effort for this phase is the
maintenance of the deployed system. The value delivery phase directly
contradicts the focus of the deployment phase by explicitly avoiding exclusive
focus on any single stakeholder, as this would be "dysfunctional" for the
enterprise (Murman et al. 2002). This is assured by direct engagement of the
stakeholders in the enterprise activities as identified in previous phases.
The aspect of the comparison of the systems engineering phases and the enterprise
value creation framework is the notion of the open loop system engineering and the
closed-loop value creation framework. This demonstrates a fundamental extension of the
system engineering approach with the characteristics as part of engineering systems. In
particular, emergence and adaptability can be considered as part of this framework.
The preceding discussion seeks to highlight the precedence of using systems
engineering and related systems analysis to advance the efforts to improve the field of
engineering systems and also shows the opportunities for deepening the understanding of
how these approaches can further be developed using a multi-discipline approach.
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2.4 Management Science
Given the obvious impact that a pure systems engineering approach has in
supporting management and social considerations, engineering systems explicitly seeks
to integrate these aspects. As such, we revisit the motivation for this research effort,
which is to address the existing challenges for the DOD to provide the necessary
capabilities to the warfighter to accomplish the national military strategy. Many recent
defense leaders have tried to strengthen the idea of support to the warfighters - even
going so far as to refer to them as customers. The delivery of a capability thus represents
the concept of value to the customer that involves many organizations.
2.5 Inter-Organizational Value Delivery
The Value Creation Framework (Murman et al. 2002), with its generalized approach
of value (extrinsic and intrinsic) creation, is unique in engineering literature - calling for
more than purely technical advancements that principally drive advancements in
engineering. In contrast, management has focused on providing value. One model that
had a profound early influence is the value chain. This model provides a framework for
management to "disaggregate the firm into its strategically relevant activities to
understand the costs and the existing and potential sources of differentiation."
Primary inbound
actives
Figure 2-5 Value Chain Framework (Porter 1985)
This functional analysis of the firm provides a means that management science can
apply well understood principles of economics to assess cost-benefit analysis to strategic
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alternatives for competitive advantage. This approach brought clarity to the management
practices with established process-based management approaches with predictable
performance outcomes with such initiatives and supply chain management (Simchi-Levi
et al. 2000), total quality management (Juran 1964), process management (Hammer
1996) and six sigma (Harry and Schroeder 2000). While these early efforts provided
clarity and repeatability for analysis, the tradeoff was over-simplification through
linearity and closed-systems thinking.
With new questions and hypotheses generated by research in the context of Japanese
corporations, non-linear feedback and open, organizational systems thinking influenced
new management theories (Womack et al. 1991). In particular, the study of the Japanese
corporations points up the influence of inter-organizational relationships, both explicit
and implicit across large-scope, multi-corporate value chains, considered not to be
national/international enterprises. The study of inter-organizational relationship has been
conducted through a number of theoretical paradigms. The following figure presents a
spectrum for these paradigms spanning the reliance on two perspectives for analysis of
economic to behavioral
Transaction Resource Strategic Stakeholder Learning InstitutionalCosts Dependency Choice Theory Theory TheoryEconomics
Economic 4 ' Behavioral
Figure 2-6 Spectrum of Theoretical Paradigms (Barringer and Harrison 2000)
This paper continues to present rationale for selecting a particular paradigm and
states that stakeholder theory is not only "macro" but also opens itself to consideration
beyond explicit agency-theory based relationships (Eisenhardt 1989) with the synergy of
stewardship theory (Davis et al. 1997). This perspective has not been included in such
paradigms as Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson 1994), Resource Dependency
(Das and Teng 2000), or Strategic Choice (Jarillo 1989), but stakeholder theory also
maintains balance on explicit contracts (Jensen 2002), while Learning Theory focuses
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more on knowledge and Institutional Theory on external pressures on the firm. The next
section continues to review the Stakeholder Theory Literature.
2.6 Stakeholder Theory
While the ideas of stakeholder theory was considered and discussed earlier (Ackoff
1981), the influence of stakeholder theory in management science is mostly attributable
to the arguments supporting stakeholders in strategic management (Freeman 1984). This
work was influential in that it provided for the identification of stakeholders and
presented generalized relationships between a firm and its stakeholders. Based on this,
management principles provided insights to develop methods/heuristics to address
maximizing benefit for the firm. The following figure presents a framework (similar to
what was presented earlier) to view the relationships of stakeholders.
Figure 2-7 Firm Stakeholder Framework (Freeman 1984)
From this seminal work, stakeholder theory grew to address several lines of thought,
presented in a literature review based on the next ten years of work (Donaldson and




Descriptive Stakeholder Theory Instrumental
Managerial
Figure 2-8 Four Perspectives of Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson and Preston 1995)
e Descriptive - Presents a model describing what the corporation is.
* Instrumental - Establishes a framework for examining the connections, if any,
between the practice of stakeholder management and the achievement of various
corporate performance goals.
* Normative - Stakeholders are identified by their interests, that is, their intrinsic
value to in the corporation (whether the corporation has any corresponding
functional interest in them).
* Managerial - Establishes organizational structures and general policies and
employs case-by-case decision making.
This work framed research interests for stakeholder theory for the three phases of its
development; however, the content of the literature provides several themes for future
research contributions (Laplume et al. 2008). These themes are Stakeholder Definition
and Salience (Mitchell et al. 1997), Firms Actions and Response (Rowley 1997),
Stakeholder Actions and Response (Friedman and Miles 2002), Firm Performance
(Clarkson 1995), and Theory Debates (Phillips et al. 2003). While this provides a
convenient framework to position future work, the obvious issue is that these themes are
not mutually exclusive. Given the holistic approaches used in the engineering literature
and the influence of engineering systems on management, stakeholder theory in
management science would benefit from having theory that begins to unify theses themes
just as Donaldson and Preston called for addressing all their proposed perspectives.
2.7 Stakeholder Salience Framework
There are alternative views for stakeholders and their identification. Principally,
these alternatives are based on categorizing the roles that the potential stakeholder may
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have in their relationship from the perspective of a pre-determined firm much like the
framework initially proposed by Freeman (Freeman 1984; Jawahar and McLaughlin
2001). However, other alternatives are based on meso-level categories (Friedman and
Miles 2002).
From a systems analysis perspective, stakeholders are the components in a
purposeful system. As different systems, enterprises have different purposes, a
framework that does not assume roles, a priori, is necessary. A framework that uses
fundamental stakeholder attributes allows for this type of understanding. A framework
that is well accepted in terms of citations to form the basis of follow-on stakeholder
research is the Stakeholder Salience Framework (Mitchell et al. 1997). This framework
was developed to identify and categorize stakeholders based on their perceived salience
by a manager in a given firm. The identification of a stakeholder is greatly dependent on
the view applied to the criteria. This view spans a spectrum that can be called a narrow
or broad view; where a narrow view is any entity that has placed something at risk with
the firm while the broad view addresses any entity that affects or is affected by the firm
(Mitchell et al. 1997). Additionally, one must consider whether the view is based on the
actual or potential relationship, Mitchell, et al, argue that the potential relationships can
be as relevant as the actual relationships. Salience is comprised of three attributes:
power, legitimacy, and urgency. Power is defined as the ability to bring about the desired
outcomes (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974). Legitimacy is "a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions," according to
Suchman (1995). Urgency is defined as the degree to which stakeholder claims call for
immediate attention (Mitchell et al. 1997). With the three attributes defined, the
framework proposed (Mitchell et al. 1997) and follow-on research tested and concluded
the existence of the relationship between the perceived level of the three attributes and
stakeholders salience (Agle et al. 1999; Magness 2007). Also discussed was the fact that
the attributes are not mutually exclusive, as depicted by the following figure.
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Urgency Legitimacy
Figure 2-9 Stakeholder Salience Framework (Mitchell et al. 1997)
The perceived level of each attribute in combination with the other attributes leads
to the classification of the stakeholders. The following table indicates the classification
categories based on the combinations of attributes:
Table 2-2. Stakeholder Salience Framework (Friedman and Miles 2006)
Power Legitimacy Urgency Group Category
Y N N Latent Dormant
N Y N Latent Discretionary
N N Y Latent Demanding
Y Y N Expectant Dominant
Y N Y Expectant Dangerous
N Y Y Expectant Dependent
Y Y Y Definitive Definitive
The groups are in order of "increasing" salience with the respective categories
depicted within each level of the group. It is interesting to note that while Mitchell, et al,
discuss the "change in momentum" from the perception of only one attribute to a
stakeholder with two, however this shift has been translated into a tree-like hierarchy of
the groups in following literature (Friedman and Miles 2006). By mapping Latent to
Low Priority, Expectant to Moderate Priority, and Definitive to High Priority, this
attempt to linearize the framework does not account for the dynamism, a central focus of
the framework, where a stakeholder can gain or demonstrate other attributes. This
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overall categorization approach serves to balance the broad and narrow views on
stakeholders by narrowing or classifying the initial possible meaningful stakeholders.
Later work sought to refine the practice of stakeholder management, using a
network-based model with prioritization "weights" derived from a constructed a metric
for stakeholder salience, the "stakeholder salience index." The network approach was
offered in the context of an enterprise en lieu of a firm centric approach (Grossi 2003).
This metric is constructed by decomposing the attributes into subtypes, scoring the
stakeholder candidate on an ordinal ten-point scale, and aggregating the scores with a
function to capture the relationship between the three attributes. The protocol for
collecting the scores is through the administration of a survey to selected stakeholders.
(See Chapter 3) This again simplifies the practice of stakeholder management with a
repeatable and reproducible metric, but loses the fidelity of the attributes and their
dynamic impact on the enterprise dynamics (Matty et al. 2008).
2.8 Social Science
Social Science and the study of public policy provide a general context for the role
of defense acquisitions in how the United States organizes for defense (Sapolsky et al.
2009). However, social science also examines the organizational theories that help
understand how organizations are designed and how they interact internally and with
each other. This need was recognized by systems analysts as understanding the "internal
political system" (Ackoff et al. 2006). It is through the study of politics and interactions
of the various constituencies that the parallels of stakeholders and interorganizational
relationships gain valuable insights.
2.8.1 Organization Theory
Similar to systems thinking that lead to establishing the firm as an organization
(Ackoff 1981), organization theory proposes the organization as a system (Kast and
Rosenzweig 1973). This system is comprised of a number of interconnected subsystems
(Daft 1989) much like the systems views that describe the enterprise architecture
(Nightingale and Rhodes 2004). Organization Theory has evolved much like systems
theory from its traditional deconstructional approaches (Weber 1946) to a more
connected typology (Gulati et al. 2000).
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2.8.2 Bureaucracy
Merriam-Webster (2009) gives the definition of bureaucracy as "government
characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to strict rules, and a hierarchy of
authority." While the term bureaucracy has developed a strong negative connotation
(Wilson 1989), the following discussion will adhere to the definitions contained in the
literature. Weber states that there are six characteristics of bureaucracy:
1. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas which
are generally ordered by rules that is by laws or administrative
regulation.
2. The principles of office hierarchy in the levels of upgraded authority
mean a firmly ordered system of super insubordination in which there
is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher one.
3. The management of the modern office is based upon written
documents which are preserved in their original or draft for.
4. Office management at least all specialized office management-in such
management is distinctly modem-usually presupposes thorough and
expert training.
5. When the office is fully developed official activity domains the full
working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his
obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited.
6. The management of the office follows general rules, which are more
or less stable, more or less exhaustive, in which can be learned. These
characteristics combine in the management archetype that ensures that
establishment of each office (organizational entity) has a specific
purpose, authorities and level in an organization construct that is
explicitly codified in documentation. Advantage of technology and
the changes that were clearly possible.
(Natemeyer and McMahon 1989)
2.8.3 Dynamic Open Organizational Systems
The bureaucracy characteristics identified by Weber implicitly insulate the closed
system bureaucracy (Thompson 1967) from the dynamic stresses that change and adapt
organizational systems (Cyert and March 1963). This inclusion of the behaviors and their
systematic effects opened new approaches to understanding organizational processes
(Simon 1997) and how these behaviors tied multiple subsystems together. However, as
contingent theories for organization were developed, the management archetype of
bureaucracy continued to be the prevalent implementation (Nohria 1991).
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Continued research into bureaucracy found that bureaucracy was not a static closed
system, but could evolve, as open systems must in order to accomplish the tasks required
of the organization in an uncertain environment. It also emerged that solutions are
actually incompatible to the bureaucracy, such as those identified by Wilson (1989):
e Accountability - Getting agencies to serve-agreed-upon goals
e Equity - Treating all "citizens" fairly
e Responsiveness - Reacting reasonably to the special needs of a particular group
of "citizens"
e Efficiency - Obtaining the greatest output for a given level of resources
e Fiscal Integrity - Assuring that funds are spent prudently for the intended
purposes
The challenge to find synergy among these challenges helps not only drive the
behaviors of the existing bureaucracy but also forces to expand the bureaucracy as
additional processes are added to control and manage these requirements (Wilson 1989).
This updated bureaucratic-behavior theory can be generalized to understand how the
organization does not grow without bound.
2.8.4 Defining the Organization
Each organization, in general, is established on the premise of differentiation and
integration (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Taylor and Weber both sought to capture the
industrial efficiencies and advancements due specificity in the task environments. As
firms grew larger and evolved into corporations, there was a qualitative difference in the
work done at different levels - leading to the recognition of three levels of responsibility
and control: technical, managerial, and institutional (Parsons 1960). While the
hierarchical relationships can dominate the research (Jaques 1989), the interest of the
relationships allow a broader context for less explicit ties (Gulati and Kletter 2005).
Nohria espouses that that there are three organizational forms: Functional, Divisional,
and Hybrid. (Nohria 1991) However, in later work, this perspective is out-scoped to
industry level with the idea of networks as a form (Gulati et al. 2000). Again, the
interdisciplinary convergence is apparent when organizational structures are compared to
boundaries of the three levels of enterprises previously presented (Murman et al. 2002).
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2.8.5 Integrating the Organization
Defining the organization is necessary for understanding the central concepts of
organizational structure, but not sufficient. How the organization is integrated must also
be considered. With inherent efforts to have mutually exclusive task environments for
component sub-organizations in a bureaucracy, there is a need for integration. This is
effort is usually requires separate integration organizational components (Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967). However, we see that this need for integration is met with a balancing
dynamic in that components in a bureaucracy strive for autonomy to maximize their task
accomplishment (Wilson 1989). Internal efforts to control the exchanges between
organizations are a general characteristic with significant effort expended (Thompson
1967). How these dynamics are balanced is dependent on the normative perspective that
is central from stakeholder theory. It is important to note that the normative aspect is not
completely based on the agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) but has strong implications
from stewardship theory (Davis et al. 1997).
2.9 Implications for Research
Comparing and contrasting these multiple disciplines provides a holistic perspective
on the main themes for the study of the program enterprise in the bureaucracy of the
Department of the Defense. In each respective body of knowledge, there are few gaps;
however, when a multi-disciplinary view is used, we find that the value creation approach
from enterprise engineering systems superficially leverages the maturing management
theories of stakeholders. The effort to close this theoretical gap is reinforced both
specifically to the problem domain in the DOD and in generality for non-DOD
organizations. To establish a basis for comparison, the current state of the defense







Figure 2-10 Current Program Enterprise Theoretical Basis
From the previous discussion, there are significant gaps that can be addressed using
a multidisciplinary approach. From engineering and social science, the following
assertion is made: a defense program is comprised of a number of varied stakeholders
with significantly different purposes for their enterprise activity (Fox 1974; Gansler
1980; Murman et al. 2002; Sapolsky et al. 2009; Wilson 1989). A stakeholder's
influence on the program enterprise varies longitudinally and when compared to other
stakeholders (Agle et al. 1999; Allen et al. 2004; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Forrester
1961; Freeman 1984; Gulati and Kletter 2005; Jawahar and McLaughlin 2001; Mitchell
et al. 1997; Nightingale and Rhodes 2004; Thompson 1967). The purpose, both stated
and implied, for a system is the fundamental consideration for the system lifecycle,
including organizational system (Ackoff 1981; Gulati and Kletter 2005; Jensen 2002;
Murman et al. 2002; Nightingale and Rhodes 2004; Nohria 1991; Redshaw 2010; Sage
1992; Sage and Armstrong 1999). Based on these assertions, the following framework is







Figure 2-11 Proposed Program Enterprise Stakeholder Salience Influence
This framework depicts several key aspects. Leveraging the broader, more general
theoretical basis, user requirements and program advocacy are extended to value creation
and stakeholder theory respectively. The open loop "thinking" is modified to a closed
loop framework; thus, stakeholder theory, value creation, and Enterprise Architecture are
translated from exogenous considerations to endogenous factors that must be included in
the systems analysis of the program enterprise. This also explicitly asserts the existence
of dynamic influence relationships between the three perspectives. These form the basis
for the overarching research question and propositions presented in Chapter 1 that serve
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There are four elements to a research project: research question, prior work,
research design, and contribution to the literature (Edmondson 2007). The research
questions provide focus and scope for the effort. The prior work indicates the state of the
research area and enables identification of theoretical gaps and contradictions through a
review of relevant literature. This exercise informs the researcher where the question
falls on the continuum of nascent to mature theory. Based on the level of theoretical
maturity, researchers have an expectation of these four elements based on three
archetypes of methodological fit.
For this particular research effort, the literature revealed that the theoretical
opportunities demonstrate an intermediate level of maturity. The research questions
propose relationships between new and established constructs. The type of data that
should be collected is hybrid (both qualitative and quantitative); data will be acquired
through interviews, surveys, observations. It will be subjected to content analysis,
exploratory statistics, and preliminary tests. The analysis will support a provisional
theory that integrates previously separate bodies of work.
As part of the literature review, several inter-organizational relationship research
project methodologies were reviewed and categorized in the following table:
Figure 3-1 Stakeholder Theory Research Methods
Survey
Clarkson, 1995; Carmeli, et al, 2007; Gulati & Kletter, 2005; Agle, et al, 1999, Magness,
1999
Regression
Lunnan & Haugland, 2007; Barton, Hill, & Sundaram, 1989; McGuire, Sundgren, &
Schneeweis, 1988; Preston, Sapienza, & Miller, 1991
Interviews
Kotter & Heskett, 1992; O'Toole, 1991; Gulati & Singh 1998
Decision Analysis
Keller, et al, 2009; Templin, 2004
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These approaches were consistent with the expected archetypes given the methodological
fit. While survey methods were the mode followed by Regression (of quantitative
corporate data), preliminary assessments of public data available were limited to
principally ordinal scales or qualitative assessments, such as those found in the
Probability of Program Success Assessment and lacked dimension and the richness
needed for developing new insights. Based on the elements to ensure methodological fit,
the next section presents the research method selected.
3.2 Case Study Research
3.2.1 Methodology Logic
Based on the methodological fit previously discussed for Intermediate Prior Theory,
the research method was informed by further consideration of the following conditions
for application of case study methodology: form of the research method, control of
behavior/events, and focus on contemporary events (Davenport 2009). Given that the
research questions were structured to understand "how", the selection was not necessarily
limited. However, due to the limited control of the behavior/events, designed
experiments were not feasible. Also, control over the variables was critical given the
diversity across programs. The perceived considerations of systems that support a
capability through employment of a particular battlefield operation system provided great
diversity among the more than 500 Army programs. Last, the relative availability of
contemporary events was present; however, the span of time for events to occur must be
considered; the behavior/events for a program typically spans multiple years. Based on
these additional considerations, Case Study was selected over survey, archival analysis,
history, or experimental.
There are five components for the research design for case study: the study's
question(s), case proposition(s), unit(s) of analysis, logic linking the data to the
propositions, and criteria for interpreting the findings.
3.2.1.1 Study Questions
Based on the preceding discussion, the study questions were a principal
consideration for selecting case study. The structure of the question that was generated
by the literature review strongly supports this decision.
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3.2.1.2 Case Propositions
The literature that supported the development of the study questions also supports
the development of the case propositions. Based on the theoretical framework
established in Chapter 2, there are two principle propositions that will serve as the basis
for the case study. These are presented again:
P1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise program
value creation process.
P2: The program enterprise architecture influence stakeholder salience
attributes.
3.2.1.3 Unit(s) of Analysis
The question of defining the unit of analysis is related to the definition of a case. As
previously discussed in the literature (Murman et al. 2002), there are three levels of
enterprise: program, multi-program and national/global. Based on the questions and
propositions, an initial consideration is to examine an enterprise at the program level.
Based on preliminary data collection efforts, all data is focused on the program level as
well. It followed that a case would be defined as a program. To continue the relationship




Figure 3-2 Alternative Case Study Designs(Yin 2009)
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As mentioned in the methodology logic, programs in the Army are aggregated into a
battlefield operating system that addresses one or more needed capabilities. This
relationship of the battlefield operating system and the capability provides a more
concrete construct for the context of the case. Based on the propositions, it was evident
that the unit of analysis would have to be at the stakeholder level. This did not preclude
comparing and contrasting the relationships among stakeholders at the program-level, but
primary analysis was at the stakeholder (organizational) level and its interaction within
the program, as part of the battlefield operating system for a capability.
Adapting the over-arching methodology approach from different texts and
publications on research methods, the following diagram was developed to portray the
case study method adopted (Babbie 1979; Edmondson 2007; Eisenhardt 1989; Fowler
1995; Fowler 2009; Yin 2009).
Conduct Write Individual Draw cross-case1st Case Case Report Conclusions
+g Select Cases - Modify Theory
DevelopTheoryConduct 0Write IndividualDevlopThery 
- 2"d Case Case Report
Design Data Develop Policy+ Collection - Implications
Protocol
S Conduct Write Individual _ Write cross-
3"' Case Case Report case report
Figure 3-3. Adapted Overarching Case Study Methodology
3.2.1.4 Logic to Link Data to Propositions
Initial assessments were made on the type of data that was available at the program
enterprise level for both quantitative and qualitative data. Access to the data was
consideration as well, however with the support of senior U.S. Army leadership, access
was ensured given the researcher used appropriate consideration for classification and
distribution. While the data that was available would help inform the research about the
initial propositions, it was determined that more direct data collection was necessary.
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As depicted in Figures 2-10 and 2-11, the influence of value creation on the
enterprise architecture is established. This approach is prescriptively provided through
existing policy in the form of the DOD 5000 series (DOD 2007). The proposed
framework reverses the exogenous relationship of enterprise architecture on the
stakeholder salience. Likewise, the framework proposes to research the influence of
stakeholder salience on value creation, which is currently excluded in the literature. This
is a significant step in the instrumental aspect of the stakeholder salience framework
insights to stakeholder theory. Without existing program data that explicitly or implicitly
measures these two new influence relationships, this research adapts and extends existing
protocols and tools for stakeholder salience. As will be discussed below, based on the
interest in influence of the framework relationships, an interview protocol was developed.
The previous research considered the contributions of the salience attributes to the
overall salience of typical stakeholder groups (Agle et al. 1999). For the purpose of this
study, the following figure illustrates three of the nine relationships between stakeholder
salience attributes and value creation processes:
Figure 3-4 Influence of Salience Attributes on Value Creation
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This approach can be extended for Proposition 1 as part of an administered question
during the interview protocol using a Likert Scale with a "declarative statement followed
by a response options that indicate varying degrees of agreement with or endorsement of
the statement." (Devellis 2003) The following question and response options (Siegle
2008) were presented as part of the interview.
The influence of <salience attribute> on <value creation process>:
+/- Unimportant




While superficially the question and direct assessment afforded a simple response
that could be easily recorded, the respondents were asked to develop the data. This was
accomplished using the following approaches (Weiss 1994):
1. Extending
2. Filling in detail
3. Identifying actors
4. Others the respondent (would) (consult)ed
5. Inner events
6. Making indications explicit
The second proposition did not have precedence in literature due to proposing a
converse relationship to previous assertions (see Figure 2-10). However, in previous
research, the stakeholder identification and categorization efforts where typically justified
by respondents using the various enterprise architecture framework views without
prompting (Matty et al. 2008; Matty et al. 2007) while using a stakeholder salience
assessment questionnaire (Grossi 2003). Again by extending the respondents answers to
the questionnaire, the respondents provided details such as examples, events, etc. to
justify their assessment of the salience attributes, and additionally, what could be changed
to influence the perceived stakeholder's salience. This approach allowed for the
necessary data to be presented without influencing the responses with predetermined and
avoid response bias. This data would allow for an assessment of the influence of
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enterprise architecture (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004) on the sub-attributes that
aggregate to the salience attributes (Grossi 2003).
3.2.1.5 Criteria for Interpreting Findings
The logic applied to link data to the propositions, permits direct testing of the
hypothesis using ordinal and categorical data analysis techniques. Without the
precedence of previous statistical models, non-parametric analysis techniques were used
with the level of significance selected as 0.05. While a level of significance of 0.01 is
more common using parametric analysis, the higher level was selected to account for a
reduction in the tests' power from both a methods standpoint as well as the sample size of
stakeholders within each case (Conover 1999).
Other steps were taken to mitigate bias. During the data processing of the
qualitative data, the coding schemes were documented and were tested for repeatability
and reproducibility using graduate students that had received formal instruction on
separate frameworks for both the definitions and existing applications of the theories.
The feedback from these procedures provides confidence of appropriate steps to mitigate
bias and increase internal validity during the data analysis. Other procedures were
developed as well and will be discussed as part of the collection and analysis protocols.
3.3 Case Selection
Based on over-arching case study approach, preliminary research about various
capabilities, battlefield operating systems, and programs was conducted. While there
were many programs that were at various states of lifecycle development, the capability
for "conduct aerial reconnaissance" in the aviation battlefield operating system had three
active programs operating near simultaneously for the attack-scout helicopter program
management office. This was a unique research opportunity as most program offices
have one typically in the retirement phase while a second is in development. These cases
were very strong candidates based on the approach that "replication, not sampling logic,
is used for multiple case studies." (Yin 2009)
While all programs follow the same generalized lifecycle management process
identified by the upcoming or most recent milestone decision (DOD 2007), there are
factors to be considered. One is the Acquisition Category (ACAT) which determines the
decision authority, whether at the DOD, Service, Program Executive Office level and if
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authority may be delegated to other government officials. The acquisition strategy
determines the program structure to achieve the required capability, whether it is
evolutionary (incremental) or single-step (typically utilized in conversion for
"commercial, off-the-shelf," available solutions). In many programs, there is a lead that
is responsible for integration of different engineering and development efforts. Typically
in system acquisition a primary contractor (COM-LSI) is selected that manages sub-
system and component integration with "sub-contractors" supporting the effort.
However, in other cases the government may select to leverage internal system
engineering management expertise (GOV-LSI).
The three candidate cases were reviewed. The results are presented in the following
table:
Table 3-1. Candidate Case Factors
Program Milestone ACAT Strategy/Lead
1 Post MS-C 11/111 Single/GOV-LSI
2 Pre-B II Single/COM-LSI
3 Pre-B II Single/GOV-LSI
Program 1 was very late in the lifecycle, Post Milestone C, and had been considered for
retirement from operation. Program 1 had initially before ACAT-levels were established,
but using current standards would have been ACAT II. However, based on the maturity
of the program and decreased development funding, it was categorized as ACAT III.
This was significant from a research standpoint as there are very few periodic reports
required for an ACAT III program and its financial resources were not explicitly
delineated in budget categories. Due to its maturity, there were few research and
development actions in the program, which allowed the government to maintain lead
system integration responsibility.
Program 2 was much more significant in terms of the reporting requirements due to
oversight requirements placed on an ACAT II system program very early in the lifecycle,
pre-milestone decision B. While this would provide specific data, both quantitative and
qualitative, this data would not be available for the other cases for direct cross-analysis.
With the selection of adapting an existing commercial, off-the-shelf material solution, the
primary commercial developer was placed in the role as Lead System Integrator.
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Program 3 was also very early in its development, pre-milestone B, and also had
explicit reporting requirements placed on it as it was an ACAT II program. This program
was using an adaptation of an existing military system; this prompted the program office
to assume LSI-responsibilities.
The high-degree of replication extended beyond these typical program factors in
that as a result of the similarity in the battlefield operating system, many of the functional
elements in the Army would be similar. This translated to expected consistency among
all possible stakeholders as aviation capabilities were handled by the same offices in the
Department of the Army Headquarters, Army Commands, Program Executive Office,
and even the same commercial organizations. Again, this was a unique instance of case
replication within the same context.
3.4 Design Data Collection Protocols
Several research efforts, (Matty et al. 2008; Matty et al. 2007) used surveys
protocols (Grossi 2003; McNutt 1998) which provided quantitative information;
however, during the administration of the survey, the respondents provided qualitative
data about the basis for their survey responses. Based on this consideration, the survey
instrument was used to form the basis of the interview protocol. The following protocol
was then developed and conducted for the three cases:
* Develop initial list of candidate stakeholders using program documentation (e.g.
reports, meeting participation, distribution list, etc.)
" Identify POC in candidate stakeholder organization (e.g., Program Manager, Lead
Analyst, Action Officer)
* Provide survey instrument for review and schedule initial phone call.
" Administer survey for self-assessment, record conversations. For each factor,
respondent selects appropriate score and provides justification. Specific examples
requested (instructed that example should be of typical behavior, not outlier.)
Other requested assessments are reviewed to identify any issues of non-
familiarity. Follow-up phone call is scheduled.
* Respondent completes other requested assessments.
* Follow-up phone call is conducted with discussion of other assessments and
justifications providing extended data verbally. (Note: In addition to current
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perceived salience score, also collected is ideal salience attribute scores for self
assessment)
* Respondent questioned about salience attributes influence on value creation.
" Recordings are transcribed and provided for verification to respondent.
3.5 Collect Data
Following the protocol described, the data collection plan was developed. With a
relatively high number of stakeholder candidates and limited time with the points of
contact, a sampling plan was developed. Using a lattice sampling approach (Abbey
1978) the study spanned all stakeholder candidates without significant loss of statistical
significance.
The stakeholder candidates initially conducted a self-assessment for their
stakeholder salience attributes as part of the initial interview. This allowed for the
interviewer to clearly articulate the definitions for the terms in both the stakeholder
salience and value creation. With the consistency for the definitions established, the
respondents would assess the perceived level of the salience attributes using the scales set
forth in the survey. The data was then extended by requesting the rationale for the score.
This allowed for the data extending approaches previously mentioned. The respondents
would then provide an assessment for specified other stakeholder candidates. For
illustration of this stakeholder lattice sampling approach, stakeholder SO1 conducts
assessments on SOL, S05, S16, S20, S23 as indicated in the following figure:
Assessed
Figure 3-5. Lattice Sampling for Stakeholder Assessments
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The assignment of stakeholder assessments was random, except for the self-
assessments, using an algorithm developed by the author in visual basic. This approach
is very efficient if the population is well defined in advance, which in this context, all
stakeholder candidates are identified in advance. As part of the initial coordination, a list
of stakeholder candidates was provided to all known respondents with the request to
provide additional candidates as deemed necessary by the initial subset of stakeholders.
Specific results of this effort will be presented in each of the cases.
The results of this lattice sampling approach included data collection from
candidates that later determined to demonstrate salience attributes that would result in
their categorization as stakeholders and non-stakeholders. Additionally, these approach
restricted collection to only those candidates that explicitly interacted with the program
enterprise for the respective case. During the coordination for the list of candidate
stakeholders, stakeholders would not provide assessments on other stakeholder
relationships without explicit knowledge of the relationships of candidates and the
enterprise. While this internal perspective may be considered a possible source of bias,
the functional organizational structure of the DOD ensures that many of the candidate
stakeholders are potential stakeholders in many program enterprises and were able to
differentiate between the relationships in one enterprise and others. This understanding
actually reinforces the validity of the data collected.
As stated, the basis of the interviews was the survey instrument that captured the
stakeholder attribute assessments. The extended data was captured by recording the
responses and transcribed. The extended data was the critical data that would provide the
insights for the influence relationship for the proposed framework.
3.6 Analyze Data
3.6.1 Within Case Analysis
3.6.1.1 Data analysis for influence of stakeholder salience on value
creation.
Based on the self-assessment of the respondent, the explicit question was proposed
to ensure the linkage of the data to the propositions. This explicit feedback used the
Likert scale as discussed. The data was not assumed to follow an explicit distribution
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requiring nonparametric statistical analysis techniques. This would be test to verify this
assumption. The data analysis for this influence relationship was conducted in two steps.
The first step was to test the independence of the value creation and stakeholder salience
attributes. Statistically, this is accomplished with the null hypothesis that all nine
influence scores represent a different sample and that each sample would have the same
median if independent. It is important to note that in formulating the null hypothesis, it
should leverage the logic that significant evidence will allow one to reject the null
hypothesis in order to avoid type one errors. For multiple samples, the appropriate test
for independence is the Kruskal-Wallis Medians Test (Conover 1999). The use of this
test meets the following assumptions:
e Random Samples
e Independence within each Sample
e Mutual Independence among various samples
e Measurement scale at least ordinal
* Either k population distributions are identical or some the populations tend to
yield larger values than other populations
3.6.1.2 Data analysis for influence of enterprise architecture on
stakeholder salience.
The second step was to address the proposition for identifying the presence of
influence by enterprise architecture (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004) on the stakeholder
salience attributes (Mitchell et al. 1997). The data for this investigation was initially
captured in a semantic form based on the extended data from the respondents justifying
their assessment of the salience attribute for the stakeholder. The data was then
processed using initial coding to identify initial themes, then using focused coding to
build and clarify the categories and assess degree and type (Charmaz 2006). These
results were then evaluated to determine the level of influence using the same Likert
scale. These data were then tested to prove the independence of the stakeholder salience




Building theory from case study methods is iterative as it leverages this critical step
as it "forces investigators to look beyond initial impressions and see evidence thru
multiple lenses," and sharpens the construct definition, validity and measurability
(Eisenhardt 1989). This step also ensures that the investigator attends to all the data both
in content and in richness (Yin 2009). Based on the results of the statistical tests
stipulated above, and given that the previous tests allowed the more general conclusions
for dependence, it follows that the investigator will perform tests on the influence
relationships explicitly. Conclusions reached from these statistical extensions will further
advance the contributions in the theory generating process.
3.8 Enfolding Literature
Just as the literature review is critical in identifying the initial theoretical gap(s) for
the research effort, this step uses two approaches to further address the research questions
and strengthen the propositions for the theoretical contribution. This is done through two
approaches, comparison with conflicting literature and comparison with supporting
literature. Comparison of findings with conflicting literature builds internal validity,
raises theoretical level, and sharpens construct definitions. Comparison of the findings
with supporting literature sharpens generalizability, improves construct definition and
raises theoretical level (Eisenhardt 1989). This also enhances the quality of the analysis
by addressing four principles (Yin 2009):
* Attend to all data to by ensuring that interpretations account for all data and
alternative interpretations.
" Address all major rival interpretations either directly or restate as a research for
future studies.
. Ensure that the analysis addresses the most significant aspect of the case study.
" Build expert knowledge in the case study effort.
Using these principles as guides, the case study methodology provides commits the
investigator to return to the data to address inconsistencies or opportunities identified




The decision for closure within a case is based on the notion of theoretical saturation
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). The literature helps to guide the analysis of the qualitative
data. Based on the literature review this provides a "theoretical horizon" for the coding
and analysis of the extended data. As a result, using the frameworks established in the
literature, the coding strategy was well defined by the constructs and was focused on the
relationships between the frameworks. After the completing initial and focused coding
processes, analysis of the Likert Scales, iterations of refining the hypotheses, comparative
analysis with existing literature further data analysis until the resulting propositions were
as focused and strong as plausible. At this point, the case was then written up
independently.
3.9.2 Cross-Case Analysis
With the data collected and analyzed within each case, a similar data analysis
process was conducted for comparing and contrasting all three cases. This was facilitated
by the hybrid data approach of incorporating similar quantitative data analysis techniques
with multiple samples and cross-case coding for the relationships based on the
frameworks used. This analysis permitted data analysis across the cases to identify
general results to inform the refinement of grand hypotheses and contrasting the cases for
further insights. This hybrid approach was iterative as well until theoretical saturation
was reached for improving the propositions based on the whole of the data.
3.10 Communicating the Results
A critical aspect of the research process is conveying the contribution and the results
of the research findings (Yin 2009). To facilitate the flow of the findings and maintain
clarity, the report follows the research process at the case-level and then presents the
synergies of the work at the cross case level. This allows for the replication logic to
sharpen and focus the theoretical contributions and amplify policy recommendations in
the context of the research. Additionally, this allows for distinction in future
opportunities to continue research efforts to continue building or testing the contributions
for theoretical and/or practical aspects.
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4 Case I Program A
4.1 Background
The first case focused on an Army aviation program. The program traces its
requirements to 1960. The Army and Navy had solicited proposals from industry for an
aircraft that could provide aerial reconnaissance mission support. Nearly 7 years later,
the Army accepted the first helicopter and subsequently deployed the aircraft into
Vietnam months later. In 1974, the Army approved the Aviation Helicopter
Improvement Program, which called for a near term scout helicopter that had day, night
and adverse weather capability, long-range observable subsystem and compatibility with
advanced maneuver and attack systems being developed. The industry partner that
produced the current materiel solution presented a more robust version of the current
aircraft with the requested sensors integrated. In winning the competition, the
relationship between the services and the lead industry partner was ensured to reach at
least twenty years for this program. However, upon reaching the 389 aircraft desired for
the fleet, the production runs for the aircraft ended in 1989.
With the aircraft reaching the planned horizon for its operations phase of the lifecycle, a
new opportunity presented the program a chance to demonstrate its ability to provide
capability to the warfighter in armed conflict. As the success of the aircraft's ability to
find and observe enemy was displayed during Operations Desert Storm/Shield, the Army
decided to enhance the weaponry to provide a limited attack capability. Upon the
successful integration of the weapons, a new model nomenclature was awarded to the
aircraft, designating its fourth generation.
4.2 Motivation
In terms of establishing an initial case for study, program A, was ideal both from a
theoretical and practical vantage. It was touted as a successful program, with a rich
history of consistent, well-developed relationships amongst the stakeholders. Having
been in the operations and sustainment phase of the system's lifecycle for more than 40
years, with 15 years in the current configuration, the roles and relationships for this
program had been codified and were well understood by the enterprise.
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4.3 Review Existing Case Studies
After completing the literature review, there were no case studies that focused
explicitly on Program A. There was one case study that included program A as a unit of
analysis, but this case study was focused on only on one part, test and evaluation, in the
acquisition process (Aragon 1994). The findings of this case study research identified
practices that could be implemented by several key stakeholders that would enhance the
test and evaluation efforts to the defense acquisition process. While many of these
recommendations are supported by thorough analysis, in the larger context of life-cycle
management, the recommendations place additional requirements for consideration in the
value identification process on stakeholders that are principally focused on the value
delivery. As such, this case study targeted the acquisition process, and only implicitly
addressed stakeholder interactions.
Based on open source documents, the principle references for this case were
preliminary research efforts (Matty et al. 2008; Matty et al. 2007). This work was
principally focused upon the enterprise architecture and systems analysis of logistical
support at the U. S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama. The
logistical support for Fort Rucker was the primary mission of the Aviation Center
Logistical Command (ACLC). Given that all of the associated units and organizations at
Fort Rucker have clearly articulated mission statements, well-defined functional tasks,
and regulations with explicit metric standards, this enterprise was assessed using the Lean
Enterprise Self-Assessment methodology (Nightingale et al. 2001). The results found
that the enterprise was very low in terms of the enterprise integration. While this
conclusion was based principally on the process architecture, there were several key
insights that were observed during the survey triangulation process using operational
data. The primary insight is well known to systems analysis where local results are
maximized, but less than optimal results are achieved globally.
An instance of this was comparison of the key performance indicators for the two
salient stakeholders - the US Army Warfighting Center's 1 th Aviation Brigade that was
responsible for the training of the students, and the ACLC that provided logistical and
maintenance support for the supporting aircraft fleet. While the aviation center is a
multi-program enterprise including other programs from the program for this particular
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case, i.e. Blackhawk, Chinooks etc. the findings were systemic across all programs. Both
stakeholders were successful in meeting their respective mission standards with a nearly
meeting the number of graduates required from the schools, codified with a 96%
graduation rate for students, and a 73% operations readiness rate for the aircraft, where
70% is the objective threshold. However, when establishing the relationship between the
two by determining the number of hours available and the number of hours required for
training the number of students for a 12 month period, it was apparent that a nearly 43% -
65% surplus of aircraft availability existed across the programs (Matty et al. 2008). This
significant indication of the persistent dynamics of the value creation process and had
been observed for the most recent five years. The explanation for this excess capacity
was identified in the value creation process with the apparent disconnected value
identified, the hierarchy of functional value proposition process and resulted in the
surplus value delivery. Based on the existing enterprise architecture, the organizational
and process views deterred the knowledge view ability to facilitate this integration. This
also suggested that the enterprise architecture influence the stakeholders and their efforts
in the value creation process.
4.4 Develop Initial Hypotheses
Chapter 3 develops the logic for the initial hypothesis that served as the basis for
each of the cases. The initial hypotheses also served as the basis for the iterative steps of
analyzing data, refining hypothesis and enfolding in the literature.
P1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise program
value creation process.
P2: The program enterprise architecture influence stakeholder salience
attributes.
4.5 Crafting Protocols
The reference case work indicated that protocols developed for quantifying
stakeholder salience, the stakeholder salience index (Grossi 2003), would be useful in the
collection of necessary data to understand the relationships between enterprise
architecture stakeholder salience and value creation. The protocols prescribed in Chapter
3 were applied. One of the major themes of research in stakeholder theory is the
identification and classification of stakeholders (Friedman and Miles 2006; Laplume et
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al. 2008). The existing framework allows for the classification of these entities as non-
stakeholders and stakeholders based on the perceived presence of the salience attributes
(Mitchell et al. 1997). While an initial list of stakeholders was developed as part of the
preliminary coordination and research, without formally applying the salience framework
the entities or individuals on this list are referred to as candidate stakeholders; however it
is not a specific focus of this effort to classify the entities but to understand the
relationships between their perceived attributes and these attributes influence on value
creation.
4.6 Collect Data
In accordance with the protocols established, an initial set of eighteen candidate
stakeholders was established. The term candidate is used as recognition to the substantial
literature devoted to the identification and categorization of stakeholders (Friedman and
Miles 2006; Laplume et al. 2008). One of the principle contributions of the Stakeholder
Salience framework is the identification and categorization of stakeholders as well as
non-stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997). Based on preliminary inquiry with the candidate
stakeholders, this list was expanded to a list of twenty-three candidate stakeholders.
The Stakeholder Salience Index assessments (Grossi 2003) were provided to the
stakeholder respondents electronically, and initial interviews were scheduled. Using the
lattice sampling approach, the sampling plan was developed. The following figure
illustrates the sampling approach where the candidate stakeholder was asked to complete
a self-assessment and four other candidate stakeholder assessments.
The settings for administering the survey-interviews varied with sixteen recorded
telephonic interviews referencing the provided copy of the Stakeholder Salience Index
assessment or seven with WebEx@, which is an internet-based application that allows
one to share the image on one's computer screen with distant parties and simultaneously
record the voice communication. The Webex was preferable, as the respondent was not
required to manipulate the assessment sheets or provide the completed response sheet
after the interview; however, many respondents were restricted from participating on
Webex due to information security measures.
The responses consisted of selecting a description of the assessed candidate
stakeholder with respect to a specific salience attribute. As an example, the attribute and
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the descriptions are provided below; the complete Stakeholder Salience Index assessment
is enclosed in Appendix A.
Table 4-1. Stakeholder Salience Attribute Description
Criticality:
" The stakeholder is time insensitive or has very low demands for a timely response
to its claims at risk in the enterprise
" The stakeholder asks for its stakes or values with enough anticipation allowing the
enterprise to attend them in a timely manner
" The stakeholder requires attention to its stakes in plausible or reasonable times
" The stakeholder calls for a prompt attention to the stakes at risk in the enterprise
" The stakeholder demands immediate attention to the stakes it compromise in the
enterprise and their associated payoffs
Upon selecting the most representative description, in this case for criticality which
is a component of salience attribute of Urgency, the respondent would extend the data
when prompted with the such questions as "why does the this entity demand immediate
attention?" or "Why doesn't this entity need more attention from others in the
enterprise?" This allowed for justification of the assessment; however, this justification
was then coded against the enterprise architecture framework views.
The initial interview was focused on reviewing the terminology of the Stakeholder
Salience attributes, conducting the self-assessment using the stakeholder salience index
assessment with extending the data. The final portion of the interview was to review the
other stakeholder candidates that were to be assessed in the second interview. Initially,
several respondents were hesitant to assess some of the others, as they did not work
directly with them. After the sampling approach was explained using multiple
perspectives and the assurance of anonymity, there were no refusals.
Prior to the second interview, the respondents had completed making their
selections of the appropriate descriptions for the remaining four candidates stakeholders.
This was to allow for more thorough discussion and extending the data. All of the second
interviews were conducted with the same individual that participated in the initial
interview. Based on the previous self-assessment interview, many had comments
prepared for their justifications. During this second interview, the respondents were also
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introduced to the value creations process framework and asked to assess the influence of
the stakeholder salience attributes that were now very familiar upon the value creation
process steps. These nine relationships were assessed using a Likert scale as described in
Chapter 3. These scores were then recorded on a response sheet by the interviewer.
Upon conclusion of the interview, the respondents were able to review their responses
real-time using the Webex or were provided a copy of their responses in raw form. Upon
acceptance and validation by the respondent, the data was then processed and analyzed.
4.7 Analyze Data
4.7.1 Proposition 1: The Stakeholder Salience Attributes Influence
The Enterprise Program Value Creation Process.
The data that was recorded from the interviews was both quantitative from the use
of the Likert scale and qualitative from the justifications. The following presents the data
analysis supporting consideration of proposition one: The stakeholder salience attributes
influence the enterprise program value creation process.
The Likert scale used was an extension of the five point Likert Scale (Siegle 2008).
This extension to a 10-point scale was done to avoid confusion about scoring during the
interview as the Stakeholder Salience Index assessment was based on a 10-point scale. In
accordance with the study protocol, the data was then placed into a database for statistical
analysis. Without the existence of previous literature to provide insight on the expected
distribution from this non-parametric analysis techniques were used. In order to identify
the relationships of the salience attribute and the value creation process the following
pairing were developed:
Table 4-2. Pairing of Salience Attribute to Value Creation











Nonparametric techniques do not make typical assumptions of the distributions such
as symmetry, modality, etc. These methods seek to draw insight from the observations,
rather inference from the parameters that typically are used to define the distribution
family. Most nonparametric techniques also use the median as the primary statistic for
the measure of central tendency. The following graph illustrates the medians, depicted
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Figure 4-1. Graph of Medians for Salience Attribute Influence on Value Creation
From the graph, it is evident that pairings 12, 21, and 33 have very high medians
and 22 is very low. In structuring the test hypothesis, the objective is to structure the test
so that the presence of strong evidence will allow the researcher to reject the null
hypothesis. The null hypothesis when comparing these pairing constitutes a multiple
sample test. A multiple sample test that compares the medians from the samples is the
Kruskal-Wallis test. The null hypothesis proposes that all medians are equal, while the
alternative hypothesis is that at least two of the medians are different. As is common
with hypothesis testing a p-value is computed and then compared against a pre-
determined level of significance. The consistent level of significance stated in Chapter 3
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was 0.05. Upon inspection of the graph, it was not surprising that the p-value for this test
was 0.00.
Table 4-3. Kruskal-Wallis Analysis
Kruskal-Wallis Nonparametric ANOVA: Score
HO: Median 1= Median 2-...- Median k
Ha: At least one pair Median I # Median j
Kruskal-Wallis Statistic (H) 164.48
DF 8
P-value (2-sided, adjusted for ties) 0.0000
We reject the null hypothesis that all medians are equal and conclude that the
influence relationships are different. This was an important test due to the possibility that
the influence of all salience attributes on all value creation processes could have been
rated as very important. Had this data been observed then essentially, this would indicate
that that none of the influence relationships was important. Based on the strong evidence,
the initial hypothesis of stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise program
value creation process can be refined.
4.7.2 Proposition 2: The Program Enterprise Architecture Influence
Stakeholder Salience Attributes.
The data linked to the second proposition was qualitative. As described in the
methods section, the data was collected during a series of interviews where respondents
assessed selected candidate stakeholders' salience attributes using the salience attribute
index assessment (Grossi 2003). During the completion of this assessment, the
respondents provided extended data that was analyzed qualitatively to determine the level
of influence of the enterprise architecture views (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004; Rhodes
et al. 2009) on the stakeholder salience attributes (Agle et al. 1999; Mitchell et al. 1997).
It is important to note that influence of enterprise architecture on the assessment of the
stakeholder salience does not necessarily infer that that high influence resulted in high
salience assessments. In fact, the majority of the extended data analysis indicated that the
salience attribute was not high due to limitations of the candidate stakeholder due to
enterprise architecture.
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A common example of this was the influence of Process and Organization. As an
example, a candidate stakeholder that had explicit responsibility for a key task, which
should lead to high legitimacy by definition, was not assess as having high legitimacy.
The further investigation revealed another candidate stakeholder, which was assessed as
having high power, had created a redundant process to complete the task. As a result,
other assessments perceived that the first candidate stakeholder had low legitimacy, while
the second candidate stakeholder was assessed as high legitimacy due to the influence of
the process architecture that was being implemented. This also provides insights relative
to the dynamic and cumulative nature of the enterprise - while the documented enterprise
architecture may imply stakeholder salience, the value creation process can change over
time based on the influence of stakeholder salience. This dynamic cycle is evidence of
the framework of the dynamic stakeholder salience enterprise engineering system.
The results of the qualitative coding produced a frequency and intensity of influence
that was codified using a Likert scale. The scale is presented in the following table:







The results of this qualitative data process were captured in a database, and then
analyzed using ordinal data analysis. Before conducting the statistical testing, it is
helpful to review the data for the influence of the enterprise architecture views influence
on stakeholder salience (EA-SS). The median score are presented in the following table:
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Table 4-5. Median Influence EA-SS Scores
rge cy Power Legitimacy
Criticality Importan Coercive Utilitarian Symbolic Pragmatic Moral Cognitive
Policy/EF 1 3 9 4 4 8 3 2
Strategy 1 2 3 4 2 3 2 2
Process 9 9 7 8 6 9 2 8
Organization 8 8 9 6 9 5 8 5
Knowledge 5 5 7 5 2 9 2 7
Infra/info-Structure 5 5 5 8 8 5 8 5
Product 8 4 8 8 8 6 5 5
Service 7 5 5 8 5 5 5 5
While it possible to explicitly test for differences across the influence relationships
using an extension of the Median Test (Conover 1999), a more standard and efficient
statistical analysis method is analysis of variance (ANOVA) (Devore 1999). The non-
parametric test for ANOVA is the Kruskal-Wallis test. This test's null hypothesis is that
the sample scores should have the same results, while the alternative is that at least one
has larger scores. From the table it was anticipated the samples for each of the influence
relationships would be different. The result of this test produced a p-value of 0.000.
Therefore, the decision is to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of
the influence relationships is higher than the others. This result leads the researcher to
explore those enterprise architecture views that either strongly or weakly influence the
stakeholder salience.
4.8 Refine Hypothesis
4.8.1 Stakeholder Salience Influence on Value Creation
While Figure 4.1 has already highlighted several influence relationship that we
would expect to be important or very important, 13 and 31 appear to have scores that that
may be possible. Using the non-parametric sign test, the null hypothesis is that the
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median is equal to six and the alternative hypothesis is that the median is greater than six.
This test method was selected, as it was evident that the observations were not symmetric
about the median, which is an underlying assumption for the alternative test method,
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test. This hypothesis allowed for strong evidence to rejecting the
null hypothesis, which leads to the conclusion that the influence relationship is important
or very important based on the Likert scale. The results of the statistical analysis for all
influence relationships are presented in the following figure.
1 Sample Sign Test for Medians: Score
HO: Median =6
H.: Median Greater Than6
interaction - Code 11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33
Count (N) 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Median 5 9 6 9 2 4 6 4 a
Points Below 6 16 0 8 0 23 16 5 19 0
Points EqualTo6 7 0 5 0 0 7 11 4 0
Points Above 6 0 23 10 23 0 0 7 0 23
P-value (1-sided) 1.0000 0.0000 0.4073 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3872 1.0000 0.0000
Figure 4-2. Sign Test Results for All Pairings Influence Relationships
The results of this analysis permit the following conclusions:
The influence of Power on Identification is not important or very important.
The influence of Power on Proposition is important or very important.
The influence of Power on Delivery is not important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Identification is important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Proposition is not important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Delivery is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Identification is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Proposition is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Delivery is important or very important.
Based on these conclusions, the following propositions are provided as a result of
this
Pla: Stakeholder Legitimacy strongly influences Enterprise Value Identification
Pib: Stakeholder Power strongly influences Enterprise Value Proposition
P1c: Stakeholder Urgency strongly influences Enterprise Value Delivery
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These conclusions provide new insight for the relationships between the stakeholder
salience model and the value creation process framework. These insights now permit one
to understand that based on the perception of the presence of the salience attributes how
the stakeholders influence the value creation process of the enterprise. For the candidate
stakeholders, this was very enlightening but also well accepted. Numerous respondents
expressed 'frustration' that while their legitimacy allowed them to offer value
opportunities to the enterprise, the decision making processes in the value proposition
phase were dominated by those stakeholders that had high-levels of power to drive the
process. As a result, the stakeholders that had high-levels of urgency forced the
enterprise into a reactionary mode and focused on those stakeholders at the expense of
the overall value opportunities. It was apparent that the second proposition was critical to
help identify policy opportunities to redesign the enterprise architectures to address this
challenge.
4.8.2 Enterprise Architecture Views Influence on Stakeholder
Salience.
From the medians for the sixty-four influence relationships, there were several
influence relationships that appeared important or very important, while others appear to
be unimportant or of little importance. To test for these conclusions, we examine the
scaled qualitative data. The non-parametric Sign test was selected. Given the ordinal
values for the Likert scale selected, for an enterprise architecture view to be considered
an important or very important influence on stakeholder salience, there must be strong
evidence to suggest that the median is greater than six. Likewise, for an enterprise
architecture view to be unimportant or of little importance to influence stakeholder
salience, then their must be strong evidence to suggest that the median is less than five.
The sign test was applied to all the enterprise architecture views with the scaled
observations as the ordinal data.
While there were twenty-three respondents, due to the categorization that occurs in
looking at the influence relationships, the observations increase dramatically at a rate of
sixty-four observations per respondent per assessment or 7360 total observations. This
had an impact on the sensitivity of the testing procedure. In the case of identifying
important or very important influence relationships, the test statistic, which is the count
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of observations that are greater than the expected median value of six, can be
approximated by a normal distribution. Therefore, as the number of observations
increases the standard error for a given level of significance will decrease at a rate of the
square root of the number of observations. As a result, the critical value for rejecting the
null hypothesis is very close to the expected count, which for the Sign test uses the worst
case of fifty per cent success. The test is very useful still as this sensitivity is accounted
for in the logic of the selection of the hypothesized median and the ordinal scale. The
results of the calculations for the two sets of hypothesis are presented in the following
tables.
Table 4-6. Sign Test for Important EA-SS Influence
II apl Sign Test for Meias OBS
H6: Median -6
H: Median Greater Than 6
EAV lnfraflnfo-Structure Knowledge Organization PolicyIEF Process Product
Count (N) 920 920 920 920 920 920
Median 6 5 8 4 8 7
Points Below 6 372 488 186 644 164 307
PoIntsEqual To 6 162 117 114 48 93 110
Points Above 6 396 315 621 228 663 503














From the results of the statistical analysis, the conclusion is that Organization,
Process, and Product are important or very important to influence stakeholder salience.
Also, while infra/info structure was scored as moderately important with a median
score of six, it had third highest number of observations above six, but had a significant
number below six that produced a p-value of 0.2033. This bi-modal response was
indicative of the different stakeholders and the interaction between process and
organization infra/info-structure (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004). there was a explicit
relationship in the responses of the stakeholders that described themselves in their self
assessment as principally life-cycle process focused (Nightingale 2002).
The second pair of null/alternative hypotheses are tested and presented in the
following table.
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Table 4-7. Sign Test for Unimportant EA-SS Influence
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
Ho: Median -5
Ha: Median Less Than 5
EAV infraflnfo-Structure Knowledge Organization PolicyEF Process Product Service Strategy
Count(N) 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920
Median 6 5 8 4 8 7 5 2
Points Below 5 228 389 112 551 132 197 267 812
Points Equal To 5 144 99 73 93 32 110 196 72
Points Above 5 548 432 735 276 756 613 457 36
P-value (I-oIded) 1.0000 0.9377 1.0000 0.0000 1000 1.000 1.0000 0.0000
The results allow the conclusion to be drawn that in the current enterprise
architecture, strategy and policy/external factors are not important in influencing
stakeholder salience. These results were somewhat surprising given the intense efforts of
senior leadership to provide very explicit and detailed policy to govern DOD acquisition
enterprises. One senior official offered the following insight, "We document stylized
processes in policy, but we execute real ones." This sentiment was echoed amongst
nearly all the candidate stakeholders, where policy is a guideline not a hard and fast rule.
The Army uses two terms: requirements and constraints. Requirements are those tasks
that are must be conducted and constraints are those actions that are prohibited. Review
of the extended data showed the following to be prevalent. Policy is primarily the means
for higher levels of organization to mandate increasing requirements upon those entities
at lower levels of the process hierarchy to improve outcome quality and integration. As a
result, policy masked by processes that may not be explicitly executed with the policy's
nuances enacted. This masking of hierarchy intent occurred with the regard to strategy as
well. While the capability that was provided by the program enterprise was well know
across all candidate stakeholders, only three of the stakeholders attempted to provide
responses into the next level of integration of how the program supported the multi-
program level enterprise. In fact, their perspective was one of resource competition and
defense of their resources and authorities.
The next refinement was to test the orthogonal perspective: What stakeholder
salience attributes were most influenced by enterprise architecture? The existing
enterprise architecture was important to influence two of the three sub-attributes for
power, Coercive and Utilitarian, with Moral, a sub-attribute of Legitimacy being, un-
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influenced by the different enterprise architecture views. We will address this power
aspect in context of the existing literature, but the moral influence was not surprising
given the common perception that the Army is a values-based organization. As a result,
those organizational values were deemed to be institutionalized rather than as a result of
enterprise design.
P2a-c: Process, Organization, Product have important or very important influence
on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
P2d: Strategy and Policy/External Factors have low influence on Stakeholder
Salience attributes.
P2e: Coercive and Utilitarian (Power) is most influenced by the current
Enterprise Architecture
P2f: Moral Legitimacy is least influenced by the current Enterprise
Architecture.
4.9 Enfolding Literature
The previous section presented the explicit findings based on the data analysis. In
the section, the following provides the context of where these findings can be placed in
the literature to facilitate addressing gaps or strengthening existing theory. This is a
multi-discipline effort that draws from the domains presented in Chapter 2 to reconcile
complementary and competing perspectives that are inherent in enterprise engineering
systems.
4.9.1 Stakeholder Salience Influence on Value Creation
Pla: Stakeholder Legitimacy strongly influences Enterprise Value Identification
As presented in Chapter 2, the process of value identification is the extension of the
definition phase of the system engineering methodology (Sage and Armstrong 1999).
One of the most controversial aspects of stakeholder theory centers around the debate of
the broad or narrow view (Freeman 2004; Jensen 2002) that defines what candidate
stakeholders have a legitimate claim on the enterprise (Mitchell et al. 1997). The first
finding from this case study is that for those stakeholders that demonstrate legitimacy,
they influence the enterprise value identification. As the first step in the value creation
process, the unilateral or bilateral exchanges amongst the stakeholders are put forth.
Those that subscribe to a view that the interorganizational relationships are only those
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explicit interactions, captured by transaction cost economics (Williamson 1994) or
resource dependency (Clarkson 1995), will limit this step to looking at the requests for
proposals and corresponding proposals; however, stakeholder theory with a normative
perspective (Donaldson and Preston 1995) allows for a broader view considering "non-
trivial relationships" including moral responsibilities just as the exchange transactions
(Brenner 1993).
By the definitions provided for legitimacy (Mitchell et al. 1997), it may be possible,
albeit difficult, for an enterprise to generate the necessary value for the end-user by
performing an incomplete value identification, the program enterprise cannot sustain
itself without accounting for the stakeholders' claims (Murman et al. 2002). This is
especially true in the bureaucratic program enterprise where the problem of
accountability (Wilson 1989) while directly linked to the enterprise's ability to complete
value identification, also strives to achieve efficiency which increasing in complexity
when there are divergent legitimate claims.
Pib: Stakeholder Power strongly influences Enterprise Value Proposition
The value proposition process at the program level formalizes the program
objectives, defines the relationships between and structure the program to deliver
expected value to the stakeholders." (Murman et al. 2002) While this process is
congruent to the system develop phase, the main difference is that the value proposition
expands the engineering effort to include the technical engineering processes as well as
the institutional aspects of the stakeholders value exchanges.
In the development of the Stakeholder Salience Framework, several definitions of
Power are presented (Mitchell et al. 1997). Based on the responses in the extended data,
the following was the one most commonly applied by the respondents: "the ability ...to
bring about the outcomes they desire."(Salancik and Pfeffer 1974) The sub-attributes
used by the Stakeholder Salience Index assessment (Grossi 2003) are explicitly defined in
the framework's development (Etzioni 1964; Mitchell et al. 1997). This ability to bring
about the outcomes in a bureaucracy is how the organization addresses its accountability
challenge (Wilson 1989). While the enterprise may have been very thorough with its
value identification processes, the system complexity, that is typical of an enterprise
engineering system, the uncertainty and risk from in the environment (Cutcher-
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Gershenfeld and Rebentisch 2002), alter the dynamic state of the system (ESD 2002).
While the well-being of the enterprise is dependent on the sustainment of the necessary
value exchanges, the pressures to meet accountability requirements (Wilson 1989) placed
on the powerful stakeholder often cause them to justifies responsiveness and focus the
enterprise proposition to align closer to their value needs. This confirms the data
captured about powerful stakeholders dominating the decision-making processes.
P1c: Stakeholder Urgency strongly influences Enterprise Value Delivery
One of the prominent characteristics in enterprise operations management is the idea
of Just-in-Time operations (Murman et al. 2002; Sheffi 2005; Womack and Jones 2003).
This idea captures the essence of urgency from a stakeholder salience attribute. The
definition provided in the Stakeholder Salience Framework is based on "the degree to
which a stakeholder's claim calls for immediate action." (Mitchell et al. 1997) This
attribute adds a dynamic component to the framework as it explicitly gauges temporally
the interactions. As stated in the motivation for this research, there is an average of 23
months delay in fielding capability for Defense acquisition systems indicating the
severity of this attribute for end users (GAO 2009) and frequency is related in other
research with a significant number of programs that experience delays (Cutcher-
Gershenfeld and Rebentisch 2002). To place this in context, an Army unit operates on a
three-year cycle - two years training, one year deployed. This delay would cause a unit
to be handed new equipment just before heading into a combat zone.
With this basis for the role that urgency has in value delivery, in the context of the
bureaucratic program enterprise, this attribute presents a dilemma. The two primary
challenges are equality and responsiveness (Wilson 1989). In the characteristics of
bureaucracy, the rules, once decided are well established, directly supporting the notion
of equality. However, the stakeholders that have a high degree of urgency require a
relatively high level of value exchanges. Given the ongoing operations experience by
this program enterprise in supporting the Army in two theaters the literature strongly
confirms this finding.
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4.9.2 Enterprise Architecture Views Influence on Stakeholder
Salience.
Unlike many commercial ventures that may be new start-ups or "skunk works," this
research acknowledges that the government and defense industry have national-level
enterprise architectures in existence. Based on the existence of these enterprises, we
examine how the Enterprise Architecture developed for a particular program enterprise
influences the stakeholder salience.
P2a-c: Process, Organization, Product have strongest influence on Stakeholder
Salience attributes.
The process view is comprised of the activities by which the enterprise generates
value for the stakeholders (Rhodes et al. 2009). This process view is comprised of a
process architecture that addresses three levels of processes: lifecycle, enabling
infrastructure and enterprise leadership (Murman et al. 2002; Nightingale 2002). This
architecture is the basis of what is developed as "task environment" (Thompson 1967).
The organizational view includes organizational structure as well as relationships,
culture, behaviors, and boundaries between entities (e.g. individuals, teams and
organizations) (Rhodes et al. 2009). In their seminal work (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967),
organizations necessarily create boundaries to allow specificity and expertise. This is a
key characteristic in the bureaucracy (Weber 1946). However, as a result of this
decomposition the role of integrators needed. A relationship was identified between the
amount of differentiation and integration such that the more differentiation the greater the
need for integrators (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Additionally the integrators must be
positioned in the hierarchy to ensure that integration is enforced to resolve any conflicts
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). While these principles are fundamental in the
characteristics of bureaucracy, it follows that by the granting of these integration
responsibilities with the ability to enforce integration, an integrator has been allocated
power and legitimacy. The notion of urgency is also implicit based upon the severity and
frequency of conflicts.
A product is thought of as the instantiation, physical or virtual, of value that is
delivered to the stakeholder. The product view consists of the products produced by the
enterprise for use by its stakeholders. This product architecture view may be very
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elaborate when a product architecture consisting of technical views at the system, sub-
system and component levels and higher at a family level to account for variants
(Thevenot and Simpson 2009). Given the well established decomposition for functional
responsibilities in the military (Hadley 1986; Wilson 1989), decomposing a product
nearly provides an organization chart for the stakeholders that would expectantly manage,
contract, support, finance, and ultimately use the system to be developed.
P2d: Strategy has Low influence on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
The stated definition of the Strategy view is "goals, vision and direction of the
enterprise, including business model and competitive environment" (Rhodes et al. 2009).
Based on the Process Architecture leveraged in the Enterprise Architecture views
(Nightingale 2002), the strategy view is mostly perceived at the enterprise leadership
processes. This is significant as it is at the program enterprise level that industry partners
or candidate stakeholders have the highest level of legitimacy. The strategy view is the
perspective that goals and supporting objectives are identified. These objectives are the
basis of what guides the enterprise to work toward a shared vision. While all
stakeholders in a DOD program enterprise are supporting to provide capability to the end
user, this may not be the primary objective. The literature refers to this dichotomy as the
Agent-Steward Dilemma (Martynov 2009) While this is typically an ethical
consideration for individuals, it can be considered for the entities of individuals or
organizations - stakeholders (Eisenhardt 1989). The principal behavior is described as
when desires or goals of the principal and the agent conflict, and it is difficult for the
principal to check the agent's actions (Eisenhardt 1989). The stewardship behavior is
when the stakeholder chooses to serve the principal's objectives rather than pursue
opportunities that would not result in a common benefit (Martynov 2009). While this
behavior is a component of the culture of the organization, the use of power can
predispose stakeholders to agent-principal relationships (Davis et al. 1997). This is
finding illuminates the self-defeating attempts to leverage contracting types to assert
greater power by the government over industry partners not only by shifting risk but also
with elaborate management information systems to capture value delivery in increasingly
smaller reporting cycles (Sapolsky et al. 2009). While, this research does not propose a
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solution to this dilemma, the explicit identification of effects of this phenomenon has not
been presented in literature.
P2e: Moral Legitimacy is least influenced by Enterprise Architecture views.
Moral legitimacy predominantly captures the normative perspective of stakeholder
theory. While other sub-attributes capture "goodness" of a candidate stakeholder by their
contributions to achieved the desired results of the enterprise, moral legitimacy assesses
the ethical support of the enterprise. While the literature does not provide recent explicit
studies on the moral legitimacy of Army or defense industry organizations, the literature
that considers moral claims does not connect aspects of enterprise architecture strongly
other than organizational responsibilities (Brenner 1993).
4.9.3 Enterprise Architecture View Interaction
An additional comment based on the literature is that the enterprise architecture
views are not independent; the framework provides interactions among the views
(Nightingale and Rhodes 2004; Rhodes et al. 2009) However, in establishing this initial
data set for analysis, statistical testing methods used test the enterprise architecture views
and the respective stakeholder salience sub-attributes without the interaction terms. The
interactions of the enterprise architecture views are identified as part of the future
research refinements.
4.10Closure
Based on the statistical analysis supporting the refined propositions, the evidence of
supporting literature and addressing conflicting perspectives, the findings of this case will
be forwarded for reevaluation in the cross-case analysis.
Several steps have been taken to address validity. The first was the data collection
effort with multiple sources of data, verification of the transcripts and assessments by the
key informants, a clear chain of evidence and use of a case study database as part of a
rigorous case study protocol. The second was the approach for data analysis to ensure
that all data was addresses and focused on both rival explanations but remain focused on
the most significant aspects of the case. All these combined with the replication logic for
the remaining two cases strengthen the validity of the case study and its findings.
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5 Case 2 COTS Program
5.1 Background
The second case focuses on an Army aviation program that was intended to provide
critical capabilities for the Army's aerial reconnaissance efforts. The combatant
commanders requested the capabilities for their efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
initiation of the program was announced in 2004, shortly following the Army's
cancellation of the world's most advance aerial reconnaissance helicopter, the Comanche.
The Comanche, a 23-year effort, had a history of challenges with six program
restructurings. A program is restructured when significant changes to schedule,
quantities, or specifications occur. In the case of this program, budget pressures as well
as schedule challenges were the primary drivers for the program restructurings and
ultimately the cancellation. This final decision was not a surprise as several independent
reviews had identified the persistent as well as new challenges (GAO 2001).
Given this pattern of program challenges, the Army proactively developed a plan to
reallocation of the planned fiscal resources to directly affect its capabilities. By
reallocating the resources to significantly improve the readiness of other platforms
addressing deferred maintenance and supply-chain backlogs, the Army could extend the
lifetime of existing air frames to allow for an accelerated "commercial off-the-shelf'
(COTS) acquisition. Using benefits of this approach (Templin and Heberling 1994), this
new program would leverage technologies that were determined to be mature, and as part
of the source selection, team with industry partners with a record of successful aviation
development programs. The Army leaders perceived that this approach would mitigate
risks common to technologically intense acquisition programs, and they successfully
convinced the leaders at the Department of Defense to support this effort. It is important
to note the background of the four key leaders in the Executive Office of the
Headquarters, which consists of the top two civilian leaders and the top two generals in
the Department of the Army. While the top generals typically have infantry or armor
command experience, the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army was an Army helicopter pilot,
giving the leadership first-hand functional and technical experience of the required
capabilities to be provided by this new program enterprise.
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Additionally, while the majority of the development effort of the Comanche was
during waning years of the Cold War, combatant commanders, engaged in the two
theaters, were increasingly reliant on the existing aerial reconnaissance capability the
Army possessed. Based on the risk mitigation and the demand to support the deployed
units, a very aggressive schedule for the new program was approved with first unit
equipped in four years.
According to the monthly periodic reports, the program seemed to be headed toward
success. However, as the enterprise worked to complete the engineering and
manufacturing development for the planned Milestone C decision, the program office
reported that the program's development cost and cost per unit had increased
significantly and several critical tests were postponed due to system integration problems.
In March, 2007, as awareness of these challenges were acknowledged, the Army leaders
issued the industry partners a "stop-work order" until plans could be revised to assure
meeting the agreed to value propositions. Unable to sufficiently mitigate these risks, the
Department of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Logistic and Technology,
cancelled the program in October 2008.
5.2 Motivation
This case was selected primarily due to the replication of the enterprise architecture
and value creation processes as a set of the three program enterprises. However, it is
unique in that it is the only one of the three cases that has been canceled for failing to
deliver upon its value proposition. This helps to build the internal validity of the
construction of theoretical contributions using cases that were both successful and failing.
5.3 Review Existing Case Studies
A literature review failed to produce any case studies for the program that were
released to the public. However, several information briefings and monthly program
assessments were provided to the researcher for consideration and analysis. A summary
of the monthly reports, provided by the Army, for the Probability of Success Report Tool
(Higbee 2006; Higbee and Ordonio 2005) were aggregated to produce the following
longitudinal analysis for the program.
From the following figure, the two areas represent the assessment of the program
enterprise ability to be successful based on the assessed areas during the period January
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2006, to March 2007 when a stop-work order was issued by the U.S. Army to the lead
developer due to anticipated cost over-runs and schedule delays. It is interesting to note
that while the technical aspects, such as program resources, program execution
dramatically decreased, 26.5 percent from the maximum score of 68 in April 2006, to the
minimum of 52 in March 2007, the assessed value of program advocacy, the second
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Figure 5-1 Probability of Success, Program 2
The program advocacy conveys explicit support or lack-of-support by pre-
determined stakeholders - Congress, DOD leadership, Warfighters, Joint Staff, Industry,
international partners, and Army leadership. This assessment is based on actions,
decisions, communications, and other direct interactions between the program manager
and these entities. With this information, initial analysis would indicate that weak
dynamics due to stakeholder salience were influencing the value creation in the program
enterprise.
5.4 Develop Initial Hypotheses
Again, the case looks at the initial set of hypotheses that serve as the basis for each
of the cases:
P1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise program
value creation process.
P2: The program enterprise architecture influence stakeholder salience
attributes.
These propositions will be tested and based on the data analysis and the existing
literature the propositions will be refined and focused.
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5.5 Crafting Protocols
The protocols used were consistent across all three cases. However, the list of
candidate stakeholders was significantly different for case 2. This program enterprise
was unique compared to the other cases in that the program had been canceled in 2008.
As a result, all potential respondents left the organizations either through reassignment,
retirement, or were no longer working for the candidate stakeholder entity. This required
the researcher investigation to not only identify qualified respondents but also research a
means of contact to initiate the interview process. The criterion for a respondent was that
he had been in a leadership or management position for the candidate stakeholder entity
for a minimum of twelve months. This ensured that the potential respondent would have
been represented the candidate stakeholder entity in all processes through out an annual
cycle, which is predominant business cycle for government agencies and supporting
organizations. The initial list of fifteen candidate stakeholders was identified based on
preliminary inquiries with the previous assistant program manager and key leaders that
were still in positions of authority. From this list of fifteen candidate stakeholders, the
researcher was able to interview twelve respondents that met the qualification criteria.
While this is considered a small sample size, the number of observations provided
appropriate amount of data.
After reviewing the case study protocol, it was determined that the current
instruments would continue in use to collect the data. Using the WebEx@ tool for
presenting the Stakeholder Salience Index (Grossi 2003) to capture candidate stakeholder
assessments and extend the data (Weiss 1994) to collect information about the initial
research propositions. The Program Probability of Success reports were very helpful to
inform the discussion about the candidate stakeholders in terms of value creation with
regard to stakeholder salience.
5.6 Collect Data
The twelve respondents from Industry, DOD and across the Army voluntarily
participated in the study. All respondents were the principles for their respective
organizational entity with the exception of one Army senior leader that had retired and
was not available. His executive officer was interviewed as a proxy; he was
acknowledged by reputation as having full knowledge of the principal's interactions and
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rationale in their engagements with the program enterprise. Due to the relevance of the
previous and possible future actions as a result of the program, all respondents insisted on
non-attribution and anonymity.
Due to the smaller number of candidate stakeholders, using the lattice sampling
method (Abbey 1978) would have allowed for reducing the number of assessments for
each respondent; however, the savings in time or effort for the responses were negligible,
therefore each respondent was asked for a self-assessment and to assess four other
stakeholders.
In accordance with the research protocol, the interviews were conducted in three
parts - introduction and self-assessment, completion of the Stakeholder Salience Index
for the four other candidate stakeholders, and the interview for justification of the
stakeholder salience assessments and the value creation influence. Each part was
reported to average approximately one hour. The collection effort from identifying the
list of respondents until completing the last interview required nearly eight months. This
was primarily due to difficulty in scheduling the interviews with the respondents.
The interviews were recorded with consent, and transcribed. These transcripts were
then verified by the respondent for accuracy and completeness. The data was then
processed and incorporated into the case study database.
5.7 Analyze Data
5.7.1 Proposition 1: The Stakeholder Salience Attributes Influence
the Enterprise Program Value Creation Process.
The data that was recorded from the interviews was both quantitative from the use
of the Likert scale and qualitative from the justifications. The following presents the
data-analysis-supporting consideration of proposition one: The stakeholder salience
attributes influence the enterprise program value creation process.
The scale used was an extension of the five point Likert Scale. This was done to
avoid confusion as the Stakeholder Salience Index assessment was based on a 10-point
scale. In accordance with the study protocol, the data was then placed into a database for
statistical analysis. Without the existence of previous literature to provide insight on the
expected distribution from this non-parametric analysis techniques were used. In order to
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identify the relationships of the salience attribute and the value creation process the
following pairing were developed:
Table 5-1. Pairing of Salience Attribute to Value Creation










Nonparametric techniques do not make typical assumptions of the distributions such
as symmetry, modality, etc. These methods seek to draw insight from the observations,
rather inference from the parameters that typically are used to define the distribution
family. Most nonparametric techniques also use the median as the primary statistic for
the measure of central tendency. The following graph illustrates the medians, depicted
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Figure 5-2. Graph of 95 Percent CI for Median for Salience Attribute Influence on
Value Creation
From the graph, it is evident that pairings 12, 21, 31, and 33 have medians above
seven which would indicate that these interactions between the salience attribute is
important or very important influence on the value creation process. Additionally, 13,
22, and 32 have medians above six, which is the ordinal value for the moderately
important, but may not be statistically significant. However, 11 and 23 have much lower
median scores and therefore, using the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric ANOVA test,
there is a strong expectation that the medians will be statistically significantly different.
Again, the null hypothesis proposes that all medians are equal, while the alternative
hypothesis is that at least two of the medians are different, with a level of significance
selected as 0.05. Given the visible differences of the medians, the expected result of
rejecting the null hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0.027.
Table 5-2. Kruskal-Wallis Analysis
Kruskal-Wallis Nonparametric ANOVA: Score
HO: Median 1 - Median 2 ... Median k
H.: At least one pair Median I # Median J
Kruskal-Wallls Statistic (H) 17.363
DF 8
P-value (2-sided, adjusted for ties) 0.0265
With the decision to reject the null hypothesis that all medians are equal, there is
strong evidence to suggest that the influence relationships are different. Also insightful is
noting that the medians were spread across the ordinal scale. This indicates that while the
influence relationships are different, there are some that appear to important and others
that are not. Using the interactive analysis approach, more focused testing can be
performed using this data.
5.7.2 Proposition 2: The program enterprise architecture influence
stakeholder salience attributes.
While the respondents were directly asked to assess the candidate stakeholder
salience, the extended data of respondent justifications for these assessments provided
rich qualitative data on the influence of the enterprise architecture on the perceived
stakeholder salience. These justifications were recorded, transcribed, and coded
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(Charmaz 2006) for frequency (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and intensity (Eisenhardt 1989),
using the Enterprise Architecture Views (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004; Rhodes et al.
2009).
As a result of this data processing, the following table is presented reflecting the
median scores for the influence relationships of the Enterprise Architecture Views (EA)
on the Stakeholder Salience attributes (SS):
Table 5-3. Median Scores for Influence of EA on SS
_ __U_ Power ___Loig _
Criicaity Importance Coercive Utilitarian Symbolic P Mora Contive
Policy/EF 2 8 9 5 5 8 2 3
Strategy 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2
Procews 7 5 8 8 5 8 2 8
Organization 7 7 10 5 8 5 8 5
Knowledge 2 5 5 5 2 8 2 8
infrallnfo- 2 2 5 7 5 2 4 5Structure
Product 8 8 6 7 8 7 5 5
Service 2 5 5 7 5 5 5 5
From inspection, it would seem that the medians are different. Using the table to
illustrate the pairs for identifying the pairs, it follows that the first influence pairing
would be Policy/External Factors and Criticality; second is Policy/External Factors and
Importance; until the sixty-fourth pairing of Service and Cognitive(Legitimacy). This
establishes 64 levels for the factor of influence-pairing. By using the Kruskal-Wallis Test
we gain sensitivity over the extended Medians Test (Conover 1999) and leverage all of
the information from the observations. With sixty-four levels for the influence of
Enterprise Architecture (EA) on Stakeholder Salience Attribution (SS), the graph of the
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medians for the various levels is very compressed; however, the graph easily depicts the
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Figure 5-3. Medians of Influence of EA on SS
The p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test was 0.000. The decision is to reject the null
hypothesis that all the medians are the same and conclude that more than one of the
influence pairings has greater influence than others. This again allows more focused
propositions for data analysis.
5.8 Refine Hypothesis
5.8.1 Stakeholder Salience Influence on Value Creation
From the analysis of the initial proposition, several influence relationships appeared
to be important. The graph also indicates the observations were not symmetric by the
location in the range of the median. This would support continued usage of the non-
parametric Sign test (rather than the Wilcoxon test). Based on ordinal values for the
Likert scale, Any median that is equal to six is moderately important; however, if there is
strong evidence to suggest that the median is great than six, that influence relationship is
said to be important or very important. Table 5-2 illustrates the influence pairings for
Stakeholder Salience (SS) on Value Creation (VC). The results of the Sign test for the
nine influence relationships are shown in the following table.
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Table 5-4. Sign Test for SS on VC
I apeSin Test for Medians: Score
Ho: Median -6
Ha: Median Greater Than 6
Interaction - Code 11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33
Count(N) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Median 5 9 6 7.500 6.500 5.500 7.500 6.500 9
Points Below6 8 0 5 2 5 6 4 2 2
PointsEqual To6 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 4 1
Points Above 6 4 11 5 9 6 4 7 6 9
P-value (1-sided) 0.9270 0.0005 0.6230 0.0327 0.5000 0.8281 0.2744 0.1445 0.0327
These results suggest that there is strong evidence to suggest that the medians for
Power-Proposition, Identification-Legitimacy, and Urgency-Delivery are greater than six
and to conclude that these influence relationships are important or very important. The
influence relationship of Urgency-Proposition had a median of 6.5. This would indicate
that the sixth-ranked observation was a 6 and the seventh ranked observation was a 7,
with the midpoint of the two being 6.5. However, based number of other observations
below 6, there was not strong evidence to conclude that that the median was greater than
with statistical significance. Reviewing the qualitative data, there were several
perspectives that saw a very important influence by the candidate stakeholders that were
higher in the organizational hierarchy; however, the candidate stakeholders that were
operating in the lower levels of the enterprise stated that the urgency should influence the
proposition aspects of the enterprise value creation process, it currently was not. These
results provide the following conclusions:
The influence of Power on Identification is not important or very important.
The influence of Power on Proposition is important or very important.
The influence of Power on Delivery is not important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Identification is important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Proposition is not important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Delivery is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Identification is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Proposition is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Delivery is important or very important.
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Based on these results, the following refined propositions are provided:
Pla: Stakeholder Legitimacy strongly influences Enterprise Value Identification
Pib: Stakeholder Power strongly influences Enterprise Value Proposition
P1c: Stakeholder Urgency strongly influences Enterprise Value Execution
Having revisited the data to refine the hypotheses for the influence of stakeholder
salience on value creation, we now revisit the data with respect to the influence of
Enterprise Architecture on Stakeholder Salience.
5.8.2 Enterprise Architecture Views Influence on Stakeholder
Salience.
With the conclusion that at least one relationship of the influence of an Enterprise
Architecture view on Stakeholder Salience Attribute was greater than the others, a
statistical test was conducted to identify any relationships that were important or very
important. This was accomplished using the Sign test based on the ordinal data set of
480 observations for each of the eight enterprise architecture views. The results of this
test are presented in the following table:
Table 5-5. Sign Test for Important EA-SS Influence
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: X
H16: Median -6
H.: Median Greater Than 6
EAV InftraInfo-Structure Knowledge Organization PollcyIEF Process Product Service Strategy
Count (N) 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Median 4 5 7 5 7 7 5 2
Points Below 6 344 287 145 257 151 120 308 450
Points Equal To 6 58 60 70 43 60 73 79 14
Points Above 6 78 133 265 180 269 287 93 16
P-value (1-slded) 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.9999 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
The sign test's null hypothesis for this test construct was that the median is 6, while
the alternative was that the median is greater than six. Based on the analysis presented,
Organization, Process, and Product had p-values sufficiently low to reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that their influence on stakeholder salience is important or very
important. This result is not surprising given the literature review's emphasis of the task
environment and organizational structure on bureaucracies (Weber 1946; Wilson 1989).
The evidence of the influence of product was indicative of how enterprise architecture
influence multiple system properties (Whitney et al. 2004).
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In contrast, the data is tested to identify enterprise architecture views that are
unimportant or of little importance. This is accomplished using the sign test with a null
hypothesis that the median is equal to five, while the alternative is that the median is less
than five. The results of this test are presented in the following table:
Table 5-6. Sign Test for Unimportant Important EA-SS Influence
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
Ho: Median - 5
H.: Median Less Than 5
EAV infralinfo-Structure Knowledge Organization PoeyIEF Process Product Service Strategy
Count (N) 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Median 4 5 7 5 7 7 5 2
Points Below5 282 236 83 206 109 67 223 427
Points Equal To 5 62 51 62 51 42 53 85 23
Points Above 5 136 193 335 223 329 360 172 30
P-value1sided) 0.0000 0.0213 1.0000 0.8076 1.0000 1.0000 0.0059 0.0000
The results are interesting based on the number of enterprise architecture views that
were found to be unimportant or of little importance. It is important to note the context of
this enterprise. Recall that this enterprise program is pre-milestone B. This confers that
there are no prototypes that are in production as technologies are still being integrated
into the platform. As a result, there is essentially no infrastructure other than the
development locations. Likewise, at this stage of the program enterprise the task
environment is very segregated to the respective functional organizations. The extended
data indicated that there was very little knowledge that was shared outside organizational
boundaries. The data also indicated that in addition to a lack of exchange of knowledge,
there was little exchange of support. Therefore by definition, the service sub-architecture
was virtually nonexistent. The enterprise architecture view that was the least influential
was strategy. In comparison to the probability of success reports the strategic fit of the
enterprise was contradictory. According to the probability of success reports, the strategic
alignment of the program was very good with 14 of 15 points for this metric. In
attempting to triangulate this score with the candidate stakeholders' responses, it was
apparent that while the alignment of the capabilities to be delivered by the program
enterprise to the national level enterprise were constant, the strategic enterprise
architecture view across a program enterprise was not well defined nor understood.
Based on the data that was collected, it is also insightful to examine which stakeholder
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salience sub-attributes were most influenced or least influenced by these enterprise
architecture views.
Using the similar approach, each stakeholder salience sub attribute was tested to
have a corresponding important or very important influence relationship with the
enterprise architecture views. The results of this test are illustrated in the following table:
Table 5-7. SS that had Important Influence by EA
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
Ho: Median - 6
Ha: Median Greater Than 6
SALSA Coercive Cognitive Criticality Importance Moral Pragmatic Symbolic Utilitarian
Count (N) 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Median 6 5 3 5 3 6 5 6
Points Below 6 193 271 320 245 366 213 278 176
Points Equal To 6 66 63 30 60 35 57 52 94
Points Above 6 221 146 130 175 79 210 150 210
P-value (1-sided) 0.0923 1.0000 1.0000 0.9997 1.0000 0.5771 1.0000 0.0465
It is evident from these results that utilitarian (power) was most influenced by the
enterprise architecture views. Also, coercive (power) was appeared to be influenced by
the enterprise architecture, but the evidence was not statistically significant to reach the
conclusion. These two results amplify the general comments by those candidate
stakeholders that were principally operating at the lifecycle process level. In particular,
there were many decisions that were made at much higher levels of the organizational
structure that typically had been delegated to lower functional managers. While it was the
intent of the higher-level leadership to assist and expedite the successes of this program
enterprise, the result of this effort forced an acceleration of work that had significant
impacts on the value creation process.
In examining the data for the stakeholder salience sub attributes that were least
influenced by the enterprise architecture views the statistical analysis results are
presented in the following table:
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Table 5-8. SS that had unimportant influence relationships with EA.
1 Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
H6: Median -5
Ha: Median Less Than 5
SALSA Coercive Cognitive Criticality Importance Moral Pragmatic Symbolic Utilitarian
Count (N) 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Median 6 6 3 5 3 6 5 6
PointsBelow 5 140 202 297 196 330 175 206 87
Points Equal To 5 53 69 23 49 36 38 72 89
Points Above 5 287 209 160 235 114 267 202 304
P-value (1-sided) 1.0000 0.6534 0.0000 0.9730 0.0000 1.0000 0.4410 1.0000
The test results all the researchers to conclude that criticality and moral sub
attributes were minimally influenced by enterprise architecture. This may seem to
contradict the conclusions of the previous paragraph, but it is important to distinguish
between the accepted enterprise architecture and the system implementation. The data
reflects the inability for the enterprise architecture to mitigate the results of changes to the
other stakeholders' criticality. Well the influence of the enterprise architecture on the
moral attribute was of little importance will as it was widely accepted that the enterprise
inherently had moral legitimacy. Again, this reaffirms, and triangulates, the observed
reports for the anticipated contribution of the capabilities to be generated by this program
enterprise.
Based on these findings, the initial propositions have been refined and are presented
below:
P2a-c: Process, Organization, Product have important or very important influence
on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
P2d: Info/Structure, Knowledge, Service and Strategy have low influence on
Stakeholder Salience attributes.
P2e: Utilitarian (Power) is most influenced by the current Enterprise
Architecture
P2f: Criticality (Urgency) and Moral (Legitimacy) are least influenced by the
current Enterprise Architecture.
With these refined propositions, the next step in the methodology is to you view,
compare and contrast in the context of the accepted literature.
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5.9 Enfolding Literature
The previous section presented the explicit findings based on the data analysis. In
the section, the following provides the context of where these findings can be placed in
the literature to facilitate addressing gaps or strengthening existing theory. This is a
multi-discipline effort that draws from the domains presented in Chapter 2 to reconcile
complementary and competing perspectives that are inherent in enterprise engineering
systems.
Pla: Stakeholder Legitimacy strongly influences Enterprise Value Identification
One of the controversial aspects of stakeholder theory is the conflicting definitions
of legitimacy (Freeman 2004; Jensen 2002). Those that subscribe to the narrow definition
seek to provide a basis that definitively includes or excludes those that have "something
at risk." (Mitchell et al. 1997) Captured in the extended data, was the implications of
strategic and institutional legitimacy (Suchman 1995). The aspects of operational
contributions that are the basis of strategy are not requisite in a bureaucracy for a
candidate stakeholder to have high institutional stakes based on its position in the
organization or process. As a result, stakeholders that demonstrate only legitimacy as
their attribute of salience are afforded the opportunity to engage in the value
identification effort for the program enterprise. The manner in which organizations
operationalize this relationship can have adverse affects as related in the next section.
Pib: Stakeholder Power strongly influences Enterprise Value Proposition
Power is a significant consideration at the program level (Wood 2010). However in
a bureaucracy, a stakeholder that has power and legitimacy is said to have authority
(Mitchell et al. 1997; Weber et al. 1947). This "dominant" stakeholder has the ability to
justifiably influence the decisions that identify the value for the enterprise and determine
the manner for the creation of enterprise value. This characterization was particularly
insightful for this case with respect to one candidate stakeholder that was added to the list
of candidates. The sample's assessments overwhelmingly scored them as high for power
and legitimacy based on the escalation of decisions to very high-levels of the Army for
oversight to correct the failures of the Comanche program. However, this influence over
the decisions was detrimental in the long run as many of the decisions to help alleviate
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the process limitations and constraints were identified as contributory to the systemic
failures of the program enterprise.
Plc: Stakeholder Urgency strongly influences Enterprise Value Delivery
The failures of serial processes manifest the errors in subsequent phases (Kumar et
al. 2000) and are typically not observed until downstream processes fail. Just as the
DOD has required a systems engineering lifecycle approach (Redshaw 2010) to be
mitigate this risk of systemic failure, the similarity presented in Chapter 2, holds true for
the value creation process as when the program enterprise must deliver its promise at a
critical event such as a milestone event, the previous errors will be apparent. With the
challenges apparent that precipitated the "stop-work-order," the stakeholders that had
unmet urgent claims were recognized. The decisions that attempted to maintain the
velocity of the program effort, had failed to deliver the value necessary. Based on the
data, this would appear to be a surprise; however, the dynamics of this accumulation of
unfulfilled value delivery are not only well known, but incorporated in many systems
analysis courses (Sterman 2000). By the interactions between the Stakeholder Salience
Framework (Mitchell et al. 1997) and the Value Creation Framework (Murman et al.
2002), we see that this proposition captures the influence that while urgent claims on the
enterprise that are met can help success, urgent claims that are unmet, will compile and
ensure failure. The number of program enterprises cited in government reports that are
delayed and over-budget provide reinforcement to this phenomena (GAO 2009).
P2a-b: Process and Organization have important or very important influence on
Stakeholder Salience attributes.
Consistently through this research, the strong influence of process and organization
upon the bureaucracy is evident for the institutions that interact to form the program
enterprise. For this case, the influence of process and organization was of particular
interest given the duration in which the enterprise was in existence. However, as
presented by foundational work on organization theory, given the canonical task
environment, the result will produce a congruent organization design (Daft 1989).
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P2c: Product has important or very important influence on Stakeholder Salience
attributes.
As a reminder of the case context, this program was attempting to leverage existing
technologies and to integrate them into a functional operational system. In this case, the
product has significant impact on the inclusion of stakeholders with the elimination of
several commercial stakeholder candidates. The decisions that provide the value
propositions can be significantly influenced by the type of product that is produced
(Winn 2001; Winn and Keller 2001). While the management might classify this influence
as marketing, this research shows that there is a larger dilemma when the enterprise
perspective is applied (Gulati and Kletter 2005) to the value creation process (Murman et
al. 2002).
P2d: Info/InfraStructure, Knowledge, Service and Strategy have low influence
on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
The finding that these essential enterprise architecture views were of little
importance to influence the stakeholder salience initially seems to contradict accepted
literature; however, when examining the temporal aspect of enterprise in terms of
maturity, this finding is supported. From an info/infrastructure standpoint, the program
adopted existing systems that provided management office space, engineering facilities,
and existing infostructure for networks, software architectures, and other information
technology systems. While this may appear to support the risk mitigation approach of
COTS lifecycle approach, it may not support enterprise lifecycle support in terms of
maturity. Based on enterprise architecture' influence, explicitly information and
supporting information systems, the maturity of the enterprise has great implications
(Ross et al. 2006). While this work does not provide an explicit parameterization of time
for maturity, there is a cumulative adoption of maturity for enterprise architectures in
terms of form and function. This also provides for the consideration of strategy. The
level of integration that is need for an approach of using integration must incorporate a
sharing of information and knowledge (Venkatraman 1994; Venkatraman and Henderson
1998). This integration provides the basis for developing the type of strategic alliance
(Gulati and Kletter 2005; Gulati et al. 2000) commiserate with an integrated program
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enterprise. Having used essentially a standard architecture for these views there was little
to no differentiation that was apparent in the stakeholders' salience.
P2e: Utilitarian (Power) is most influenced by the current Enterprise Architecture
In this case, utilitarian power was very much influenced by the effect of
organization and process, in particular the organization hierarchy and decision-making
processes. The three ways to assert influence using this framework are Coercive,
Utilitarian and Symbolic. Using the respective definitions, utilitarian (power) is based
upon the control of resources and their allocation (Etzioni 1964; Mitchell et al. 1997).
Based upon the high degree of influence of the process and organization views, this
particular salience attribute was dominated by the resource management decision-making
process. Based on the reports, there were early indications of the challenges facing the
program. However, the tiered-levels of governance within the Army consistently
rationalized the concerns as "something that could be fixed later." This perspective up
the decision-chain is consistent with the impact of having a universally accepted
understanding of the situation (Hambrick and Mason 1984). While the architecture is not
responsible for this section of those decision makers, it provides for the processes,
organizational positions, and the products (such as the budget decisions) that empower a
stakeholder with the authorities to exercise this type of power (Benz and Frey 2007;
Dutton and Jackson 1987). In this case, it is evident that the "lessons" of public
governance are not universal within a bureaucracy.
P2f: Criticality (Urgency) and Moral (Legitimacy) are least influenced by the
current Enterprise Architecture.
The influence of enterprise architecture on Moral (legitimacy) is directly reflected in
the normative aspects of stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Driscoll and
Starik 2004). It is interesting to note that the criticality (urgency) of stakeholders was not
influenced by enterprise architecture - this is a contradiction of the existing literature.
Based on the review of the extended data and analysis, this salience attribute was
influenced in a manner with the exception of the three major enterprise architecture views
process, organization, and product. This example speaks directly to the conclusion drawn
by other research efforts in the DOD acquisition enterprises (Beard 1976; Sapolsky
1972). These conclusions of the influence of key stakeholders on the processes based on
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their organizational position will drive the enterprise toward delivery of specific products.
As a result of this richer understanding and reviewing the data, this proposition is refined
to exclude critical (urgency) as not being influenced by enterprise architecture views.
5.10Closure
Interestingly, the basis for the Stakeholder Salience framework was presented for an
outward perspective from the "CEO's"-vantage (Agle et al. 1999; Mitchell et al. 1997).
However, in this case, this framework would have benefited the enterprise, as the
stakeholder that was assessed as having the most authority (power and legitimacy) was
not aware of their salience and how imposing this influence impacted other stakeholders'
salience, which, as shown, influences the value creation process. As a result, the impact
of the identification of the requisite value exchanges across all stakeholders and the
proposition adopted on how to deliver the requisite value placed urgent stakeholders in an
unfeasible situation. While a public report of the issues responsible leading to the
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6 Case I Program A
6.1 Background
The third case is the most recent and arguably the most relevant. This statement is made
in reference to a number of large-scale defense programs being terminated with more
expected (Gates 2009). As a result of these decisions the lifecycle for current systems are
increasing. For many airframes in the services, their fleet ages are dramatically
increasing. For the Army, the current aerial reconnaissance platform has an average age
of 18.5 years since fielding the last block upgrade. (Note: A block upgrade is a
significant re-engineering effort for a particular sub-system that may result in the change
of the system nomenclature.) This upgrade focused on the sensor suite that provided
capability for nighttime/all-weather surveillance; however, many of the avionics, engines,
control, navigation systems, and the chassis were carried forward from previous
generations. This enhanced the capabilities, but would not have significant impact on the
sustainment and supportability of the system (Prouty 1989). Also interesting is the fact
that the Army is currently operating with a deficiency of aggregate numbers for the
aircraft due to lack of production capability for new aircraft to replace those that are
catastrophic losses. These conditions plus the advancements necessary to provide
necessary capabilities demanded by the combatant commanders for the enterprise
program indicate that there is significant demand for fielding a new aircraft. As
mentioned in Chapter 5, there have been two efforts to meet this need that were not
successful in fielding to the Army. As a result, the temporal pressure to field a viable
system, the current program enterprise was requested, in October 2009, to initiate a
significant reengineering effort to produce an aircraft that would meet necessary
capability requests for an interim, approximately another 15 years, until a new helicopter
could be developed. In March 2010, the Army notified the researcher that the enterprise
program was operational for inclusion in the research effort.
6.2 Motivation
Based on the research methodology presented in Chapter 3, this case was included
as part of the multiple case design. This case is particularly interesting from a practical
and epistemological vantage. This case exemplifies the case study approach for
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replication. While the same entities will form the set of candidate stakeholders, there are
many new individuals in the key positions due to cyclic personnel turnover in both
government and commercial organizations. This would be helpful with both internal and
external validity as it supports consideration of the enterprise system more so than a set
team of leaders.
6.3 Review Existing Case Studies
From a research methods standpoint, Case 1 is treated independently from this case
and was not referenced to inform this case study effort as it will be cross-analyzed in a
later section. Likewise, there were minimal case studies available for reference on
aviation program enterprises (Matty 2009; Matty et al. 2008) or lifecycle extensions.
6.4 Develop Initial Hypotheses
Chapter 3 develops the logic for the initial hypothesis that served as the basis for
each of the cases. The initial hypotheses also served as the basis for the iterative steps of
analyzing data, refining hypothesis and enfolding in the literature.
P1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise program
value creation process.
P2: The program enterprise architecture influence stakeholder salience
attributes.
6.5 Crafting Protocols
The protocols described in Chapter 3 were replicated for this case. The data was
collected using the instruments and methods described in the following section.
6.6 Collect Data
One of the events scheduled to initiate the value creation process, a special
conference was held for all interested parties for both government and commercial
organizations. The attendee list for this conference served as the preliminary list of
candidate stakeholders. This list would be adjusted as needed based on the interview
data. Following the protocol presented in Chapter 3, twenty-five candidate stakeholders
were interviewed. The interviews were conducted over a period of five days in person
during a conference in Dallas, Tex. in April 2010. The lattice sampling approach (Abbey
1978) was used. The number and structure of assessments were maintained with one
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self-assessment and assessments for four other candidate stakeholders. The interviews
were conducted by one researcher and were recorded for transcription for data processing
in a separate room in the conference area at a time selected by the respondent to minimize
distractions due to other scheduled activities. The interviews were conducted in two
parts. The first session introduced respondents to the Stakeholder Salience Index
assessment (Grossi 2003) by facilitating a self-assessment and collecting extended data
(Weiss 1994). The respondent was provided copies of the Stakeholder Salience Index
assessment for the four remaining assessments. The second interview was not scheduled
sooner that at least one day to allow the respondents sufficient time to complete the
assessments. Based on the attendance at multiple days at the conference, all the
respondents were able to observe this approach. During second interview, the researcher
captured the results of the assessment for the four candidate stakeholders, while recording
the justification for the assessments; additional responses for the influence of stakeholder
salience on value creation were collected as well. After the conclusion of the interviews,
the data was transcribed. The transcriptions and completed assessments were provided to
the respondents for review and concurrence. The verified data was then processed and
analyzed in accordance with the research protocol.
6.7 Analyze Data
6.7.1 Proposition 1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the
enterprise program value creation process.
The data that was recorded from the interviews was both quantitative from the use
of the Likert scale and qualitative from the justifications. The following presents the data
analysis supporting consideration of proposition one: The stakeholder salience attributes
influence the enterprise program value creation process.
The Likert scale used was an extension of the five point Likert Scale. This was
done to avoid confusion as the Stakeholder Salience Index assessment was based on a 10-
point scale. In accordance with the study protocol, the data was then placed into a
database for statistical analysis. Without the existence of previous literature to provide
insight on the expected distribution from this non-parametric analysis techniques were
used. In order to identify the relationships of the salience attribute and the value creation
process the following pairing were developed:
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Table 6-1. Pairing of Salience Attribute to Value Creation










Nonparametric techniques do not make assumptions of the distributions such as
symmetry, modality, etc. These methods seek to draw insight from the observations,
rather inference from the parameters that typically are used to define the distribution
family (Conover 1999). Most nonparametric techniques use the median as the primary
statistic for the measure of central tendency. The following graph illustrates the medians,
depicted on the Y-axis, for the nine influence relationships, depicted on the X-axis.
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From the graph, it is evident that pairings 12, 21, and 33 have very high medians,
and 22 is low. In structuring the test hypothesis, the objective is to structure the test so
that the presence of strong evidence will allow the researcher to reject the null
hypothesis. The null hypothesis when comparing these pairing constitutes a multiple
sample test. A multiple sample test that compares the medians from the samples is the
Kruskal-Wallis test, also known as non-parametric ANOVA. The null hypothesis
proposes that all medians are equal, while the alternative hypothesis is that at least two of
the medians are different. As is common with hypothesis testing a p-value is computed
and then compared against a pre-determined level of significance. The consistent level of
significance stated in Chapter 3 was 0.05. Upon inspection of the graph, it was not
surprising that the p-value for this test was 0.00.
Table 6-2. Kruskal-Wallis Analysis
Kruskal-Wallis Nonparametric ANOVA: Score
H: Median 1 - Median 2 ... Median k
H.: At least one pair Median i # Median J
Kruukal-WallIs Statistic (H) 96.677
DF 8
p-value (2-sided, adjusted for ties) 0.0000
We reject the null hypothesis that all medians are equal and conclude that the
influence relationships are different. Based on the strong evidence, the initial hypothesis
of stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise program value creation process
can refined.
6.7.2 Proposition 2: The program enterprise architecture influence
stakeholder salience attributes.
Using the qualitative data from the justifications provided for the Stakeholder
Salience Index assessments, the researcher processed the extended data to address the
second proposition as described Chapter 3. Again, the coding scheme used an approach
similar to correlation and not covariance to establish relationships. This approached
captured enterprise architecture influence either that enhanced the stakeholder's salience
sub-attribute, or had a negative stakeholder's salience sub-attribute; very similar to the
coefficient of determination whose range is (0,1) reflects magnitude not direction
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(Devore 2000). An influence that was "unimportant" was rarely used in the justifications
or was stated as having almost no influence.
Before providing examples of the extended data, the stratification that occurred in
the collection of the justifications was explicit in the structure of the Stakeholder Salience
Index assessment as the data was provided with reference to a specific salience sub-
attribute assessment. Examples of this extended data included the following quotes from
various assessments about different candidate stakeholders that had enterprise
architecture influence:
"They are the gate keepers. Anytime we have to request approval for
a change in required documentation, they have to approve it." (Process)
"They are in the hot seat. If they call and say they need something
we will try our best to provide it to them when they need it." (Product)
"We submit our requirements to our headquarters to make sure we
can do the work, but we know that those that make the decisions will only
give us 70% and hang on to the other 30% until we convince them we
need it." (Organization)
The results of the qualitative coding produced a frequency and intensity of influence
that was codified using the following Likert scale:












The results of this qualitative data processing were captured in a database, and then
analyzed using ordinal data analysis. The following table presents the median values for
the influence of the enterprise architecture (EA) views influence on stakeholder salience
(SS) sub-attributes:







Policy/EF 1 8 10 5 5 8 6 2
Strategy 2 3 2 5 3 2 2 2
Process 8 10 9 9 7 9 3 8
Organization 8 8 9 6 10 5 9 5
Knowledge 5 5 8 5 2 8 2 8
Infra/Info- 6 6 6 8 9 6 9 5Structure
Product 9 6 8 9 9 9 8 5
Service 8 5 5 9 5 6 5 5
The non-parametric test for ANOVA is the Kruskal-Wallis test. This test's null
hypothesis is that the sample scores should have the same results, while the alternative is
that at least one has larger scores. From the table it was anticipated the samples for each
of the influence relationships would be different. The following table presents the results
from this analysis.
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Table 6-5. Kruskal-Wallis Analysis
Kruskal-Wallis Nonparanetric ANOVA: OBS
Ho: Median 1 - Median2- ... - Median k
H.: At least one pair Median 1 # Median j
Kruskal-Wallis Statistic H) 5444.8
DF 63
p-value (2-sided, adjusted for ties) 0.0000
The result of this test produced a p-value of 0.000. Therefore, the decision was to
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the influence relationships is
higher than the others. This result leads the researcher to explore those enterprise
architecture views that either strongly or weakly influences the stakeholder salience.
6.8 Refine Hypothesis
6.8.1 Stakeholder Salience Influence on Value Creation
While Figure 4-1 has already highlighted several influence relationship that we
would expect to be important or very important, 13 and 31 appear to have scores that
indicate that may be possible. Using the non-parametric sign test, the null hypothesis is
that the median is equal to six and the alternative hypothesis is that the median is greater
than six. This test method was selected as it was evident that the observations were not
symmetric about the median, which is an underlying assumption for the alternative test
method, Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test. This hypothesis allowed for strong evidence to reject
the null hypothesis, which leads to the conclusion that the influence relationship is
important or very important based on the Likert scale. The results of the statistical
analysis for all influence relationships are presented in the following figure.
Table 6-6. Sign Test Results for All Pairings Influence Relationships
I Sanple Sign Test for Medians: Score
Ho: Median -6
H.: Median Greater Than 6
Interaction - Code 11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33
Count-- 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Median 5 9 6 9 4 5 6 5 8.500
Points Below 6 20 1 10 1 18 14 6 14 0
Points Equal To 6 2 0 5 0 0 4 11 2 1
Points Above 6 4 25 11 25 8 8 9 10 25
p-value (1-sided) 0.9999 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.9855 0.9331 0.3036 0.8463 0.0000
The results of this analysis permit the following conclusions:
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The influence of Power on Identification is not important or very important.
The influence of Power on Proposition is important or very important.
The influence of Power on Delivery is not important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Identification is important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Proposition is not important or very important.
The influence of Legitimacy on Delivery is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Identification is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Proposition is not important or very important.
The influence of Urgency on Delivery is important or very important.
Based on these conclusions, the following propositions are provided as a result of
this
Pla: Stakeholder Legitimacy strongly influences Enterprise Value Identification.
Pib: Stakeholder Power strongly influences Enterprise Value Proposition.
Plc: Stakeholder Urgency strongly influences Enterprise Value Execution.
Based on these refined propositions, the research addresses focusing the second base
proposition comprising the proposed integrated framework in Chapter 2.
6.8.2 Enterprise Architecture Views Influence on Stakeholder
Salience.
Given that there was strong evidence to suggest that Enterprise Architecture
influences Stakeholder Salience, the data is revisited to focus and refine propositions.
Continuing to use non-parametric analysis methods, the next step is to explicitly test for
important and unimportant influence relationships. Structuring the data set of
observations, the influence of each of the Enterprise Architecture views can be tested for
influence on Stakeholder Salience. This is accomplished using the Sign-test. Given the
ordinal values for the Likert scale selected, for an enterprise architecture view to be
considered an important or very important influence on stakeholder salience, there must
be strong evidence to suggest that the median is greater than six. Likewise, for an
enterprise architecture view to be unimportant or of little importance to influence
stakeholder salience, then their must be strong evidence to suggest that the median is less
than five.
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As there were twenty-five respondents, sample size may initially appear to be small;
however, based on the partitioning in the data collection for the influence relationships,
the observations increase dramatically at a rate of sixty-four observations per respondent
per assessment or 8000 total observations. This is considered a large sample size, which
helps the efficiency of the statistical methods. The results of the calculations for the
important influence are presented:
Table 6-7. Sign Test for Important EA-SS Influence
I Sajule Sign Test for Medians: X
H6: Median - 6
H6: Median Greater Than 6
EAV InfralInfo-Structure Knowledge Organization PolicyEF Process Product Service Strategy
Count (N) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Median 7 6 8 6 8 8 6 3
Points Below 6 298 475 245 479 190 185 431 908
Points Equal To 6 162 135 113 109 63 90 179 53
PolntsAbove6 540 390 642 412 757 726 390 39
P-value (1-sded) 0.0000 0.9983 0.0000 0.9886 0.0000 0.0000 0.9286 1.0000
Based in the examples quotations presented above, the results for Organization,
Process and Product are not surprising. However, the significance of Infra/Info-structure
is worthy of further discussion. The data that supported this centered on the fact that
while this program enterprise has been reengineered for new capability, the infrastructure
and the infostructure is being carried forward and does not require the typical start-up
investments. The insight appears unique to this context, especially when further analysis
reveals that this enterprise architecture view had very important influence on Moral
(legitimacy) and Utilitarian and Symbolic (power). While Utilitarian power can be
generated rather quickly based on the resource management scheme, Symbolic (power) is
accrued slowly over institutional generations (Hadley 1986).
The analysis now seeks to identify current enterprise architecture views that are
unimportant for influencing the stakeholder salience. This test is structured by testing for
significant evidence that the median is less than five. The results are presented in the
following table:
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Table 6-8. Sign Test for Unimportant EA-SS Influence
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
H.: Median - 5
Ha: Median Less Than 5
EAV Infralinfo-Structure Knowledge Organization Policy/EF Process Product Service Strategy
Count (N) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Median 7 6 8 6 8 8 6 3
Points Below 5 136 369 143 379 128 108 260 833
Points Equal To 5 162 106 102 100 62 77 171 75
Points Above 5 702 525 755 521 810 815 569 92
P-value (1-sided) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 100 00 1.0000 1.00 0.0000
The results allow the conclusion to be drawn that in the current enterprise
architecture, strategy is not important in influencing the current stakeholder salience. The
strict definition of the acquisition strategy is the plan to adapt the DOD Lifecycle
Framework to meet program specific milestones given cost, schedule, and performance
targets. However, in researching acquisition doctrine, a more appropriate representation
of strategy is the approach for the acquisition approach whether the system will use
incremental (block) delivery of capability or a spiral development where technologies are
integrated based on maturity rather than as a unified upgrade. When respondents were
probed about this perspective, the response was that the same efforts and oversight was
required for either "strategy" but there was a general expectation that spiral acquisition
should help mitigate schedule risk. The analysis continued to next perspective in looking
at which salience sub-attributes were influence in an important or unimportant manner by
enterprise architecture.
The existing enterprise architecture was important to Criticality and Importance,
both sub-attributes of Legitimacy, Coercive and Utilitarian, both Power, and Pragmatic
and Pragmatic, Legitimacy. These results are very insightful about the widespread
influence that Enterprise Architecture has on the Stakeholder Salience. Given the recent
reengineering for the program enterprise, this confirms the impact this effort had on the
program enterprise. None of the Stakeholder Salience Sub-attributes had unimportant
influence relationships from Enterprise Architecture. It is worth discussion the
previously mentioned sub-attributes of Moral and Symbolic. Review of the data
indicated the specific relationship of info/infrastructure was very high as discussed, but
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other influence relationships were moderately important. These results allow the refined
propositions to be presented as follows:
P2a-d: Process, Organization, Product, Info/Infrastructure have important or very
important influence on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
P2e: Strategy has low influence on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
P2f-j: Coercive and Utilitarian (Power), Criticality and Importance (Urgency),
and Pragmatic (Legitimacy) are most influenced by the current Enterprise
Architecture.
6.9 Enfolding Literature
Pla: Stakeholder Legitimacy strongly influences Enterprise Value Identification
This is related to this case based on recent findings about DOD acquisitions based
on Dominant Mission Emphasis (DME) for material solutions (Gillespie 2009). Initially,
it may appear that these findings are contradictory, where stakeholders that lack
legitimacy are influencing the value identification process; however, continuing to relate
the two findings, the results on DME actually help to substantiate the finding that
stakeholders that have legitimate claims such as end-users or their representatives are
provide the inputs for consideration in the value creation process. However, this does not
ensure perfect value creation as discussed in the next section.
Pib: Stakeholder Power strongly influences Enterprise Value Proposition
One of the major challenges in decision-making is the approach known as
alternatives-focused thinking. This approach has several shortfalls: viable alternatives
are not considered, objectives identified are only means to the address consequences, lack
of logical match between alternatives and objectives. (Keeney 1992) While Gillespie's
findings focused on the identification of requirements, the reason this effort is
informative is that the DME had been "socialized" through informal influence
mechanisms to stakeholders rather than technical processes altering the value proposition
(Gillespie 2009). This observation reinforces and amplifies the assertion of the need to
codify and understand the influence of stakeholders' power. From the case presented
here, it is evident that a holistic perspective using the enterprise architecture provides this
qualitative insight.
P1c: Stakeholder Urgency strongly influences Enterprise Value Delivery.
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In looking at the influence of urgency on enterprise value delivery, the two sub-
attributes of urgency are particularly useful: importance and criticality (Grossi 2003).
From the developing literature on enterprises, the approaches differ from traditional firm
interactions (Allen et al. 2004; Sheffi 2005; Womack et al. 1991). Such methods as 'just-
in-time" or kanban techniques dramatically increase the sensitivity to the timing of value
exchanges. This is holds true for both production and service related areas (Liker 2004).
In recent years, these approaches have been increasingly adopted by the DOD in all
institutional areas, especially those that directly support the combatant capabilities.
(McGrath 2010).
Given that the Value Creation Framework leverages "systems thinking" for its
feedback structure, where the feedback of the delivery process is an input to the
identification, one might consider that urgency would have influence on the Identification
process. Some literature on expedited decision-making would convolute or even omit the
deliberate process of Identification (Weick 1995). This is not the context for the
discussion presented. However, the question of influence is addressed using the data
analysis, Table 6-5, with a relatively low p-value of 0.3036. While this was not sufficient
to reject the null hypothesis, it does indicate that there is some evidence to consider there
is some moderate influence but not important or very important.
P2a-d: Process, Organization, Product, Info/Infrastructure have important or very
important influence on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
Reviewing these findings, the fact that the process, organization, and product are
important or very important to influence stakeholder salience are expected based on the
characteristics of bureaucracy (Weber 1946), the emphasis of the system engineering
methodologies employed (Redshaw 2010). However, as previously discussed
info/infrastructure's influence was principally due to the amount of info/infrastructure
existing. Manufacturing plants, operational information systems, etc. provided the virtual
and physical means to initiate the value creation process. With these virtual and physical
pathways in place, the organizations, process, were already connected, and provided
established product architecture.
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P2e: Strategy has low influence on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
Based on the strategic architecture for the goals, objectives, the business model, etc.
we find that all of this was established prior to the initiation of the program enterprise by
leverage an existing enterprise. This is interesting given that while the similar
organizations were utilized with 22 of the 23 organizations from Case 1 (two additional
candidate stakeholders were included), the business model was changed in terms of the
lead for systems integration. This role was changed from industry partner to the
government program office. Interestingly this had little change in the salience
assessment. The extended data reflected that this was principally to the well-known and
accepted rules for each of the candidate stakeholders through standard operating
procedures. This reinforced the finding of the influence of process and organization and
is supported by the organizational literature (Shapira 1997; Simon 1997)
P2f-j: Coercive and Utilitarian (Power), Criticality and Importance (Urgency), and
Pragmatic (Legitimacy) are most influenced by the current Enterprise
Architecture.
There is a consistent theme that is pervasive across these salience sub-attributes.
This theme is authority - the combination of power and legitimacy (Mitchell et al. 1997;
Weber et al. 1947). This insight for authority is an important finding from a theoretical
standpoint as it explicitly connects the influence that enterprise architecture has on one of
the dominant traits that exist for a given stakeholder in the bureaucracy. This finding
demonstrates that a holistic approach is necessary to align stakeholder salience within the
enterprise.
6.10Closure
This case examined the reengineering of an existing program enterprise to provide a
necessary capability to the combatant commanders. This material solution will fulfill a
principle value proposition through the requisite value exchanges among the enterprise
stakeholders. This is accomplished through the enterprise value creation process
(Murman et al. 2002). The stakeholders that comprise the program enterprise influence
this value creation process based upon their salience attributes. These case findings
conclude that the legitimacy of a stakeholder is an important influence on the value
identification; the stakeholder's power is and important influence on the value
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proposition process; and the stakeholder's urgency is an import influence on value
delivery process.
The stakeholder's salience attributes are influenced by the enterprise architecture.
Specifically, the process architecture, organization architecture, product architecture, and
info/infrastructure architecture are important influences on the stakeholder salience
attributes. The salience sub-attributes that are importantly influenced by the architecture
are Coercive and Utilitarian (Power), Criticality and Importance (Urgency), and
Pragmatic (Legitimacy). There were no Salience sub-attributes that did not have an
important influence relationship based on the enterprise architecture.
These findings are supported by current literature, but offer new insights and extend
the understanding of the relationships between two frameworks (Mitchell et al. 1997;
Murman et al. 2002). This understanding will be vital for advancing the four
perspectives of stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston 1995) and its impact on
engineering systems.
This case is significant in that this approach of reengineering program enterprises is
expected to increase with program restructures evident in this particular capability set.
Additionally, with expected budget reductions, programs that are not succeeding will be
canceled, extending the lifecycle for program enterprises that may be late in the sustain
phase for the material system.
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The three cases selected provided a rare opportunity to examine three acquisition
enterprises operating in a relatively short period of time with nearly complete replication
in all aspects of the enterprise architecture, candidate stakeholders, and value creation
expectations. However, given these similarities that results of the program enterprises
were distinctly different with one program lasting nearly forty years, the second being
canceled with out completing engineering and manufacturing development, while the
third is still very early in is operations and has yet to hold its first milestone decision.
By conducting the three cases independently,
7.2 Develop Initial Hypotheses
The initial hypotheses were developed as part of Chapter 3:
Proposition 1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise
program value creation process.
Proposition 2: The program enterprise architecture influences stakeholder
salience attributes.
These propositions will serve as the starting point for the iterative analysis
approach, leveraging the superset of data developed in the three cases by adding the field
to discern the case as a sample variable.
7.3 Crafting Protocols
While these propositions were refined following the case study methodology in the
respective chapters for the three cases, this cross-case analysis will treat the individual
cases as three samples. This approach for cross-case synthesis compares and contrasts
the cases and enhances the quality of the analysis by following four principles presented
by Yin (Yin 2009):
e Attend to all the data: All the data that was processed for analysis with-in each
case is used to provide a larger sample for the respective analytical factors. Given
the level of replication across the cases, these samples are consistent with the
notion of being from the same population - supporting general inferences about
the decision and conclusions for this cross-case analysis.
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e Address the most significant aspects: With the larger sample, this will increase
the sensitivity of the respective statistical analysis methods by reducing the
margin of error for the test statistics. It follows that those findings that were
consistent across the cases will persist, and those that were peculiar to a case will
not be apparent.
e Address all major rival interpretations: Leveraging the analysis for the cases,
those unique findings for a respective case can be identified and considered as
possible rival finding and reexamined for special circumstances for corollaries to
refined hypotheses.
e Use prior expert knowledge: Based organizational interest for this research,
several functional subject matter experts offered to review the findings to provide
a domain perspective on the results.
Using the superset of the database, similar non-parametric tests, such as the
Kruskal-Wallis test can be conducted for the influence relationships as well as to test for
differences across the samples. The analysis to compare the cases is vital to ensure the
internal validity for the research. If significant differences for the influence relationships
are identified the Sign test will be utilized to identify extreme influence relationships
based on the extended Likert (ordinal) scale.
As there was no intention of collecting data explicitly for the cross-case analysis, all
data was collected following the protocols developed for the individual cases. With this
intention, the pairings for the Stakeholder Salience Index assessments were maintained as
much as possible to reduce variation based on the assessment and corresponding
justifications for proposition 2.
7.4 Collect Data
Each case had used a lattice sampling approach. Changes to the pairing were
minimized for case 1 and case 3 where one candidate stakeholder from case 1 was not
sampled and three candidate stakeholders were added in case 3. For consideration of the
influence relationships for Stakeholder Salience on Value Creation, this resulted in 93.9
percent alignment between cases 1 and 3 with 83.3 percent of Case 2 observations being
aligned to cases 1 and 3. For the influence relationships of Enterprise Architecture
influence on Stakeholder Salience, this resulted in a 95.5 percent alignment of the
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assessments between case 1 and case 3. Case 2 observations aligned to 63.3 percent of
case 1 observations, due to the exclusion of nearly 13 candidate stakeholders from Case 1
and the addition of 4 new candidate stakeholders. These additions were principally due
to the different Acquisition Category level.
Using statistical analysis, the number of observations in a data set requires
significant consideration. Parametric methods for multiple samples often use pooled
estimates to account for differences in sample size. However, for the non-parametric
methods used in the analysis, the principle calculation is the ranking of the observation
among all observations. As a result, the sample size consideration is mitigated much like
the results of a probability plot where the percentile of an observation corresponds to its
position in the ranked list of observations. In a sense, this is sampling from the same
population, so observations will occur with respect to a similar measure of central
tendency. Infrequent observations that that may result in a larger sample having higher
rankings will also contain infrequent observations that occur that will result in the larger
sample to have lower rankings. This is true whether the population is symmetric or
skewed (Conover 1999). Based on this result, the Kruskal-Wallis test is also utilized to
examine the effects of the case that produce
7.5 Analyze Data
7.5.1 Proposition 1: The Stakeholder Salience Attributes Influence
the Enterprise Program Value Creation Process.
In each of the cases, there was strong evidence to suggest that stakeholder salience
attribute influence value creation. Using the superset of data, the following graph depicts
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Figure 7-1. SS influence on VC (Superset Data)
From the graphical analysis, the influence relationships appear to be different. The
Kruskal-Wallis test findings show that there is strong evidence to conclude that there is a
difference in the influence relationships.
Table 7-1. Kruskal-Wallis Test for SS influence on VC (Superset Data)
Kruskal-Wallls Nonparametric ANOVA: Scor.
H6: Median 1 - Median 2- ...- Median k
H.: At least one pair Median I # Median J
Kruskal-Wallis Statistic (H) 249.08
DF 8
p-value (2-sided, adjusted for ties) 0.0000
Bases on the p-value from this result, the decision is made to reject the null
hypothesis that the influence relationships are the same and conclude that there is strong
evidence to suggest that the influence relationships are different. This permits follow-on
analysis to examine each of these relationships.
7.5.2 Proposition 2: The Program Enterprise Architecture Influence
Stakeholder Salience Attributes.
The second proposition was supported in each of the cases and refined. However,
the findings in these refinements varied across the cases. Using the superset of data, the
same analysis used in the cases is performed to assess whether the influence relationships
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of Enterprise Architectures (EA) on Stakeholder Salience (SS) are the same or different.
As a summary of superset of data, the medians for the respective relationships are shown
in the following table.
Table 7-1. Influence of EA on SS (Superset)
Urgencyv Power LegithnacyUr0GW, , , -
Criticality ~moortw~ci coercee Symbolic lPreg..tic Morai Coanb.
Policy/EF 1 7 9 5 5 8 4 2
Strategy 2 2 2.5 5 2 2 2 2
Process 8 9 8 9 6 9 2 8
Organization 8 8 9 6 9 5 9 5
Knowledge 4 5 5 5 2 9 2 8
Sntructu 5 5 5 8 8 5 8 5
Product 9 5 8 8 8 8 6 5
Service 2 5 5 8 5 5 5 5
It would appear that the medians are different; however, in order to directly address
all the data available, the statistical analysis is used incorporating all the observations.
The results of this analysis are shown in the following table.
Table 7-2. Kruskal-Wallis Test for EA on SS (Superset)
Kruskal-Wallis Nonparmnetric ANOVA: OBS
Test Information
IH6: Median 1 - Median2 ... - Median k
H6: At least one pair Median I # Median j
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Kruskal-Wallis Statistic (H) 12184
DF 63
p-value (2-sided, adjusted for ties) 0.0000
The p-value confirms that there are differences across the influence relationships for
the levels that Enterprise Architecture influences Stakeholder Salience. This suggests
that further analysis is needed to focus and refine the proposition for the influence
relationships.
7.6 Refine Hypothesis
7.6.1 Proposition 1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the
enterprise program value creation process.
In each of the three cases, the propositions were refined to focus the proposition
leveraging all of the data. Using similar statistical analysis, it is expected that the results
will be consistent. This is due to the statistical method utilized - the Sign test.
The method essentially applies a binomial test on the proportion of success, defined
as an observation that exceeds the hypothesized value and then conducts a hypothesis test
where the probability of success is 50 percent. While the test has strong historical
precedence, the test is extremely versatile (Conover 1999). In terms of efficiency,
measured by the number of observations required for a test to produce similar level of
significance, the Sign test is at least 0.86 efficient compared to the parametric t-test for
any distribution, while avoiding the assumptions of normality that lead to testing errors
(Devore 2000).
Using this test to identify those Stakeholder Salience attributes (SS) - Value Creation
process (VC) relationships that are important or very important, the following results are
provided:
Table 7-3. Sign Test for Important SS-VC Influence
1 Sample Sign Test for Medians: Score
Test Information
Ho: Median -6
Ha: Median Greater Than 6
Interaction - Code 11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33
Count (N) 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Median 5 9 6 9 4 5 6 5 9
Points Beow 6 44 1 23 3 46 36 15 35 2
Points Equal To 6 9 1 12 1 1 13 23 10 2
Points Above 6 8 59 26 57 14 12 23 16 57
p-value (1-ided) 1.0000 0.0000 0.3877 0.0000 1.0000 0.9999 0.1279 0.9974 0.0000
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These results are consistent with the findings in each of the three cases for
identifying those relationships that are important or very important in terms of the
stakeholder salience attributes that influence the respective value creation process. The
following analysis continued this effort to identify any relationships that are not
influential.
Table 7-4. Sign Test for Unimportant SS-VC Influence
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: Score
Test Information
Ho: Median - 5
H6: Median Less Than 5
Interaction - Code 11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33
Count (N) 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Median 5 9 6 9 4 5 6 5 9
Points Below 5 22 1 9 0 38 23 2 26 2
PointsmEqualTo5 22 0 14 3 8 13 13 9 0
Points Above 5 17 60 38 58 1& 25 46 26 59
p-value (1-sided) 0.2612 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0013 0.6673 1.0000 0.5551 1.0000
Based on this result using the terminology of the Likert scale, the Legitimacy of a
candidate stakeholder is unimportant to influence the Value Proposition. This result will
be further examined based on the existing literature.
It is especially interesting that the findings were so consistent looking at the three
cases. In order to examine this perspective of internal validity, the Kruskal-Wallis test
can be constructed to test if there were differences in the responses. If the null hypothesis
is rejected, meaning there is a difference among the cases, this increases the validity since
the influence results may be different, but the important relationships were still











Figure 7-2. Case Median Confidence Intervals
Interpreting this graph, Case 1 was very consistent producing a 95 percent
confidence interval that the median is (6, 6), while in Cases 2 and 3, this 95 percent
confidence interval is (6, 7). Using this non-parametric method propagates the ordinal
scale, where if a parametric approach had been used, it is likely that the intervals would
have had decimal values based on the assumption of a continuous domain for the
population. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis is rejected and the conclusion
is there is strong evidence to suggest that the samples are different. This enhances the
internal validity of the analysis.
7.6.2 Proposition 2: The Program Enterprise Architecture Influence
Stakeholder Salience Attributes.
In reviewing the three cases, the refined propositions varied much more for which
Enterprise Architecture views influence stakeholder salience attributes; however, there
were some consistent findings. As previously discussed, the non-parametric methods
will account for the deviation in sample size across the cases. Similar analysis as was
conducted with-in the cases is conducted, with an expectation of those views that
consistently were identified as important or unimportant were persistent across all the
observations and provide strong evidence. The following graph illustrated the 95 percent
confidence intervals for the 64 influence relationships. The graph is not presented to
provide detailed values, but to reflect that apparent differences in the expected value for
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Figure 7-3. 95 Percent CI for EA-SS Influence Relationships
As the findings from using the Kruskal-Wallis test supported follow-on analysis,
each influence relationship was tested in order to conclude if there was strong evidence to
suggest that the Enterprise Architecture View influence was important or unimportant
and if a Stakeholder Salience sub-attribute had important or unimportant influence by
enterprise architecture views. The following tables reflect this analysis:
Table 7-5. Sign Test Important EA Influence Relationships
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
He: Median - 6
H1: Median Greater Than 6
EAV Infralinfo-Structure Knowledge Organization PoncyIEF Process Product Service Strategy
Count (N) 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
Median 6 5 7 5 8 7 5 2
PointBelow6 1014 1250 575 1380 506 612 1202 2242
PointEqual To 6 372 312 297 200 206 273 419 89
Points Above 6 1014 838 1528 820 1689 1515 779 69
P-value (1-ided) 0.5089 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 t.00 1.0000
These results reflect the Enterprise Architecture Views that were consistently
identified as important or very important in the influence on Stakeholder Salience sub-
attributes. Revisiting the extended data, this influence reflects the current state of the
enterprise architecture that is identified as important to influence a candidate
stakeholder's current assessment of salience. This does not imply that the other views do
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not have the potential to be altered. This distinction will be important as part of the
literature analysis and policy analysis.
Table 7-6. Test Unimportant EA Influence Relationships
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
Ho: Median -5
H: Median Less Than 5
EAV Infra/info-Structure Knowledge Organization PolicyIEF Process Product Service Strategy
Count (N) 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
Median 6 5 7 5 8 7 5 2
Points Below 5 646 994 338 1136 369 372 750 2072
Points Equal To 5 368 256 237 244 136 240 452 170
Points Above 5 1386 1150 1825 1020 1895 1788 1198 158
P-value (1-sided) 1.0000 0.9997 1.0000 0.0066 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Based on the results of this analysis, Policy/External Factors and Strategy were
unimportant in terms of there influence on stakeholder salience sub-attributes. This was
particularly interesting given the review of the literature that has significant references to
policy changes at the DOD level and the dynamic environment surrounding the national
defense enterprise. Based on extended data analysis, while the policy was either a
constraint, stipulating a task that must be done (that is not usually "value added") or a
limitation inhibiting an action that would lead to task accomplishment, it was equally
challenging across the enterprise and was not regarded as beneficial to a particular
candidate stakeholder. The researcher attempted to identify policy analysis within the
Army or DOD to triangulate these statements; however, the proponents for the policies
could not produce documentation of the analysis that lead to the specific policies that
were cited in the data. Likewise, strategy was not existent from the perspective of nearly
all of the respondents. When prompted to explain the strategic view for the program
enterprise, the respondent would summarize the DOD Lifecycle Management Framework
with what tasks needed to be accomplished to pass the next milestone decision.
Using the alternative view of which Stakeholder Salience sub-attributes were part of
important or unimportant influence relationships, the statistical analysis produced the
following results.
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Table 7-7. Test SS Important Influence by EA
1 Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
Ho: Median -6
Ha: Median Greater Than 6
SALSA Coercive Cognitive Criticality Importance Moral Pragmatic Symbolic Utilitarian
Count (N) 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
Median 7 5 6 6 4 7 6 7
Points Below 6 750 1402 1096 1172 1475 929 1157 799
Points Equal To 6 286 307 224 313 200 269 242 327
Points Above 6 1364 691 1080 915 725 1202 1001 1274
P-value (1-sided) 0.0000 1.0000 0.6422 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.9996 0.0000
These results allow the conclusions that Coercive (Power), Utilitarian (Power) and
Pragmatic (Legitimacy) were importantly influenced by the existing Enterprise
Architecture. These results are consistent across the cases. The sub-attributes of Power
were significant based on the resource management aspects for Utilitarian while Coercive
power was based on either approvals for actions or tasking authority. (Note: Tasking
authority is the term used for the authority given to an entity within a command structure
to give direction to other entities within that same command structure; this typically a
particular staff element in the command structure's headquarters.) The Pragmatic
(Legitimacy) sub-attribute had a consensus among respondents that the enterprise
architecture had "bureaucratic lock-in" for what a stakeholder could or could not
contribute, regardless of their abilities; this influence would even restrict their ability to
demonstrate this ability.
The Stakeholder Salience sub-attribute that did not have an important influence
relationship from the enterprise architecture was Moral (Legitimacy) as reflected in the
following table:
Table 7-8. Test SS Unimportant Influence by EA
I Sample Sign Test for Medians: OBS
Ho: Median - 5
Ha: Median Les Than 5
SALSA Coercive Cognitive Criticality importance Moral Pragmatic Symbolic Utilitarian
Count (N) 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
Median 7 5 6 6 4 7 6 7
Poin kBelow 5 528 1048 945 869 1267 667 890 473
Points Equal To 5 222 354 151 303 208 272 267 326
Points Above 5 1650 998 1304 1228 925 1471 1243 1601
P-valuejil-sded) 1.0000 0.1393 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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The results for Moral were consistent across all the cases and were concluded to be
the same with a Kruskal-Wallis test p-value of 0.395. These results have been discussed
in the three cases and the extended data only supported the responses that the enterprise
architecture did not influence the moral legitimacy of a candidate stakeholder. While not
directly related to the logic of the pattern of analysis, it was note worthy that the
minimum score for Moral (Legitimacy) was a 5.65 on the Stakeholder Salience Index
while overall the candidate stakeholder was not assessed as demonstrating other
sufficient levels in the attributes to be categorized as a stakeholder.
Based on these results the following articulate the over-arching propositions from
this analysis.
P2a-c: Process, Organization, Product have important or very important influence
on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
P2d: Policy/External Factors and Strategy have low influence on Stakeholder
Salience attributes.
P2e: Coercive (Power), Utilitarian (Power) and Pragmatic (Legitimacy) are
importantly influenced by the current Enterprise Architecture
P2f: Moral (Legitimacy) is least influenced by the current Enterprise
Architecture.
7.7 Enfolding Literature
A review of stakeholder literature illustrates the major themes of stakeholder theory
contributions extend primarily one or two (Laplume et al. 2008) of the four perspectives
(Donaldson and Preston 1995). Building upon the Stakeholder Salience Framework
assures that the four perspectives are embedded, and by integrating this framework with
the Value Creation Process embeds the enterprise engineering influences.
7.7.1 Proposition 1: The Stakeholder Salience Attributes Influence
The Enterprise Program Value Creation Process.
Pla. The stakeholder salience legitimacy influences the enterprise program
value identification process.
Value identification is the first process of the value creation process. From the
system engineering perspective this is the most critical (Sage and Armstrong 1999).
System engineers assert that unless the needs are clearly defined the system cannot meet
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engineering field and the enterprise value creation process (Murman et al. 2002). While
the comparison of the two supports a similar result for flawed value identification, the
enterprise value creation process is recurring with feedback and permits the adjustment
and refinement of the value to be created. This is one of the significant contrasts of the
two methods.
Stakeholder Theory as defined by Donaldson and Preston, has a normative
perspective: "The theory used to interpret the function of the corporation including the
identification of moral or philosophical guidelines..." (Donaldson and Preston 1995).
While many contributions investigate the extent of the moral guidelines (Driscoll and
Starik 2004), the normative perspective infers a relationship that this are implications for
the stakeholders' consideration of the results of the enterprise's efforts. This
consideration is clearly asserted with the discussion of the Value Creation Process. "How
stakeholders find particular worth, utility, benefit, or reward I exchange for their
respective contributions to the enterprise." (Murman et al. 2002) The question of how
stakeholders influence this value identification is based on the identification of
stakeholders and their sense of value. The findings provide explicit insights to close this
theoretical gap with respect to this influence relationship.
Pib. The stakeholder salience power influences the enterprise program value
proposition process.
This finding compares to the proposition that resource scarcity will initiate
stakeholders to leverage their power to ensure that necessary resources are provided for
their purposes (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974), in effect altering the value propositions with
respect to other now-competitive stakeholders. The benefit for this research finding is
that this influence is not limited to scarce resources, but based on organizational
objectives. As discussed in case 3, there influence of the salience attribute, power, can be
leveraged by stakeholders to alter the value proposition (Gillespie 2009) to support the
Dominant Mission Emphasis and focus capabilities on the decision makers outside of the
bureaucratic rules and policies (Miewald 1970).
Plc. The stakeholder salience urgency influences the enterprise program value
delivery process.
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In examining the sub-attributes of urgency, importance and criticality, provide the
temporal aspect to the dynamics of the stakeholder framework (Mitchell et al. 1997).
While there are many literary contributions that support the notion of the term, Urgency,
defined by Mitchell, et al, and infer a relationship with delivery (Dutton and Jackson
1987; Eesley and Lenox 2006; Magness 2007; Parent and Deephouse 2007). These
inferences are incomplete, addressing only one sub-attribute of the urgency (Dutton and
Jackson 1987), or dealing with a very narrow definition of value that is delivered. One
distinction that is informative for this finding is the distinction of the Urgency of the
request rather than the Urgency of the stakeholder (Eesley and Lenox 2006). This overly
constrains the time-horizon to discrete, countable requests - modem enterprises execute
demands for numerous value exchanges. With consideration of this literature, the finding
follows sound logic and is empirically supported.
P2a-b: Process and Organization have important or very important influence on
Stakeholder Salience attributes.
Within a military organization the common perception of ultimate power control
through the hierarchy; however, during periods of intense operational demands, the
challenges placed on the service force change resulting in adjustments to the decision
making approaches and governance structures (Miewald 1970). As these environmental
conditions influence the organization or modify the decision processes, adjustments to
governance mechanisms are made (Schneider 2002) influencing stakeholders' power.
This consideration of this relationship has been presented in recent Acquisition literature,
but not researched (Kotzian 2010; Wood 2010). One of the most influential works on
bureaucracy (Wilson 1989) presents that the enabling tasks and the organizational
structure must address the challenge of "autonomy" and "efficiency", defined very close
to power and legitimacy. From organizational theory, relationship of the task
environment and the organization structure provide the basis for the organizational
behavior in the larger context of the operating environment (Thompson 1967). With the
near convergence of the recurring insights, this finding is has a viable basis of support
based on the respective frameworks definitions.
P2c: Product has important or very important influence on Stakeholder Salience
attributes.
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Product was found to have an important or very important influence on stakeholder
salience in all three cases. This finding was not expected based on the initial literature
review, however, based on the insights from organizational theory (Gulati and Kletter
2005; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) this finding extends the premises presented. The logic
follows (tying together the seeming unrelated propositions): based on the products
architecture defined, the bureaucracy has established through differentiation, the task
specificity needed; therefore based on the product architecture, the stakeholders are
essentially determined from the aspect of legitimacy. However, the same research that
provides this certainty also considers the need for integration (Lawrence and Lorsch
1967), which organization theory also shows that stakeholders will attempt to alter
established salience levels by "enlarging the task environment" in which they operate
(Thompson 1967). Summarizing across the cases, the product architecture energizes the
stakeholders through their salience attributes, which then (as shown above) influence the
value creation process. This cycle is closed based on the established literature of value
creation's influence on enterprise architecture (Murman et al. 2002; Nightingale and
Rhodes 2004), which then influence other enterprise architecture views (Rhodes et al.
2009).
P2d: Policy/External Factors and Strategy have low influence on Stakeholder
Salience attributes.
The literature review discussed several studies that examined the macro-level of the
defense acquisition industry with analysis of the transactional economics (Fox 1974;
Gansler 1980). As a result of this type of analysis (Packard 1986), policies and laws with
wide-spread implications were imposed (Goldwater Barry 1986). However, also
presented in the literature review is the frustrated comments by senior leaders such as
Secretary of Defense Gates (Gates 2009). This perspective is not merely anecdotal, but
evident with continued research that identified the impotence of the policies and laws that
have been enacted (Brady and Greenfield 2010). Systems analysis term this type of
behavior as policy resistance (Sterman 2000) which is common when other dynamics are
energized by system relationships.
While consideration from the systems perspective supports this finding, it would
appear to conflict with the bureaucratic characteristics defined by Weber (Weber 1946).
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However, in close examination the of the characteristics the last characteristic is
particularly insightful, "...the management of the office follows general rules, which are
more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, in which can be learned..."(Weber 1946)
The two key terms from this characteristic is "stable rules" and "can be learned."
Resistance to organization change has already be identified as part of the behavior for
bureaucracies (Thompson 1967). As previously discussed, the influence of architecture
on enterprise engineering systems will facilitate the emergent behavior that contradicts
intended design efforts (Whitney et al. 2004). This finding helps to illuminate the
relationship between isolated architecture efforts and a well-espoused principle for
organization change management requiring a holistic approach. (Kotter 1995; Senge
1990). This conclusion for bureaucracy even contradicts existing stakeholder theory
(Jawahar and McLaughlin 2001) in that the expected dynamic lifecycle for organizations
is not witness when the three cases are examined with respect to their status in the DOD
lifecycle frame work. The preliminary stakeholder theory management perspective of the
resistance to organizational change may provide researchers a dilemma and practitioners
consternation.
However, the second view, strategy, as previously discussed, provides and
opportunity for additional consideration. The theoretical basis for this is the
consideration of the agent-theory (Eisenhardt 1989a) and the stewardship-theory(Davis et
al. 1997). Strategy has the ability to define the primary objectives, which can leverage
primarily extrinsic objectives such as agent-theory or intrinsic for subordination of self to
the benefit of the organization such as stewardship. Based on this stewardship theory, the
findings on the low influence of strategy for these cases may not be a generalizable
proposition in a strategic architecture aligned to the bureaucracy characteristics.
P2e: Coercive (Power), Utilitarian (Power) and Pragmatic (Legitimacy) are
importantly influenced by the current Enterprise Architecture
As this finding is persistent across the cases, most of the relevant literature has been
discussed that supports the finding or provides alternative perspectives, a summary is
provided. The salience attributes of power and legitimacy, while treated independently,
are the basis for authority (Mitchell et al. 1997) supports by system relationships.
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P2f: Moral (Legitimacy) is least influenced by the current Enterprise
Architecture
This finding was persistent among the cases. As stated previously, the observations
that assert the unimportant influence that Enterprise Architecture was deemed to have is
supported both in literature and recent research. As presented earlier, the perspective
afforded by stewardship theory supports the normative aspect of stakeholder theory. The
common topic that is related to concept is the research that focuses on corporate social
responsibility (Clarkson 1995). As clarified subsequent literature about the stakeholder
salience attributes (Agle et al. 1999) and sub-attributes (Grossi 2003), this ideological
parallelism is explicit. Other findings about this moral (legitimacy) present the
implications for moral (legitimacy) influencing actions or value delivery (Eesley and
Lenox 2006), but do not cite sources for the moral (legitimacy). Organizational theory
tend to allocate rationale for the source of this moral (legitimacy) in the context of an
individual's influence on the organization (Simon 1997). While this perspective would
be commiserate with the organization architecture view (Rhodes et al. 2009), the analysis
did not discern this influence relationship.
7.8 Closure
As one of the most cited works in the stakeholder theory literature, the Stakeholder
Salience Model (Mitchell et al. 1997) provides practitioners and researchers a framework
that addresses "who really matters" to a firm. Given the heightened awareness of the
phenomena of firms moving toward increasing strategic alliances, partnerships, or
extended enterprises (Dyer 2000; Gulati et al. 2000; Sheffi 2005), this research extends
the framework perspective from one that is external to the firm to one that is convergent
within the enterprise. The enterprise is the class of engineering system (Nightingale and
Rhodes 2004) comprised of stakeholders (Ackoff 1981) that exists for a particular
purpose (Ackoff et al. 2006). This purpose is to create value for its multiple stakeholders
(Murman et al. 2002). The previous systemic view of the how multiple stakeholders
interact with the enterprise was viewed through the lens of operational activity in the
value chain (Porter 1985). A more holistic framework must be applied to perceive their
relationships based on their position in the enterprise (Gulati et al. 2000) and influence in
the dynamic realization of purpose - the value creation process. Based on the influence
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relationships identified by the case study methods (Eisenhardt 1989b; Yin 2009), several
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8.1 Relationship of Theoretical to Practical Approaches
Of the four perspectives to stakeholder theory presented in Chapter 2 (Fig. 2-8), the
management perspective (Donaldson and Preston 1995) implicitly calls for theoretical
contributions that bridge the gap into the practice of the field. While the debate of having
to trade-off theoretical rigor and practical relevance continues, the goal appears to be
"synthesis of rigor and relevance at a higher level." (Gulati 2007) To this end, the last
task for the case study methodology is to provide policy implications. Based on the
findings of the case study, this is somewhat ironic given the little influence that policy
was identified to have on the value creation process. This chapter will examine the
impacts of the landmark study recommendations and associated directives, legislation,
and other forms of guidance that shape the DOD acquisition efforts.
8.2 Impact of Research and Studies for Acquisition
As indicated by Secretary of Defense Gates, there have been many studies of the
Defense Acquisition effort (Gates 2009). While the number of "130 studies" indicates
the prevalence of interest (especially given that a DOD study is a multi-million dollar
effort), it captures only those research efforts that were sponsored within the DOD and is
not exhaustive of all research efforts throughout the research community. With this
situational awareness, the expectation to provide a closed-form solution for all of DOD
acquisition would be "misdirected" (Sapolsky, Gholz et al. 2009). However, the
following discussion attempts to facilitate the translation of the findings into new
perspectives for the bureaucratic program enterprise.
8.3 Viewing Defense Acquisition Reform through a Dynamic
Enterprise Engineering System Framework
8.3.1 Early DOD Reform Efforts
Efforts to reform defense acquisition operations is old as the nation, if one
considers the story of the "breakdown of the American supply system" in 1778 linked to
the Continental Army's first Quartermaster Major General Thomas Mifflin (Payson
1950). However, for this report, relevant studies of acquisition began with the formation
of the Department of Defense (DOD) (Brown 2005). As the civilian control of the
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military is either an elected official or a political appointee, there is constant flux. Each
new leader does their best to improve the administration. Consequently, studies are
persistently ongoing to "fix" acquisition, though only a few efforts were "successful" in
being translating into law. This is deemed success in that either explicitly (by passing or
signing the law) or implicitly (by not hearing the inevitable court case to overturn the act)
all branches of the federal government approve the change.
Initially, efforts like the two Hoover commissions, 1949 and 1955, were principally
focused on the establishment of the Department of Defense. During the 1950s, Congress
did not use legislation to influence the DOD acquisition efforts based on a positive
relationship with executive branch, primarily out of respect for the sitting president's
executive experience. President Eisenhower was well known for his concern over the
efforts of the Defense Services and the Defense Industry (Eisenhower 1961). However,
with the 1960s, Secretary of Defense McNamara attempted to bring analytical rigor to
achieve the business efficiencies to the department. This analytical effort infused a
number of management science and operations research approaches to the value
propositions of the department. This was accomplished with the shift in the distribution
of the influence, from the service chiefs to the centralized analysts (Brown 2005). With
all of the focus on the decision-making efforts, smaller adjustments occurred in the
identification and delivery portions of the value creation process. These actions taken
were not popular with the service leaders (Wilson 1989), the customary program metrics
showed improvement (Brown 2005). Still, most of the changes to DOD acquisition
occurred within the executive branch. However, with the increasing involvement in
Vietnam, the rapidly increasing served to mask the inefficiencies that would surface later
and belied the significant post-Vietnam defense spending cuts. With plummeting public
support for the military and broad publicity for issues involving the U.S. Air Force's C-5
program, congressional leaders called for hearings over concerns of the apparent lack of
oversight for acquisition. Defense acquisition had become political (Brown 2005).
8.3.2 DOD Internal Reform Efforts
A number of initiatives resulted inside the DOD by Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard. The over-arching theme of the changes including the following themes:
0 Help the services do a better job
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e Have good Program managers with authority and responsibility
e Control cost by trade-offs
e Make the right decision right
e Fly before you buy
e Put more emphasis on hardware - limit paper studies
e Use the type of contract appropriate for the job
e Eliminate Total Package Procurement
These themes can be shown to target the value creation but only tangentially
leverage the influence of the stakeholder salience attributes. The first two themes clarify
the power distribution. The next two also focus on the methods used to support the value
proposition. The "fly-before-you-buy" theme and "emphasize hardware" are a reaction
to the C-5 issue but in general facilitate the delivery of value by encouraging prototyping
and accelerated delivery. The last two themes target the value identification and the
proposition aspects with identify the value exchanges and the mechanisms for these
exchanges. What is not evident from this effort was the necessary architectural changes
to realize the systemic adjustments in criticality and legitimacy. As a result, it would not
be long until the next acquisition crisis.
Successive leaders in the DOD would adjust their policy levers when confronted
with the next publicized program embarrassment, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. With
significant cost and performance challenges, the Army persisted supporting the central
tenant of its future infantry force (Brown 2005). While this is not the last program to be
identified as an example, the remaining studies seek to shape, stabilize, and reform the
entire military-industrial complex. This program also served as the impetus for the
Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, which established thresholds for program cost-overruns but
also mandates a reporting requirement for the Secretary (either Defense or service
secretary depending on the program acquisition category) to the Congress (1982).
8.3.3 Defense Acquisition Guided by Two Branches
The Cold War continued to escalate; the USSR invaded Afghanistan; Iran had taken
American hostages in the American Embassy. The election of Reagan provided the
political capital for a marked increase in defense capabilities. A report published by Dr.
Gansler (1980) provided the following warning as the nation prepared for the build-up,"
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the free market system is not operating to achieve economically efficient or strategically
responsive behavior in the area frequently referred to as the military-industrial complex."
To address these challenges, the report provided directions for further considerations.
These directions focused at the macro-level with ideas such as significant government
policy controls for the national resource of the defense industries. This re-alignment of
oversight from weapon-systems to functions, e.g., engineering, manufacturing, etc. is
much in line with the models of the value chain (Porter 1985) but at the national
enterprise level. This approach would require significant legal adjustment to include the
constitutional level. However, another study by Dr. Gansler reverses the call for strict
government constraints and limitations to coordinate their actions, but remove policy-
based "obstacles" and move to a consortium-based organizational structure for flexibility
and agility (Gansler 1995).
In the middle of the Reagan administration's effort to dramatically increase the
country's readiness, the government convened the Packard Commission to reassess the
status of the acquisition efforts (Packard 1986). The commission recommendations
continued the trend from Mr. Packard's previous guidance. The refinement of the link
between planning and budgeting aligned with the national security strategy; the
establishment of a direct linkage from the program manager to civilian oversight was
clarified to relieve program managers from the levels of bureaucracy incumbent upon the
existing chain-of-command; better requirements definition and cost-estimation, more
operational testing and live-fire testing. While these initiatives seek to address the
multitude of challenges, the following conveys the root-cause for the dilemma: "The truly
costly problems are those of overcomplicated organization and rigid procedure..."
Several more recommendations address other challenges evident in recent programs, but
this comment is the central tenet of the issue (Goldwater and Nichols 1986). As a result
of the commission's findings and immense interaction with the branches of government,
success was achieved with the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Locher 2002).
The effects of this legislation were essentially a change in the power paradigm from
the respective services (with DOD oversight) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Combatant Commanders and shaped how resources and warfighting requirements
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would be adjudicated. In the context of an enterprise framework, its purpose was to
change the value creation process significantly.
There were significant architectural changes as processes and organizations co-
developed (Murdock, Flournoy et al. 2004). The focus on developing joint product and
service architectures, once a deliberate strategic view was established. It would appear
that with this "victory on the Potomac," DOD should benefit and address the causes of
acquisition's many issues. However, as evidence, the numerous GAO reports that
continue to cite the services for their acquisition management failures as well as
academic research illustrate that the Acquisition system has not only failed to improve
but actually worsened the performance (Christensen, Searle et al. 1999).
In looking at the shortcomings of the effects of the legislation, policy analysis would
looks at the levels of the significant factors and the results to conclude that the policies
were not achieving the desired results. This analysis remains uninformed of the socio-
technical aspects of the organization as a part of the system. As a result, decision makers
lacked the rigorous analysis of these policies, strategies and other corresponding
architecture views. Implicitly, leaders are aware of this as seen in the following exchange
by Dr. Gansler in an interview with Andrew Butrica about the Goldwater-Nichols Act:
GANSLER: I think it really did have a transforming effect which we are
seeing today, probably only for the first time, the real impact of joint war-
fighting and the benefits that can come from it, in Afghanistan. And we
are now seeing technology that takes full advantage of that, so that you
have an airplane tracking a mobile target and sending that data to an army-
launched missile for real-time, in-flight retargeting. That's full jointness.
BUTRICA: That is a technological miracle compared to where things
were, say, ten years ago.
GANSLER: But we could have done it ten years ago. That's the point I
am making. It wasn't the technology that was limiting us. It was the
organization, the tactics, the strategy, and primarily the culture. When we
had AWACS years ago, the AWACS didn't have a link to a Patriot missile
on the ground. It wasn't that we couldn't build a link. Technologically, we
could easily build a link. Culturally, we couldn't build a link. Eventually,
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of course, we did. Those were the sort of cultural barriers to taking
advantage of technology and the changes that were clearly possible.
(Butrica 2002)
This critical insight demonstrates that nearly twenty years after publishing his
findings, Dr. Gansler understands the need to relate the aspects into a holistic approach
such as that called for by the Enterprise Architecture Views. Earlier in the interview, Dr.
Gansler acknowledged that the primary effect of the legislation was the re-prioritization
of the requirements (value propositions), but that the inertial resistance was great in such
a large organization as evidenced by the persistence of the "cultural barriers." From
systems thinking, policy resistance is a common phenomena as an artifact of the dynamic
complexity (Sterman 2000).
However, as senior leaders craft these architectural changes, the findings of this
dissertation demonstrate that these changes will influence stakeholder salience and
impact value creation. Such a "joint" approach has consistently been met with skepticism
and considered to lack legitimacy. While this legislation explicitly addressed the
pragmatic aspect of legitimacy, the moral and cognitive sub-attributes are not strongly
influenced by the enterprise architectures, based on this dissertation's findings. These
insights appear to provide a deeper understanding why the "long time" to address these
organizational issues. Through persistent exposure through joint assignments and
education in joint professional military education, the moral and cognitive sub-attributes
for legitimacy appear to be increasing from the data analysis, with the caveat that the
cases used were not in a joint program for comparison analysis. This is identified as an
opportunity for future work.
In order to continue to address the cultural aspects in the organizations, the result
was shifted to the individual level with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement
Act (DAWIA), initially enacted by PL 101-510 on November 5, 1990. Most of the Act
was codified in 10 USC 1701-1764.
The intent of Congress was that DAWIA would improve the effectiveness of the
personnel who manage and implement defense acquisition programs. While the Act
applied to both civilian and military personnel, it emphasized the need to offer civilians
greater opportunities for professional development and advancement. This would serve
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to shift the responsibility for weapon system development from the predominantly
uniformed officers to the government civilians based on the continuity afforded by the
civilian workforce compared to the higher turnover rates of the military reassignments.
While Goldwater-Nichols Act emplaces the critical incentives by associating
military promotions based on compliance with career paths with joint assignments and
education. DAWIA served to help incentivize both military promotions by defining a
career management with an Acquisition Corps proponency for military officers and
outlining a career path for government civilians of increasing rank. This was deemed
critical, as in most government civilian jobs there was little guidance on career path
progression for professional education, training, or employment. Again, the results for
the success of this effort are mixed. It has yielded a benefit; that is, increased perceived
professionalism for both the military and civilian acquisition personnel. However, the
significant effect has not been realized due to a disparity in the military opportunities to
lead larger programs (Acquisition Category I and II) and lead responsibilities with
civilian leadership occupying the deputy program manager roles predominantly (Garcia,
Keyner et al. 1997).
This disparity is also reflected in the selection and attendance of senior professional
education at the senior service college level without a noticeable change (Garcia, Keyner
et al. 1997). While the Goldwater-Nichols Act was thought to enhance the level of
professionalism of those current and future acquisition leaders, it has had little impact on
the larger acquisition challenges. These results are surprising to many leaders. The
Program Enterprise Stakeholder Salience Influence framework (Fig. 2-11) helps to
provide insight into this counterintuitive result. The desire of senior leadership since the
time of Secretary of Defense McNamara was to "have one person responsible and
accountable" for the program (Fox 1974; Gansler 1980; Wilson 1989). As part of the
candidate stakeholder assessments, the program managers were assessed as only having
legitimacy and urgency based on their central role for interactions between government
and industry stakeholders. When the data was extended to explore this emerging result, it
was apparent that the decision-making process and symbolic power of other four-star
command stakeholders limited the program manager to primarily be concerned with how
to manage the delivery of value. To summarize, the legitimacy of the position, buttressed
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with a high degree of professionalism, did not establish the envisioned role for the
program manager, but only served to help them with some program management tools
"to take the lemons thrown at them and to find a way to make it into lemon-aide" (Matty
2008).
8.3.4 Post-Cold-War Acquisition
The declaration of the end of the Cold War sent shockwaves around the world,
which amplified in the newly forming vacuum of defense acquisition. After nearly fifty-
years of intense development and reengineering, the defense acquisition system had lost
its objective function. With a number of claims from latent stakeholders that demanded
reallocation of the peace dividend, the defense leadership recognized the opportunity to
stabilize the nation defensive posture with a deliberate effort to dramatically increase its
efficiency both on the battlefield and in the institutional "back office" (Sullivan and
Harper 1996).
With the lack of progress evident from the previous studies that had promised
systemic solutions, Congress "increasingly involved itself in DOD affairs, demanding
information, scrutinizing every budget request and passing ever more stringent
regulations (Shiman 2005)." In response to the congressional pressures on the executive
branch and DOD, the Defense Management Reform was initiated to improve defense
acquisition and realize the objectives of the Packard Commission. Then-Secretary of
Defense Richard Cheney, led the effort establishing powerful governance bodies and
their associated extensive decision processes with the Defense Planning and Resources
Board, the Defense Acquisition Board, reinforcing the role of the existing Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and creating the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) (Shiman 2005). To impose better controls, the Defense Management
Review revised the general guideline documents, the DOD 5000-series, expanding it
nearly 15 times the previous length to 900 pages and coordinating with Congress to
decrease recurring required reports. This decrease is a significant bureaucratic event as
this decreased oversight increases the autonomy afforded to the DOD for acquisition.
Looking at the recommendations of the Defense Management Review, it is apparent
that an initiative based on purely technical solution changing the enterprise architecture
may not affect the endogenous relationships with stakeholder salience attributes that
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influence the value creation. The increased power of the DOD-level boards not only
compromised the pragmatic and utilitarian power of the services, but also mitigated the
service legitimacy into the critical value identification process with the JROC. While the
notion of integrating the service efforts to identify the necessary capabilities and
programs to achieve these ends would serve to reduce redundant acquisition efforts this
explicitly amplifies the challenge in a bureaucracy for autonomy. As with most reform
initiatives, this effort for integration has a historical precedence. During the early phases
of the "space race" that spanned from the launch of Sputnik in 1957 until the U.S. lunar
landing in 1969, the then-young U.S. Air Force was considered responsible for leading
the military charge to address this shortfall with the Navy in an unsettled back up
position. After several failures, the focus shifted from the Air Force to the Navy who
also struggled. After the success of Sputnik, the U.S. Army with its research efforts in
rural northern Alabama, Huntsville, that provided the technological breakthrough that the
U.S. needed to close the gap (Hadley 1986). Were it not for the failure of the leading
services to force the Army to acquiesce and the persistence of Army leaders to continue
to develop rocket science independently (with Dr. Von Braun), the outcome of the
international battle may have very significant differences than the current result. The
tension between cooperation and competition fuels the inter-service rivalry and provides
ample feedback to the stakeholder salience influence for value creation.
The Defense Management Review's effort met an unexpected six-month pause with
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces; the build-up of coalition forces for Operation
Desert Shield, and the amazingly swift victory of Operation Desert Storm, which served
as validation of the capabilities delivered by the much-maligned defense acquisition
system. The battlefield victory on strengthened arguments for downsizing the military
after the "Reagan Build-up" to realize the peace dividend; with the touted success of
highly technical systems, the pending realization of a "revolution in military affairs"
(Metz and Kievit 1995) strengthened the argument.
With the change of administrations in 1993, government reform was a top priority.
However, while significant reductions in military spending were approved, the same
defense strategy that provided the basis for the necessary capabilities remained
essentially the same. Using the Process, Organization, and Product views to reaffirm the
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current salience levels, the value propositions remained essentially the same. This reform
effort appeared to be another round of "the more things change the more they stay the
same."
The dynamics changed with the resignation of then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
and the confirmation of his deputy, William Perry as the new secretary. Perry having
been integral to the Packard Commission and a close observer of the Defense Military
Reform efforts was committed to driving reform down-through hierarchy of DOD. With
reform-focused offices established at the DOD and service levels, reforming was now
everyone's job in DOD. While there was much discussion about the wisdom of
removing the requirement for suppliers to meet military specifications, a potentially
significant reform initiative was the requirement of Total Quality Management (TQM).
The significance of this initiative is not the quantitative benefits to fiscal
efficiencies, although it was expected to help address significant challenges. The
significance is that approach of implementing an new management approach supports
one of the reform strategies that had been essential in previous acquisition programs such
as the Polaris System (Sapolsky 1972). This type of reform strategy calls for the
utilization of new or unfamiliar management science methods to help communicate
progress to the numerous and diverse group of stakeholders (Sapolsky, Gholz et al.
2009). The Dynamic Enterprise Engineering System framework again provides insight
as to why this strategy provides opportunities for success. The premise of the framework
suggests that successful strategies will energize a virtuous cycle in the dynamics of the
enterprise architecture - stakeholder salience - value creation. A sustainable continuous
improvement initiative, such as TQM, inherently addresses the business model (strategy)
through the process, organizational and knowledge architectures (Peters and Waterman
1982; Womack, Jones et al. 1991; Hammer 1996). These architectures facilitate the
maturation of other architectures (Rhodes, Ross et al. 2009) for info/infrastructure (Ross,
Weill et al. 2006), Product (Harry and Schroeder 2000) and Service (George 2003). As
presented in this research, these reinforcing dynamics help with the delivery of value
(Repenning and Sterman 2001), but as presented influence the value identification and
value proposition as well. While all these systematic influences were present to sustain
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this initiative, there was an important organization architecture aspect that balanced this
dynamic.
The civilian work force holds the majority of the mid-level management positions
(some politically appointed) associated with DOD institutional activities, and acquisition
is essentially an institutional process. These civilian employees typically have business
or engineering degrees. However, the military officers still hold nearly all critical
leadership positions in the management structure below the Service Secretary with
civilian deputies. The military professionals did not translate the TQM management
methods into their leadership processes for the process architecture. This aspect of
decision making is evident when one compares deliberate approach such as value based
decision making (Keeney 1992) with the intuitive sense-making approach (Weick 1995).
This dichotomy in approach can hamper future reform initiatives. If one of the two
management methods is not sustained, those who were initially supportive can quickly
become reluctant to support future efforts; conversely, those who resisted the change are
emboldened in their stasis (Repenning, Sterman et al. 2002).
The reform efforts seemed to have all the prerequisite factors needed for a
successful change effort (Kotter 1995). However, by the late nineties, DOD acquisition
reform and programs had not only stagnated, but conditions were set for a "death spiral"
(1998) with existing systems extending their lifecycles due to an ever-growing list of
replacement programs that were severely over budget and behind schedule. Leveraging
this situation as an opportunity, the Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki initiated the Future
Combat System program (see Chapter 1).
8.3.5 A Government at War
The following administration had great expectations for advancing defense reform.
For the first time in its history, the incoming secretary of defense had held the position
under a previous administration. Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who had previously served
as the youngest executive as the Secretary of Defense, returned to this position with years
of political and industrial experience. With another former secretary of defense, Vice-
President Cheney, to facilitate coordination with the senate, the DOD was poised for
acceleration in reform. The strategic context arguably changed in three hours on
September 11, 2001. With the terrorist attacks redefining war for most citizens of the
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United States, the Combatant Commanders now exercised active combat responsibilities
as part of the Global War on Terror.
Most of the country and much the world viewed the surreal images of the attacks.
The response to reestablish a defensible global order, the U.S. made retaliatory strikes in
Afghanistan. Soon after, the efforts expanded into Iraq. While the DOD and other
agencies rushed to engage with the enemy, the country was urged to return to its usual
activities to deny the terrorist's desired effect of changing the American's way of life.
The early engagements in Afghanistan and the initial conflict in Iraq first seemed an
encore of the early 1990s display of U.S. military capabilities, yet the antagonists rapidly
adapted their techniques to pose asymmetric threats. These subtle tactical changes had
operational and strategic impact on the material solutions provided to the combatant
commanders. The struggle changed rapidly from a battle of maneuver to a deadly
competition of innovation and adaptability.
As the intensity of the these exchanges and graphic images of the results increased,
so did the pressure of public opinion and political leaders on the DOD to provide the
necessary support to the Combatant Commanders and service members in harm's way.
Several highly publicized disagreements among the leadership in the DOD, Executive
Agencies and Federal Government resulted in the public attribution for the state of
activities on Secretary Rumsfeld. One of the significant points of contention was the
approach by the Secretary to use the ongoing conflict as the motivation to initiate the
transformation that was expected upon his entering the Office. Some questioned the
validity of changing the way DOD operated to meet the needs of the deployed service
members, while others saw the transformation as a disguised attempt at re-branding
"failed" reform initiatives. Nonetheless, using the Combatant Commanders as the impetus
for change provided the 'real-world' situation for adjusting the value proposition as
directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This shift highlighted numerous architectural
flaws with the process, organization, and products.
The process architectures demonstrate the lack of flexibility needed to aligning the
uncertain real-time requirements with the predictable annual-cycle defense management
methods. The organization architecture highlighted the lack of adaptability, the lack of
the necessary emergent behaviors, and the absence of skill sets to manage the dynamic
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task environment were straining the defense enterprises. The product architecture
exacerbated the system's struggles to achieve and sustain the necessary performance; the
rigid product set provided little or no help build the current capability set needed and to
avoid sacrificing the carefully designed, robust suite of advanced systems for the next-
generation battlefield.
Implicitly, those stakeholders that could fortify the existing architectures to sustain
their salience attributes. As demonstrated, by maintaining their salience attributes, they
could influence the value creation process and sustain the critical aspects of the enterprise
architecture. This type of system behavior predictable, as stated by Herbert Simon:
The individual who is loyal to the objectives of the organization will resist
modification of those objectives.. .the individual loyal to the organization
will support opportunistic changes in its objective that are calculated to
promote its survival and growth. (Simon 1997)
Government service, whether military or civilian, is based on the intrinsic benefits -
principally one's sense of duty (Light 2008). As demonstrated, the influence of
enterprise architecture has unimportant influence on a stakeholder's moral legitimacy.
Consequently, it will not be apparent that alternative architectures allow for continued
moral fulfillment.
Following the Rumsfeld's resignation as Secretary of Defense, he was replaced by
Secretary Gates. Secretary Gates' resume also boasts previous experience as the lead for
a Federal Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency. The change afforded a strategic
pause that resulted in a change in strategy by increasing the presence of forces in Iraq to
suppress and stabilize large areas. As conditions appeared to improve in Iraq, a new
administration entered the Presidency. In a nontraditional sequence of events, Secretary
Gates remained in his politically appointed position. However, it was clear that the
executive branch would reexamine current acquisition programs to validate the value
propositions (Gates 2009). Secretary Gates' findings prompted the comments (see
Chapter 1) that serve as the motivation for this research effort. Policy guidance has since
been issued that realigns several decision points along the lifecycle management
framework (see Chapter 2).
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One observation of future reform efforts may be evident in the handling of the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. Due to dramatic increase in the
effectiveness of insurgent terrorists attacks with deploying improvised mines to attack
mounted vehicle traffic, Congressional leaders and Defense officials circumvented
typical government process timelines and rapidly fielded a fleet of the MRAP's to the
deployed forces. While the vehicle is not impervious to mine attacks, it afforded greater
survivability, which meant larger mines were needed to inflict damage to the MRAP, in
turn driving the insurgents to seek other countermeasures. This fielding occurred roughly
within one calendar year. This is a significant achievement, in that while the timelines
were circumvented, the necessary (and legal) process steps were performed and provided
significant operational effects. While this observation is touted as a success, many
institutional leaders view this as a one-time exception rather than a model to emulate.
(Matty 2008)
Wartime funding for the services may had helped to arrest what Kotter in 1998
called the "death spiral" of DOD acquisition reform. Yet a decade later, it was unclear
whether growing budget concerns and the companion political pressures linked to the
national debt might set the spiral back in motion.
8.3.6 Current Reform Efforts
As discussed in Chapter 1, Secretary Gates announced several program
cancellations. This alone is not reform, but following up on administrative campaign
promises, the Executive and Legislative Branches enacted the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) (2009). The act essentially carries through
the reform themes initiated in the early 1970s by Mr. Packard, with targeted measures to
address persistent painful issues.
The WSARA's first measure was to direct the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
to seek input from the Combatant Commanders. The law also increases the requirements
for DOD to provide reports to Congress. Moreover, it and strengthens the Nunn-
McCurdy Act's consequences to programs that have a significant cost overrun with a
presumption of cancellation without pro-active Secretary-level actions to request
continuation from Congress.
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Other major policies continue to strengthen the centralized control of DOD over the
services. For example, a new cost analysis directorate has been created, allowing the
existing Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate to focus on program evaluation. In
this context, the term program includes acquisition programs as well as other efforts such
as training programs, organization structures, and so on. WSARA also mandates -
enhancing the technical acquisition process by adding a director for Life Fire Testing and
Director for Systems Engineering for assessing program plans. The act also requires
competitive prototyping, developing alternative models, unless an exception for the
benefit of the nation is approved. Moreover, the act provides new guidance on the
milestone decisions that control the progress of the program in the Lifecycle Framework.
All of these initiatives reinforce the general themes that have guided DOD acquisition
reform for the last sixty years. These themes are the following:
e Greater oversight and management control of acquisition processes by
political officials (elected and or appointed) by creating positions charged
with accountability and responsibility
e More rigorous system engineering and management methods to ensure
successful system development and eliminate cost overruns
e Re-balancing the influence of Combatant Commanders, actively engaged in
current operations, with the services long-term institutional view
In applying the Program Enterprise Stakeholder Salience Influence Framework to
previous similar actions, it was evident that the approaches used to achieve these
objectives attempted to directly alter the value creation process without consideration of
stakeholder salience and the influence of the enterprise architecture. Using the
framework to analyze the new set of policies, the following dynamic hypotheses are
formulated.
The first one considered is the intensified punitive actions as a result of a Nunn-
McCurdy breach. As was evident with Case 2, the consequence of the cost over-run was
the program was canceled. The stakeholders were aware of this possible consequence
very early in the effort; however, the breach reported until the last possible opportunity
prior to the milestone decision. This reporting was based on the same established
Earned-Value Management (EVM) metrics called for in this new legislation. Based on
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investigation results there were no lawsuits or criminal prosecutions so there were not
any negligent or illegal issues. From a policy standpoint, it does not appear that this
portion of the law will independently prevent programs from breaching the Nunn-
McCurdy threshold.
The next set of mandates does provide architecture modifications by establishing
several new directorate-level organizations. The definition of roles and responsibilities
for existing and newly created organizations has significant impact on the task
environment. However, at this level of policy, it is unclear how these changes will
integrate the requisite modifications for differentiation and integration for the process,
organization, and knowledge views. To demonstrate how these changes will dramatically
influence the stakeholder salience, we can examine one of the specific tasks assigned to
the newly formed Directorate of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE).
The DCAPE is responsible to provide guidance for the Analysis of Alternatives for all
programs for which the JROC has validation authority. This again is a shift from the
initiating Service that seeks to address a capability gap; not only in how the analysis is
conducted but also in how input is received from the Combatant Commanders. Based on
the research presented, this will have an important influence on the legitimacy for the
services, as well as the on power of the Combatant Commanders. This effect on the
Combatant Commanders, coupled with their high-levels of Urgency due to their ongoing
missions, provides them increased salience, which meets the intent of existing policies.
DOD now has entities that dominate all three of the salience attributes while the services
have significantly lost salience. This has important ramifications on the value creation
process. While this assessment does not pre-judge the impact of this legislation,
historically, when DOD overpowers the services, Congress utilizes its constitutional
mandate to allow direct interaction with the Services for value identification. If there are
sympathetic, influential policymakers on the respective appropriation committees, the
value proposition can be reflective when they determine the budget resource allocation
(Wilson 1989; Sapolsky, Gholz et al. 2009). This demonstrates the flow of changes in
the Enterprise Architecture, the relationships to the Stakeholder Salience, and the
possible result in the value creation process. While many refer to this as the politics of
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Defense Acquisition, this research provides the framework where this behavior emerges
based on the influence of the complex system frameworks.
While the law has been reviewed and appropriate directives have been provided, the
dynamics of these changes are just now being implanted system wide due to the annual
cyclical nature of many of the processes and organizational interactions. A more
thorough analysis of the implementation using the framework is warranted and would
prove valuable from a longitudinal perspective given the results of similar approaches
used in the past.
8.4 Policy Implications for the Bureaucratic Program Enterprise
The review of Acquisition Reform using a Dynamic Enterprise Engineering System
Framework is insightful to understand that interactions at the national enterprise level.
This effort can also help understand those policy implications at the program level. To
ensure the full context is apparent, the Program Executive Offices are analogous to the
multi-program enterprise level (Murman, Allen et al. 2002).
The initial motivation for this research effort was to understand the contribution to a
program probability of success based on the programs advocacy and the interaction with
the program enterprise. Based on the preceding discussion of reforms the level of
salience for a stakeholder is not only important to influence the value creation process,
but has important influence relationships based on the Enterprise Architecture. One of
the important insights from the review of Defense Acquisition Approaches (Chapter 2) is
uniformity of applying same system engineering process across all program enterprises.
As shown in this research, a stakeholder's salience will influence the value creation
process. From a management perspective, a Dynamic Enterprise Engineering System
Framework provides the enterprise an understanding of how a candidate stakeholder
influences the value creation framework and extends this to descriptive perspective, by
demonstrating how the enterprise architecture influences salience in the bureaucratic
program enterprise.
The acquisition enterprise has an established group to facilitate coordination called
the Integrated Product Team (IPT). This existing governance body provides the
opportunity to immediately impact and to directly correct this management deficiency.
This body would be the appropriate group to conduct an explicit review of the
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stakeholder salience assessment. Based on this type of assessment, each candidate
stakeholder could be provided feedback on their ability to influence the value creation
process in accordance with their respective program role. This type of instrumental
perspective would be beneficial for the individual candidate stakeholder as well as
stakeholders that serve in a facilitating role such the Chair of the IPT. Previous research
efforts clearly identify significant gaps can exist between a self-assessed salience
attribute levels and the enterprise stakeholder salience assessments for the respective
candidate stakeholder (Matty, Blackburn et al. 2008).
This research also provides clear insights for addressing stakeholder salience issues
based on the influences of the enterprise architectures. This prescriptive approach
presumes the ability to modify the enterprise architecture. The findings within and across
the cases suggest that the most influential enterprise architecture views for stakeholder
salience are process, organization and product. While the fields of study that address
these views independently are well established, an overarching field integrating these
views is still emerging (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004). However, there are insights that
facilitate this instrumental approach. Simon asserts that commitment to an organization
will facilitate adaptation (Simon 1997). Wilson appears to contradict this assertion in
that a bureaucracy will struggle to address a problem of efficiency while the organization
is concerned with its autonomy, which is essentially the ability to exist (Wilson 1989).
Lawrence and Lorsch provide the clarity needed with their rich discussion of
differentiation and integration, where the enterprise architecture can reaffirm the
differentiating capabilities of the stakeholders reinforcing their legitimacy, and asserting
power within the governance mechanisms to integrate the enterprise delivery. The
findings of research presented found little deviation of the stakeholder salience
assessments across the cases, even though current stakeholder theory proposes that
stakeholders should attenuate as a result of the (enterprise) organization lifecycle
(Jawahar and McLaughlin 2001). An example of the ability to influence this at a level
commiserate with the program enterprise is the chairmanship of the IPT. There are other
decisions that determine key implementation decisions for the program enterprise in
developing the products that are required at the enabling and leadership levels of the
8-18
process architecture that can vary across programs to best influence the dynamic
influence relationships presented.
8.5 Conclusion
Using a Dynamic Enterprise Engineering System Framework provides the
researcher and practitioner insights to understand enterprise system behaviors in a rich
sense based on the architectural influences on stakeholder salience and how these shape
the value creation process. This framework can be applied at multiple levels of enterprise
to provide dynamic hypotheses for policy analysis. These dynamic hypotheses are often
counter-intuitive due to the dynamic complexity that is addressed by the relationships of
the endogenous treatment of variables that are often treated as exogenous if not excluded.
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Review of relevant literature for this study, notably recent published reviews of
stakeholder theory (Friedman and Miles 2006; Laplume et al. 2008), supports the premise
that stakeholder theory has developed into intermediate level of theory (Edmondson
2007) with specific but diverse perspectives (Laplume et al. 2008). However, this
specificity has achieved at the expense of a cohesive over-arching theory (Donaldson and
Preston 1995). A provisional theory such as a Dynamic Enterprise Engineering Systems
framework can help reintegrate these complementary perspectives, both by leveraging
well-established frameworks that allow stakeholders to be identified and categorized
(Achterkamp and Vos 2007; Agle et al. 1999; Mitchell et al. 1997), and using system
analysis to yield for enterprise value (Murman et al. 2002; Nightingale 2002) provides
this holistic contribution.
The illustration of a Dynamic Enterprise Engineering Systems framework





Figure 9-1 Dynamic Enterprise Engineering System Framework
Through analysis of the literature of multiple disciplines (Chapter 2), this study has
sought to integrate relevant concepts across those disciplines, to identify theoretical
consistencies, and to close theoretical gaps, notably across the engineering, management,
and social science disciplines. Based on this literature review, stakeholder theory was
selected as the theoretical construct that provides the logical system-relationships
between enterprise architecture and value creation and still allows for dynamic
complexity.
Adapting two widely accepted case study methods (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2009), the
Stakeholder Salience Index assessment (Grossi 2003), and interview methods to extend
qualitative data collection efforts (Charmaz 2006; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Weiss 1994),
provided a protocol that addressed construct validity, internal validity, external validity,
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and reliability. Using case study methodology, three cases were selected based on the
logic of replication. Hybrid methods (Chapter 3) were used to triangulate the rich set of
data collected (Jick 1979) in a manner that was repeatable and reproducible and also
allowed non-parametric statistics methods (Conover 1999) to be applied to the resultant
ordinal data.
Using the research question "How does stakeholder salience influence value
creation in a bureaucratic program enterprise?" two initial propositions were posed:
Proposition 1: The stakeholder salience attributes influence the enterprise program
value creation process.
Proposition 2: The program enterprise architecture influence stakeholder salience
attributes.
Using the adapted iterative case study methodology described in Chapter 3 these
propositions were refined and focused based on the presence of strong evidence for each
of three cases studies (Chapters 4-6) and then refined based on a cross-case analysis
(Chapter 7). The resultant propositions in the context of a bureaucratic enterprise such as
a defense service agency are:
Pla: The stakeholder salience legitimacy influences the enterprise program
value identification process.
Pib: The stakeholder salience power influences the enterprise program value
proposition process.
P1c. The stakeholder salience urgency influences the enterprise program value
delivery process.
P2a-c: Process, Organization, Product have important or very important influence
on Stakeholder Salience attributes.
P2d: Policy/External Factors and Strategy have low influence on Stakeholder
Salience attributes.
P2e: Coercive (Power), Utilitarian (Power) and Pragmatic (Legitimacy) are
importantly influenced by the current Enterprise Architecture.
P2f: Moral (Legitimacy) is least influenced by the current Enterprise
Architecture.
Based on these new propositions, the significant policy initiatives were reviewed
using a Dynamic Enterprise Engineering Framework. Despite the influence of policy on
value creation for the enterprise and its stakeholders (P2f), a review of defense agency
policy initiatives (Chapter 8) pointed up the practical hindrances to driving and sustaining
value creation in the defense acquisition system, and how reform resistance can stymie
policy aimed at reversing the system's degrading performance and breaking what has
been called a "death spiral" in the system (1998). Further, current efforts and several
methods are alternatives for modifying the program enterprise architecture were
presented (Chapter 8.4) that could dynamically influence stakeholder salience and the
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value creation process to provide reinforcing systemic behavior within the existing
management hierarchy of the defense acquisition system.
9.2 Future Work
While the Dynamic Enterprise Engineering Systems framework has both theoretical
and practical potential to close significant gaps in stakeholder, the Army's senior
leadership, when briefed on the emergent findings, asked the expected question: "How
will this help us provide the necessary capabilities to the war fighter?" This section will
address this request as well as identify several other research opportunities that were
outside the scope of the current research effort.
9.2.1 Testing the Propositions Across Program Enterprise Factors
Using the case study methodology, replication logic guided the selection of the
cases. As discussed in Chapter 3, the effect of this logic was to identify cases as similar
as possible. While the results presented have high construct validity, based upon the
approach of having key informants' review of the draft case study report (Yin 2009),
when testing theoretical constructs, it is desirable gain insights as to whether the theory is
a process-based construct or a variability-based construct. Using the case study
replication logic, the constructs provided are intended to be process-based; however, the
notion of robustness is desirable from an applied research perspective. Based on this
opportunity, the repeatable and reproducible aspects of this research protocol, this effort
is feasible. Additionally, with respect to the third case, not only is the program enterprise
very early in its lifecycle, but it is on an accelerated schedule, which would make it a
strong candidate for a longitudinal case study.
Both of these opportunities would serve to strengthen or refine the constructs
presented. Specifically, future efforts could include research to:
e Test the generalizability of this study's theoretical constructs across different
programs
e Develop a self-administered Enterprise Architecture assessment for Enterprise
Architecture Views
e Refine the Stakeholder Salience Index assessment to incorporate Enterprise
Architecture Influence
e Investigate Stakeholder Salience Alignment on Enterprise Value Creation
9.2.2 Stakeholder Alignment
During previous efforts to develop a description of an enterprise architecture for the
current state and a proposed future state (Matty et al. 2008), a question arose that was
similar to the Army senior leaders' question: "What are the management decisions that
are appropriate to enhance a multi-program enterprise's ability to deliver value in a
dynamic and uncertain environment?" Without the insights of a Dynamic Enterprise
Engineering System framework, past decisions to alter the enterprise architecture have
occurred without sufficient understanding of either (a) the influences that Stakeholder
Salience has on the value creation process, or (b) the impetus of the policy resistance
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and dynamic complexity that Enterprise Architecture views have through a series of
influence relationships on value creation. Building upon the findings from the
propositions, comparative analysis of the stakeholders' salience and their influence on the
value creation process would enhance the instrumental perspective of this stakeholder
theory. The analysis results could be used within the framework of relationships
identified between the enterprise architecture views and the stakeholder salience
attributes leveraging the framework to develop generalized models and methods for
characterizing, designing, and evaluating enterprise architectures (Rhodes et al. 2009).
9.3 Conclusion
In 1989, the Cold War ended with the rapid disintegration of the USSR. The
depleted Soviet military could no longer suppress the dynamic social forces because of
the hemorrhaging of resources during the Afghanistan War. This defeat was a result of
two separate campaigns. One was the ground campaign in central Asia. The other, played
out in research laboratories and manufacturing facilities, was the campaign to compete in
the weapons race with the United States. Their inability to conduct combat operations
while sustaining the weapons acquisition lifecycle bankrupted the country and resulted in
their defeat. This lesson in political science and technology policy is alarming given the
status of the United States' commitments and global operations.
It is apparent from the actions by the United States government that the increasing
acquisition system failures are a strategic concern for both national and international
security (Hoffman 2009). In spite of nearly forty years of incrementally forcing business
efficiencies and more rigorous engineering management methods in policy to reengineer
the system, the trend of increasing program enterprise failures have not reversed (GAO
2009). This overt demonstration of policy resistance (Sterman 2000) in a large-scale,
complex system typifies the needs for an emerging field, founded in multiple disciplines,
such as engineering systems (Moses 2004).
This research presented sets the stage for advancing a provisional theory such as the
Dynamic Enterprise Engineering Systems framework to address the theoretical gap from
a multidiscipline perspective; however, the contributions presented offer applied research
opportunities that could support efforts to address the systemic challenges for the DOD
acquisition. Based on historical precedence, the development of approaches and
solutions to address these challenges is highly beneficial. Failure to do so will have
significant strategic implications at the national and international level.
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